# Heidegger K – CNDI 2014

### Argument Description / Affirmative Strategy

#### This kritik is about our relationship to nature and the environment. Heidegger talks about “technological thought”, which is the way that we look at things as resources, calculate their value, use cost-benefit analysis, think only with technological solutions, etc. The argument is that technological thought causes us to devalue nature in itself, and only focus on its ability to provide for ourselves, which causes us to exploit and use it up and damage it without caring. We are accusing the affirmative of thinking about the environment technologically. Instead, we should think phenomenologically – that simply means that we should first look at our experience of nature, and understand that it has value in itself other than what we can gain from it, and that we should have reflective consideration of how we relate to the environment before we take action, letting nature exist without our intervention.

#### On the affirmative, we have a couple possible responses. You can say that science and technology can be good in some instances (specifically your aff) and advocate a permutation, to enact your aff as a good example of technology while critically reflecting about the problems with pure technological thought. You can challenge the alternative, and say that we need to ignore vague philosophical questions and focus on concrete policy action, because the problems that we need to solve are too important. The argument is that refusing to act, and only thinking, allows environmental destruction and security threats to continue. There are also specific criticisms of Heidegger – he was associated with the Nazi party, and his philosophy is often viewed as thinking that humans (with their special form of being) are more important than animals, and both of those arguments are possible reasons why we should not use the alternative.

### 1NC Short

#### The aff’s calculative approach to the environment makes ecological destruction and extinction inevitable. Vote neg to reject their call for technological solutions and endorse eco-phenomenology – only a radical mindset shift allows us to break free of accelerating the environmental crisis.

Brown 3 (Charles S. Brown, Professor of Philosophy at Emporia State University, “The Real and the Good: Phenomenology and the Possibility of an Axiological Rationality” in “Eco-Phenomenology: Back to the Earth Itself”, 2003, http://muse.jhu.edu/books/9780791487280)

To begin to discover the possibilities in such an encounter, we will first examine Husserl’s critique of naturalism. His critique helps us to see that the modern enframing of nature results in a conception of nature consisting entirely of extensional properties related to each other within a causal matrix. Such an enframing leads to moral, social, and political crisis as the value-free conceptions of rationality and objectivity supporting such naturalism dismiss the Good as subjective preference and thus remove questions of value from rational discourse. In reducing all reality to extension and causality, naturalism separates the Good from the Real, ultimately making moral philosophy impossible. The recognition of such an impossibility is apparent in the early-twentieth-century move away from normative ethics to metaethics. 1 Husserl’s critique of naturalism helps us to see that a great deal of modern moral philosophy, including some aspects that make the development of an ecological ethics difficult, is based on an uncritical appropriation of the account of objectivity developed to epistemically support naturalistic metaphysics. As we will see in the last part of the chapter, some aspects of Husserl’s theory of intentionality can be adapted to provide new directions for developing an account of an axiological rationality that would be open to the claim that there is goodness and value within nonhuman nature. Such a form of rationality, based in the dialectics of empty and filled intentions, would begin to provide a discourse in which the goodness and value of nonhuman nature could be registered, expressed, and articulated in a rational manner, thus providing an experiential, if not a metaphysical, grounding of an ecological ethics. Husserl’s rather passionate critique of the evils of naturalism make him a clear but unnoticed ally of contemporary ecological philosophers who have argued that there are important and largely unnoticed connections between our worldviews, metaphysical systems, and forms of rationality, on the one hand, and social and environmental domination, on the other. Such philosophers, often known as Radical Ecologists, typically are social ecologists, deep ecologists, or eco-feminists. According to their specific diagnoses, each offers suggested cures involving some kind of revolution in thinking that would produce the kind of spiritual metanoia needed to develop and sustain socially just and environmentally benign practices. Radical Ecologists share the conviction that the massive ecological damage we are witnessing today, as well as inequitable and unjust social arrangements, are the inevitable products of those ways of thinking that separate and privilege humanity over nature. The Radical Ecologists’ call to overcome this kind of thinking and replace it with a new understanding of the humanity-nature relation that would result in the emergence and maintenance of environmentally benign practices requires a rethinking of both the meaning of humanity and the meaning of nature in which normative and ontological issues are at stake. Such questions lie in the very interesting crossroads of metaphysics and value theory but also intersect with a Green political agenda and (forgive the term) a “spiritual” quest for the cultivation of a new state of humanitas 3 that transcends the relative barbarism of homo centrus centrus. The Radical Ecologists see this damage as symptomatic of a deeper disorder embedded within the humanity-nature relation. It is embedded within the way nature and humanity are experienced in daily life, in myth, in literature, and in abstract thought. To the extent that the ecological devastation we witness today is the result of anthropocentrism, androcentrism, or a dualistic value-hierarchical worldview (as many have 2 4 claimed), the ecological crisis is a crisis of meaning. It is ultimately the meaning of nature and humanity that is at stake. As such it can be managed, solved, or perhaps overcome by new myths or improvements in thinking that would reconceptualize the boundaries, as well as the content, of our understanding of humanity and nature. For the existential philosopher, the roots of the ecological crisis may be much deeper than the Radical Ecologists realize. The humanity-nature disorder is perhaps best conceived as a manifestation of the tendency toward alienation inherent in the human condition, one that operates prior to any particular meaning system. This tendency toward alienation, leading to war and oppression in the past, has now been coupled with the technological power to sustain a massive homo centrus centrus population explosion, the by-products of which are poisoning and dismantling the Earth’s bio-web. There is a certain irony here as the realization of massive ecological destruction occurs just when we had thought that our science and technology would save us from the ravages of the organic world. Instead we find ourselves hurtling toward or perhaps through an irrevocable tear in the fabric of the planetary biotic web (and perhaps beyond). Dreams of technological Utopia have been replaced overnight by nightmares of ecological holocaust. The existential philosophers remind us that the replacement of one conceptual system for another is not enough unless there occurs with it a corresponding shift or lifestyle change that actually ushers in a new mode of being for humanity. Such thinking reinforces the claim of radicality within the projects of Radical Ecology. Phenomenology’s specific contribution to ecological philosophy begins in the attitude of respect for experience that it shares with ecological philosophy and many environmentalists. Just as Thoreau, Muir, and Leopold describe the world in such a way that the experiencing of the world is an integral part of it, and in doing so show us broader possibilities of experience, phenomenology as a philosophical method begins with a respect for experience and ultimately grounds all meaning in experience. Phenomenology is a method of philosophical research that describes the forms and structures of experience as well as a critique of those ways of doing philosophy that operate from a naïve standpoint. The description of experience is an attempt to return to the “things-themselves” rather than simply taking for granted higher-level, culturally sedimented idealizations and abstractions that often pass for ahistorical metaphysical discoveries. Phenomenology seeks to describe the meaning within experience and to uncover the experiential phenomena on which categories of higher-level philosophical discourse are founded and in which those experiential phenomena are embedded. Aphenomenological approach to moral philosophy 6 begins with descriptions of moral experience, while a 5 phenomenological natural philosophy begins with descriptions of encounters with life-worldly nature, that is, the nature we experience prior to theoretical abstraction. The naïve standpoint, which is simply our natural taken-for-granted involvement with the world, is initially undermined by the uniquely phenomenological method of epoche¯, which requires a philosophical abstention from everyday metaphysical and normative commitments. From this perspective, theories, ideologies, traditions, and discourses are revealed as historically and intentionally constituted. From the phenomenological perspective, there is no one correct tradition, theory, or discourse, although from this perspective we do see that there are many worlds, traditions, and theories that claim to be privileged. 7 The phenomenological reduction helps to free thinking from its natural ideological naiveté by adopting such a position of ontological neutrality. By a “bracketing” of the realistic assumptions of everyday consciousness, we are in a position to see that the world and the things in it are only given to us through the interpretative and meaning-bestowing function of our intentional acts. Husserl’s steady development of this method eventually led to the discovery of the everyday world of pretheoretical experience, viz., the lifeworld, which serves as the sense foundation for the idealized and historically constituted typifications of the human and social sciences. It is within this lifeworld of direct and immediate experience that we may begin to find an experiential grounding of an ecological ethics. Phenomenology exemplifies an attitude of respect for lived experience. Unlike naturalism, phenomenology does not seek to dismiss experience as subjective, nor does it wish to replace or reduce experience with or to a more fundamental or more basic mode of being. A phenomenological philosophy is one that remains close to our original experience, respects that experience, and seeks to find within experience a measure of rationality and truth. To this extent all phenomenology begins with a critique and rejection of metaphysical naturalism, which disrespects and seeks to eliminate, reduce, or replace experience.

### 1NC Long

#### [Insert specific link]

#### This calculative managerial approach to the environment ensures extinction – technological thinking makes ecological destruction inevitable – only breaking free of this mindset can preserve the Earth and environmental ethics.

Brown 3 (Charles S. Brown, Professor of Philosophy at Emporia State University, “The Real and the Good: Phenomenology and the Possibility of an Axiological Rationality” in “Eco-Phenomenology: Back to the Earth Itself”, 2003, http://muse.jhu.edu/books/9780791487280)

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#### Vote neg to let being be – the alt refuses the call for technical mastery of nature and allows the world to reveal itself instead of being violently challenged forth – only taking no action creates the possibility for being to transcend calculative power relations.

Joronen 10 (Mikko Joronen, Ph.D. in Geography at the University of Turku, “The Age of Planetary Space”, 2010, <http://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/66733/AnnalesAII257Joronen.pdf>)

The ambiguity between the overcoming and incorporation of metaphysics – the overcoming of the metaphysical constitution of being through an incorporation of the originary abyssality of be-ing with a hope of its transformation into what Heidegger calls the ‘other beginning’ – is above all connected with the fact that Heidegger, especially in his later thought, aims to show how all human dwelling, including our contemporary metaphysical sojourning in the planetary machination, takes place through the sites of unfolding. Hence, in order to overcome the metaphysics of planetary machination, the violent manipulation of the earth into a planetary globe, we need, not just to recover the hidden Event that appropriated machination from the ‘abyssal plenitude’ in the first place (by concealing its openness), but also to show how this fundamental abyssal realm of openness is connected to the earth-site aspect of the unfolding. As an alliance between non-violent letting-be of the earth – the realm of self-emerging things – and thinking that ‘remembers’ the originary abyssal groundlessness of be-ing – the an-arkhe underneath all metaphysical grounds – incorporation of being into non-metaphysical dwelling is obligated to provide more than a plain nihilation of all groundings, which is nothing but praise for a negative nothingness affording absolute emptiness and nihilist nomadism of the (late)modern way of life. Instead of total nihilation, this incorporation of abyssal being follows the earth without violently manipulating it: ‘Heideggerean resistance’ developed herein is a critique of prevailing world-disclosure, the manipulative grounding of planetary machination, that attempts to explicitly rationalize and capture the earth, bind, control, and secure it (de Beistegui 2007:17; Dreyfus 1993:299–300). Such resistance of the world-disclosure of machination, then, marks another form of power, a force otherwise than the will to power, a force that comes from the fundamental source of be-ing itself, and thus, because of the alliance between being and earth, shows itself as a power of abyssal openness of the earth, as a site of non-violent letting of the open and abyssal earth. Moreover, if the fundamental resistance comes from the united force of earth and abyssal being, instead of making new human efforts that underline the mastery of machination, the will-centred manipulative making, ordering, and mastering of the earth, resistance requires that we let the unity of earth and be-ing make the transformation. In other words, the overcoming of the contemporary epoch of planetary mastery of machination requires a ‘power-free-letting-be’ of the violence machination implicates; that is to say, a way of thinking that eventually enables the non-metaphysical dwelling in the earth-sites of abyssal being. As the sentence above indicates, the resistance of machination is based on two interrelated notions: first, to our power-free letting-be of the machination of things, and second, to such dwelling, which instead of the total capture of things through metaphysical grounding is based on letting of the earth-sites of abyssal being. The point of the former notion about our letting-be of the power of machination, however, is not to emphasize the forceless passivity that simply lets-the-world-spin-as-it-now-spins, but to enable recognition of the veiled alreadiness of the metaphysical machination of being, and out of this, an unfolding of the earth through a site that is no longer operative in terms of metaphysics of manipulative power (Heidegger 1966a:54–55). Thus, it is this kind of ‘meditative thinking’ (Besinnung) that ‘lets-be’ and ‘releases’ (Gelassenheit), which makes possible the latter notion, the human dwelling in the non-metaphysical sites of being. In other words, it is the recognition of the hidden absence of every securing world-disclosure of being, their nature as finite Events that only attempt to rationalize and define the inexhaustible and abyssal earth (the earth that has supported and will support the multiplicity of worlds), which allows a position between the secure dwelling and its (insecure) finitude, a dwelling in the sites of finitude. Altogether, the relation between the former notion concerning the question ‘how to resist the prevailing unfolding’ (i.e. through human Gelassenheit, by ‘letting-be’) and the latter notion concerning ‘what constitutes the fundamental power of transformation’ (i.e. the abyssal earth set in power by the recognition of the finite happening of being, das Ereignis) has the following consequences. Firstly, the resistance based on human ‘letting-be’ (Gelassenheit) of the prevailing subject-centred power of willfull machination should be understood as a chance for a letting-be-seen of more fundamental power of the Event of being (das Ereignis), as a letting-be-seen of what has always already ruled without being revealed. Since it is human Gelassenheit that leads to the awakening of the foundational finitude of all grounds of being – to the awakening of the hidden truth about the alreadiness of the Event (das Ereignis) – the primary target of ‘letting-be’ is to wake up a sense of absence (Ab-) of the prevailing ground (Grund) of being, a sense about its finitude (Polt 2006:121). Secondly, since letting-be thereby awakens a sense about the finitude of the mastery of the prevailing power of calculative machination, it also enables the fundamental ontological resistance of the conditions that ground the current planetary epoch. Altogether, the letting-to-be-seen of finite Ereignis signifies a fundamental form of resistance, since it includes a nihilating force that refuses all one track courses of ontological grounding and thus guarantees the possibility of fundamental transformation based not on human beings, who are always positioned by the unfolding of being, but upon abyssal being. Moreover, Gelassenheit does not just signify a plain critique of the moulded alreadiness of the prevailing metaphysical world-disclosure but also a decisive affirmation of the becoming of being, a futural breaking open to the ‘other beginning’ from the midst of the planetary power of machination (Heidegger 2006:18). In its most basic sense, the word Gelassenheit, the letting-be, refers to human ‘release’ from the manipulative moulding of things, and thus, to the recognition and rejection of the rule of the prevailing ground of being, the power of machination (e.g. Käufer 2005:488; Zimmerman 1993:241). Through its letting-be the calculative power of machination, its one track course of manipulative and ever-more-exploiting handling of nature (the ‘earth’ of things) and us, becomes simply rejected. Nevertheless, as Reiner Schürmann reminds us, in German the ‘lassen’ of Gelassenheit means only secondarily ‘to abandon’, ‘to reject’, or ‘to ignore’, and primarily ‘to let’ or ‘to let be’ (1978:16). Hence, it is not just the rejection and abandonment of the power of machination, but also letting-of-the-transformation-of-being into such ‘other beginning’ where being unfolds as power-free, as a modality other than violence and power, and thus, where the earth is not forced under our orderings and calculations, but rather, where earth’s leading strings are followed. Our power-free letting-be thereby indicates a double sense, a double way of resisting: by rejecting the willfull power and by permissive letting of fundamental transformation based on abyssal being and self-emergence of things on earth. According to the first sense of rejecting, letting-be indicates a radical negation of the domain of the power of machination, a negation that interrupts its total and perfectly functioning unfolding (cf. Davis 2007:303). In its first sense, then, Gelassenheit means a leap that breaks open in the midst of the planetary power of machination (our epochal self-understanding) through negation, by rejecting. It happens as a breaking open into the primordial freedom of abyssal being, into the openness prior to the freedoms and acts of a subject. Thus, this comportment of rejecting eventually brings out the abyssal groundlessness of be-ing, which according to Heidegger works as an abundant reservoir, that “grants us the possibility of dwelling […] in a totally different way” (1966a:55). In its second sense, then, Gelassenheit intimates a possibility of a mode of being radically other than willing, a release from the grasp of limitless power- and profit-seeking, a futural force of transformation that eventually offers what Heidegger calls the ‘other beginning’ based on abyssal ‘time-space-play’ of the Event of being (see Heidegger 1996b:112–113; 2000:4,60–61,181; 2006:84–86). It is the other beginning of being that signifies a radical revolution against the prevailing rule of the manipulative power of planetary machination. The other beginning is a power-free revolution that comes from a play of being, from a sudden turning (Kehre) in being, and thus is in its essence something that is not achieved by the revolutionary and utopian acts of will (Caputo 1970:39). The human ‘letting’, the lassen of Gelassenheit, therefore presents no acceptance of plain fate, but a middle way beyond the distinction between passivity and activity (Heidegger 1966b:61). It points out that we, human beings, can let being to transform: even though the transformation comes from the turning of being, being cannot transform by itself without the letting-be of human being. Therefore, as a relation between being and human being, power-free letting-be does not lead to the opposition of power, to the powerlessness, since it always has the force of letting-be, a force that is beyond the violent power and its absence, the powerlessness (Heidegger 2006:165–167). Letting-be then has a force of fundamental transformation that does not measure anything on a scale of power, because power and violence (and thus their absence) merely indicate the deletion of the original non-violent and power-free openness of the abyssal earth-site. It is this inaugural openness that requires us ‘to let’ being transform, that is to say, it requires letting that takes place as a play over the abyssal ground, as a play that allows the primordial mechanism be-ing begins the unfolding through its happening. This play does not encounter power just by changing power relations, balances, dispositions, or power forms; it lets be-ing to unfold out of the groundless openness without restoring it into power. As Ziarek points out (2002:180), with a notion about fundamental power-free openness Heidegger does not just avoid Nietzschean but also Hobbesian emphasis on violence and power as constitutive conditions of being: power and violence are just particular metaphysical determinations of being, which hide the fundamental abyssal openness and thus the possibility of power-free other beginning. Moreover, such non-violent letting also differs fundamentally from violent modes of resistance supported, for instance, by Žižek: instead of constituting violent counter-powers, power-free letting-be opens up non-violent mode of resistance, an ‘an-archic’ thinking based on groundless and abyssal being that lets things on earth emerge on their own (See Armstrong 2008; de Beistegui 2007:8, 16; Žižek 2006:282–283).

## Links

### Link – Aquaculture

#### **Aquaculture is an ecologically destructive expansion of technological thought – farming practices are unsustainable attempts to derive maximum value from nature.**

Carroll 10 (Courtney Carroll, environmental analysis and policy @ Boston University, “Fish Farming and the Boundary of Sustainability: How Aquaculture Tests Nature’s Resources”, WR: Journal of the Arts & Sciences Writing Program, Issue 2, 2009-10, http://www.bu.edu/writingprogram/journal/past-issues/issue-2/carroll/)

The advent of aquaculture has extended the industry of factory farming to earth’s marine and freshwater systems. It has greatly benefited the seafood business and has allowed consumers to have traditionally seasonal fish at any time of the year; however as the aquaculture industry rapidly grows from small scale to large scale, many question its sustainability. While the industry insists that fish farming takes the burden off wild fish stocks, other experts have suggested that the farms actually do more harm than help by increasing the spread of diseases, parasites such as sea lice, and astronomically increasing the level of pollution and waste in the wild ecosystems. In particular, the large scale production of carnivorous fish such as salmon has concerned many environmental groups because it requires much larger amounts of resources than producing other types of fish. Escaped salmon from farms can also adversely affect the genetic variability of wild populations, reducing their ecological resilience. The debate over the sustainability of aquaculture represents the conflict between America’s need to conserve and America’s need to control nature’s resources. Rising evidence suggests that fish farming may end up taxing the environment beyond its capacity if it does not become more ecologically mindful. The ultimate question of the debate remains how far society can push the boundary of sustainability and how far technology can extend the capacity of nature’s resources. Technology optimists believe new innovations can resolve any possible hurdles that may come about with the development of aquaculture. Since 1970, seafood production in the aquaculture industry has increased at an annual rate of 8.8% (Morris et al. 2). As the world Population approaches 8 billion, seafood producers have harnessed aquaculture in an effort to fill the gap between population growth and natural seafood production (Molyneaux 28–29). Farmed salmon production amounted to 817,000 tons in 2006 and increased 171 fold since 1980 (Morris et al. 2). While shrimp and oyster farms mainly grew out of developing countries, salmon farming grew out of countries with access to more sophisticated technology including the U.S., Canada, and Europe (Molyneaux 45). Initial assessments of fish farming concluded that all economies had an interest in developing aquaculture. For example, on June 2, 1976 in Kyoto, Japan, an FAO Technical Conference on Aquaculture examined and discussed types of aquaculture, the possible problems such as the risk of disease, and ultimately recommended the expansion of aquaculture, leading to huge investment in the rising industry (Molyneaux 30–31). To technology optimists, the potential rewards of aquaculture seemed infinite, but few stopped to consider possible repercussions to the ecosystem. Some environmental concerns about aquaculture did surface as it began to develop, but any initial fears of ecological impacts did little to inhibit growth of the industry. In 1967 the United States Congress established the Commission on Marine Science, and in 1969 the commission released a report that called for more research on aquaculture. Despite the lack of research, the promise of jobs and food security outweighed any concerns about its effects on the environment, and development continued unabated (Molyneaux 45). In addition, the passage of the U.S. Aquaculture Act in 1980 also helped nurture the development of the aquaculture industry (Molyneaux 46). Fish farming has obvious benefits such as food security and jobs, but these obvious benefits obscure many of the potential problems that could arise in the future. An industry such as aquaculture that does not make efforts to promote sustainability will inevitably run into problems, despite any short term benefits it may give to investors. Salmon farms especially merit concern because to produce predatory fish, companies need to “reduce fish” to produce fish, which essentially turns fish lower on the food chain, such as sardines or anchovies, into feed for farmed salmon (Halweil 5). This process requires a huge amount of resources compared to herbivorous fish, making the salmon industry more vulnerable if supplies become scarce and much more energy intensive. In addition, though the aquaculture business claims that its farms provide necessary food production for society’s growing populations, many estimates show that modern fish farming consumes more fish than it produces (Halweil 18). The question of whether aquaculture provides a sufficient food source for future generations means many companies will lead themselves to failure if they do not manage their resources responsibly.

### Link – Development

#### **“Development” rhetoric is steeped in rationalist Western exceptionalism – the calculative drive for profit paints nature and other cultures as undeveloped savages in need of violent intervention and control.**

Spanos 99 (William V. Spanos, Professor of English @ Binghamton, “America’s Shadow: An Anatomy of Empire”, University of Minnesota Press, 1999)

What, however, the panoptic Eurocentric eye of the Enlightenment comes to see in the space within this reconfigured trope of the circle is no longer - or at least not exclusively - a vast "uninhabited" emptiness, in which the natives do not count as human beings. Rather, it comes primarily to see an uninformed terra incognita. As the texts of early European travel writers (and social historians) invariably characterize this amorphous and ahistorical "new world," the European panoptic gaze falls on an "unimproved" space. As the privative prefix emphatically suggests, it is a space-time in which everything in it flora, fauna, minerals, animals, and, later, human beings - is seen and encoded not so much as threatening, though that meaning is clearly there as well, as wasteful or uneconomical and thus as an untended fallow (female) terrain calling futurally for the beneficial ministrations of the (adult, male) center.72 The predestinarian metaphorics of the circle precipitates a whole rhetoric of moral necessity. The "wilderness" as "underdeveloped" or "unimproved" or "uncultivated" (i.e., "unfulfilled" or "uncircular") space must, as the privative prefixes demand, be developed, improved, cultivated (i.e., fulfilled or circularized). Indeed, it is the wilderness's destiny. From this representation of the colonial Others as mired in and by their own chaotic primordial condition, one of the most debilitating of which is unproductive perpetual war, it is an easy.. step to representing them, as American writers and historians did the Indian race in the nineteenth century, as either self-doomed73 or appealing to the European to save them from themselves by way of imposing his peace on their multiply wasteful strife.74 Referring to John Barrow's representative (enlightened) "anticonquest" narrative about his travels as an agent of the British colonial governor in the interior of the Cape Colony at the end of the eighteenth century, Mary Louise Pratt writes: The visual descriptions presuppose - naturalize - a transformative project embodied in the Europeans. Often the project surfaces explicitly in Barrow's text, in visions of "improvement" whose value is often expressed as aesthetic.. It is the task of the advanced scouts for capitalist "improvement" to encode what they encounter as "unimproved" and, in keeping with the terms of the anti-conquest, as disponible, available for improvement. European aspirations must be represented as uncontested. Here the textual apartheid that separates landscapes from people, accounts of inhabitants from accounts of their habitats, fulfills its logic. The European improving eye produces subsistence habitats as "empty" landscapes, meaningful only in terms of a capitalist future and of their potential for producing a marketable surplus. From the point of view of their inhabitants, of course, these same spaces are lived as intensely humanized, saturated with local history and meaning, where plants, creatures, and geographical formations have names, uses, symbolic functions, histories, places in indigenous knowledge formations.75 This is an acute observation about the "anti-conquest" imperialist discourse of Enlightenment travel writing. But it is limited by its characteristic restriction of the word "improvement" to the historical context of modern capitalism (though the aside referring to the expression of the vision of improvement in aesthetic terms is suggestive). Like so much "postcolonial" criticism, its historicist problematic is blind to the genealogy of this modern "anti-conquest" concept. It fails to see that the rhetoric of "improvement" is a capitalist extension of a much older system of imperial tropes, one that, in naturalizing the latter, obscures the will to power over the Other that is visible in its earlier form. This word, that is, not only looks forward to "underdeveloped," the sedimented counterword that constitutes the base of the neocolonialist discourse of late capitalism, as Pratt seems to be suggesting. It also harks back to what Enrique Dussel calls the "developmental fallacy" informing Enlightenment philosophy of history from Adam Smith and John Locke through Hegel "and a certain Marx to Habermas. Tracing the genealogy of Habermas's Eurocentric representation of modernity back to Hegel, Dussel writes:In the Vorlesungen iiber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, Hegel portrays \_ world history (Weltgeschichte) as the self-realization of God, as a theodicy of reason and of liberty (Freiheit), and as a process of Enlightenment (Aufklarung)....In Hegelian ontology, the concept of development (Entwicklung) plays a central role. This concept determines the movement of the concept (Begriff) until it culminates in the idea - that is, as it moves from indeterminate being to the absolute knowledge in the Logic. Development... unfolds according to a linear dialectic; although originally an ontological category, today it is primarily considered as a sociological one with implications for world history. Furthermore, this development has a direction: Universal history goes from East to West. Europe is absolutely the end of universal history. Asia is the beginning. But this alleged East-West movement clearly precludes Latin America and Africa from world history and characterizes Asia as essentially confined to a state of immaturity and childhood (Kindheit).... The immaturity (Umrei fe) marking America is total and physical; even the vegetables and the animals are more primitive, brutal, monstrous, or simply more weak or degenerate.76 Even more fundamentally, Pratt's "unimproved" has its origins in the more deeply inscribed metaphorics of the seed and its cultivation, as Dussel's recurrent invocation of the rhetoric of "immaturity that in-. forms the Hegelian discourse suggests. This is the trope (which is also an aesthetics) that, along with the gaze and the centered circle, informs the very etymology of "metaphysics" and that is encoded and naturalized in the truth discourse of the Occident. That is to say, the genealogy of the word "improvement" in the discourse of post-Enlightenment travel literature is traceable to the origins of Occidental history. (The metaphor of the "virgin land," which, as I have intimated, is equally pervasive in the discourse of early colonialism, constitutes a particularly telling gendered allotrope of this metaphorical system circulating around the seed. It focalizes the identification of the panoptic gaze that perceives this "unimproved" circular space with the brutal phallic will.)77 A retrieval of the equally inaugural visual metaphorics with which it is affiliated will bring into visibility the ideological agenda hidden in the benign connotations of the metaphor of "improvement." In the positivist Enlightenment, the "unimproved" space of the "wilderness" is understood as a darkness in the sense not so much of savage or barbarous (though, again, that meaning: resonates in the word as well), as of a potentially knowable and usable unknown. What its eye beholds primarily is a terrain that, as the European cliche about the "inscrutability" of the Orient has it, compels knowing and naming precisely because its darkly unimproved state resists scrutiny- and domestication. For the French--natural scientist Michel Adanson, for example, the world of nature was a confused mingling of beings that seem to have been brought together by chance: here, gold is mixed with another metal, with stone, with earth; there, the violet grows side by side with an oak. Among these plants, too, wander the quadruped, the reptile, and the insect; the fishes are confused, one might say, with the aqueous element in which they swim, and with the plants grow in the depth of the waters.... This mixture is indeed so general and so multifarious that it appears to be one of nature's laws.7In thematizing this knowledge-producing naming-this Linnaean classificatory motif -I do not, despite its decisive contribution to the imperial project proper, want to limit its origins to the Enlightenment. As the natural affiliation of seed with light (the spatialization of differential temporal phenomena) suggests, its ultimate origin lies in the Occident's appropriation of the biblical narrative of Adam, armed with the Logos, naming the beasts. In combinations with the classical apotheosis of the sun/seed, this narrative has played a decisive role of persuasion throughout the history of Christian European imperial conquest, not least in that history of genocidal American expansionism inaugurated by the Adamic Puritans' pacification of the American wilderness.

### Link – Disaster Images

#### **Representation of environmental disasters enframes the damage within rational economic cost frameworks – technological imagery masks the underlying causes.**

Bonner 11 (Charles Bonner, Department of Philosophy @ Providence College, “Images of Environmental Disaster: Information and Ontology”, Forum on Public Policy, June 2011, http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/85643653)

The following study can be understood as an attempt to “resituate” the environmentalist problematic on a new—ontological—terrain. Its focus is rather narrow, taking the 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico as exemplary environmental disaster, and paying particular attention to the means by which such an event emerges qua disaster in the prevailing ontological context of our Information Age. These means by which the event of disaster becomes manifest are, above all, techniques of visual imaging, or “technologies of the visible.” (I borrow this term from the analysis of oil-spill disaster images worked out by Peter Galison and Caroline A. Jones in a brief piece that motivates the present study, and provides much of its subject matter.) If we recognize the increasing importance of the visual image as one of the salient features of the Age of Information, we must also consider the pragmatic implications of visual image processing as the cognitive means by which the significance of environmental disaster is to be registered. These implications are spelled out fairly clearly by Galison and Jones: the significance and the lessons to be learned from a major environmental disaster tend to be lost in the processing of “surface images” that may capture our attention and galvanize opinion, but fail to capture the deeper-lying causes and consequences of disaster, which remain conveniently out of sight, out of mind. These considerations seem to warrant the sort of conceptual shift to be sketched out in the following pages: attempting to dislodge the environmentalist problematic from the technocratic framework which is its “natural” home, and point toward the need for an ontological inquiry into the prevailing “meaning of being” that structures our world and determines our present reality in terms of information. Moreover, since we are pointing toward certain defects or deficits of the “pragmatic implications” now operative in the Information Age technocratic framework (more on this below), it will be necessary to indicate, if only in very preliminary ways, the practical implications of the type of inquiry undertaken here. Such reflections, on the new strategic and/or conceptual approaches to the very real demands and urgent questions encompassed by the environmentalist problematic, will be consigned to the conclusion of this study. There it will be suggested that an inquiry attempting to situate the environmental disaster, ontologically, among the decisive events that characterize our Age of Information does indeed shift the terrain upon which our response will have to be fashioned. Inquiry into the fundamental layout of the world in which environmental disasters are recognized as decisive and inevitable features should also affect the ways in which the disaster “speaks to us.” And if we could properly heed the significance of a major oil spill, for example, beyond the surface images of disaster and outside the technocratic environmentalist framework, we would catch sight of possibilities for new kinds of response: new ways of conceptualizing the problematic, new forms of action, and new realms of engagement. An environmental disaster is described, first of all, in terms of ”what actually happened”—two hundred million gallons of oil released into the ocean, in our exemplary case study—and then two areas of impact must be assessed: the ecological damage and the human costs. Causes and consequences of the disaster are investigated in two different “registers:” the human impact, which may of course include emotional response, a sense of tragedy, outrage or apocalyptic doom, but is ultimately reducible in principle to economic costs; and the effects of the disaster on non-human species (which may or may not be of economic importance), natural cycles, and ecosystem functions. The latter register is largely determined by ecosystem models and computer simulations, and accurate predictions and assessments of damage are possible only in the case of an ecosystem whose baseline functioning has been well studied (over the course of years or decades, depending on the complexity and type of ecosystem involved.) The human costs are also determined by mathematical models, predicting the economic and sociological effects of the collapse of fisheries, for example, or the loss of public and private revenues that follow from disruptions of seasonal tourist industries. Ultimately, a dollar figure is attached even to the destruction of wetlands, not because we can calculate the costs of all the ecosystem functions carried out by wetlands, but on the basis of estimated costs for cleanup operations and the recovery time required to return to equilibrium after a major system perturbation. (The current estimates of the total “cost” of the Deepwater Horizon disaster stand at $100 billion.) This reduction to the sphere of measurable economic parameters registers the environmental disaster as quantifiable, calculable event, subject in principle to more or less rigorous analysis by means of complex systems of accounting. Reparations, punitive damages and reform of governmental-industrial relations can, in principle, be assessed, calculated, “reprogrammed” with varying degrees of precision. The causes of environmental disaster too are understood within the prevailing technocratic paradigm as breakdowns, glitches, planning errors and technological failures. Investigations of the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico last summer directed our attention toward design or construction flaws in the “blowout preventer.” Profit-driven cost cutting measures, substandard grade cement used in the drill pipe, management decisions (“human error”) in ignoring or circumventing warning signals—these constitute the explanatory framework in which the causes of disaster are to be located and understood. But this focus on technical decisions and technological failures blocks from view any deeper inquiry into the political and economic demands, the motivations and inevitable risks of offshore drilling. If we focus on the failure of the blowout preventer we do not ask questions about our world‘s insatiable demand for fossil fuels. Within the technocratic framework the causes and consequences of environmental disaster are understood in relatively precise but superficial terms.

#### **Their image politics turns the case – focus on the representational nature of environmental damage justifies short-term solutions and lack of political accountability.**

Bonner 11 (Charles Bonner, Department of Philosophy @ Providence College, “Images of Environmental Disaster: Information and Ontology”, Forum on Public Policy, June 2011, http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/85643653)

Finally, and most importantly for our present concerns, the third point articulated by Galison and Jones concerns what we have referred to as the pragmatic consequences of the disaster imagery—or perhaps better to say, of the disaster-as-image. Insofar as a major environmental disaster such as the Gulf oil spill is perceived and comprehended through visual images, the response to the disaster will also be determined largely according to a rhetoric of images. (“Response” here is meant to include governmental and industry policy changes as well as individual citizens‘ understanding of the need for “lifestyle” changes; the concept of “pragmatic implications,” accordingly, would include both of these dimensions, collective and individual.) Observing that politicians and the public were equally ready to declare the spill “over” as their perception of the disaster-as-image was successfully resolved, Galison and Jones imply that the visual images effectively shape the response that we make, as a society and as individuals. That is to say, our response is largely an effect of the visual imagery that conveys the reality of the disaster, the media spectacle that doubles up the empirical event projected into the dimension of cyberspace. This dimension—event as information—constitutes the determining level of reality for our age of information. Also implied by this last point is the claim (made explicit later in the article) that important aspects of the oil spill which are not easily visualized by existing technologies, and thus are left “out of the picture” of the disaster that shapes public opinion and political response, might significantly alter that opinion and response. If policy makers and the public were adequately informed about these not-yet-visualized aspects, we may assume, our response would be very different: we might not, for example, be so ready to declare the spill over as soon as the oil slicks are effectively removed from the visible surfaces of the ocean. This counterfactual scenario could be realized—if only “our awesome technologies of the image” (Galison and Jones 2010, 51) allowed us to visualize the underwater plumes of oil, dispersed from the visible surface and rendered invisible to satellite cameras. The authors seem to suggest that it is due to certain technological limits or lacunae that the picture of disaster formed and disseminated via visual images is necessarily incomplete—and thus subject to distortion or manipulation: “That we have yet to develop or popularize certain kinds of technologies of vision (for deep ocean plumes, for durational models of wetland change, or for the microscopic uptake of petro-dispersants inside organisms) produces specific invisibilities that fit well with corporate policy. No picture, no action.” (Galison and Jones 2010, 49)

### Link – Economy

#### **Economic rationality subsumes all value under the calculative profit motive – the drive for globalized efficiency and productivity turns the world into a standing reserve while forcing out all alternative mindsets.**

Joronen 10 (Mikko Joronen, Ph.D. in Geography at the University of Turku, “The Age of Planetary Space”, 2010, http://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/66733/AnnalesAII257Joronen.pdf)

As a monolithic economic tradition with a particular understanding of economic practices and particular positioning of “economic subjects”, contemporary globalization of capitalism in particular expresses its metaphysical totalitarianism and uniform-ity in the devaluation of local, alternative, and marginal practices as “traditional” and “informal” (See Dirlik 1999:8; 2003; Köchler 2000:10; Escobar 2001:153; GibsonGraham 2002:35; Castree 2004:137). Such a burst of “techno-capitalism”, as Brockelman (2008a) puts it, sees the whole planet as a mere standing-reserve for the endlessly growing power of economic “will” to productize and value all in proportion to their success in such ‘productisation’. In such a Framework, all beings are simply disclosed through the Event in which they are valued, measured, and used according to their competency to be producible. Since this competency is measured in terms of market value, producability becomes calculated through a process that eventually spans the whole earth as a one big global market place (Heidegger 2001b:112). Thus, all things are simply transformed into commodities for efficient production of profits and accumulation. Even alarming topics such as global environmental change and the destruction and degradation of natural habitats have become significantly relevant only when they are set under the market calculation – either when these ecological topics start substantially affect to, or when they are wished to be affected by (for instance through emission trading mechanism), the growth rates. In both cases, all beings are uniformly mutated into commodities mastered by the calculable price mechanisms. In fact, no other way of measurement is able to enter this system of orderings without spoiling its overall efficiency – they are just “utopians” disturbing the “reality” of the efficient handling that works (i.e. the reality inside the manipulative power of machination). Since these charges of utopianism already place themselves in control of reality and thus in a realm from which all strange (i.e., the Macht-los, the “power-free”, and thus all thinking breaking free from the power of machination) becomes utopian, the reality turns into a domain of ‘what(ever) works’ and hence becomes grounded upon efficiency and workability (Dallmayr 2001:261–262). Under such colonization of calculable price mechanism, the whole globe eventually becomes an area of domination: the metaphysical essence of markets is to bring all beings into a quasi-Darwinian struggle for survival between the powers of business calculation. It is precisely because this survival is based on successful accumulation and efficient commodification of beings, that under the contemporary global capitalism the whole globe becomes conquered for its market. Under such economic malleability everything is established as producible products and hence delivered to the markets in terms of growing efficiency and competitiveness. Out of the colossal competition between the figures of calculation and machination, globalization turns into a struggle between different technological worldviews (Heidegger 1977d:134–135; See also Joronen 2008; Moisio 2008:89–90). Globalization – growing giganticism fuelled by the competition between powers of efficient manipulation – and survival – a struggle to maximize the utility and control of beings under the pre-delineating framework of gigantic calculation – are both manifestations of the operational logic of technological Gestell. Consequently, economic survival struggle and the glorification of competitiveness hide the fact that they aim at massive ordering, thus admiring the megalomania of endless growth and expansion. By penetrating and spreading, and hence, by turning all beings under the logic of technological manipulation, the techno-capitalist logic of optimization of productivity and competitiveness that constantly seeks to open new markets by turning things into products of profit making eventually present one of the ontic realities that have accelerated the globalization of Gestell.

### Link – Energy

#### Alternative energy projects seek to capture and store the Earth as standing reserve – this prioritization of human subjects results in the domination of nature.

Beckman 2K (Tad Beckman, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, Humanities and Social Sciences @ Harvey Mudd College, “Martin Heidegger and Environmental Ethics”, 2000, http://www2.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html)

Perhaps it is not difficult to understand the separate paths of the fine arts, craftsmanship, and modern technology. Each seems to have followed different human intentions and to have addressed different human skills. However, while the fine arts and craftsmanship remained relatively consistent with techne in the ancient sense, modern technology withdrew in a radically different direction. As Heidegger saw it, "the revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging [Herausfordern], which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such." {[7], p. 14} Modern technology sets-upon nature and challenges-forth its energies, in contrast to techne which was always a bringing-forth in harmony with nature. The activity of modern technology lies at a different and more advanced level wherein the natural is not merely decisively re-directed; nature is actually "set-upon." The rhetoric in which the discussion is couched conveys an atmosphere of violence and exploitation. To uncover the essence of modern technology is to discover why technology stands today as the danger. To accomplish this insight, we must understand why modern technology must be viewed as a "challenging-forth," what affect this has on our relationship with nature, and how this relationship affects us. Is there really a difference? Has technology really left the domain of techne in a significant way? In modern technology, has human agency withdrawn in some way beyond involvement and, instead, acquired an attitude of violence with respect to the other causal factors? Heidegger clearly saw the development of "energy resources" as symbolic of this evolutionary path; while the transformation into modern technology undoubtedly began early, the first definitive signs of its new character began with the harnessing of energy resources, as we would say. As a representative of the old technology, the windmill took energy from the wind but converted it immediately into other manifestations such as the grinding of grain; the windmill did not unlock energy from the wind in order to store it for later arbitrary distribution. Modern wind-generators, on the other hand, convert the energy of wind into electrical power which can be stored in batteries or otherwise. The significance of storage is that it places the energy at our disposal; and because of this storage the powers of nature can be turned back upon itself. The storing of energy is, in this sense, the symbol of our over-coming of nature as a potent object. "...a tract of land is challenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit." {[7], p. 14} This and other examples that Heidegger used throughout this essay illustrate the difference between a technology that diverts the natural course cooperatively and modern technology that achieves the unnatural by force. Not only is this achieved by force but it is achieved by placing nature in our subjective context, setting aside natural processes entirely, and conceiving of all revealing as being relevant only to human subjective needs.

### Link – Geoengineering

#### **Climate engineering is the endpoint of technological thought, transforming nature in a last gasp of planetary control – the world itself becomes knowable as standing reserve.**

Hamilton 13 (Clive Hamilton, Professor of Public Ethics @ Charles Sturt University, PhD in Development Studies, University of Sussex, “What Would Heidegger Say About Geoengineering?”, 9/11/2013, http://clivehamilton.com/what-would-heidegger-say-about-geoengineering/)

Proposals to respond to climate change by geoengineering the Earth’s climate system, such as by regulating the amount of sunlight reaching the planet, may be seen as a radical fulfillment of Heidegger’s understanding of technology as destiny. Before geoengineering was conceivable, the Earth as a whole had to be representable as a total object, an object captured in climate models that form the epistemological basis for climate engineering. Geoengineering is thinkable because of the ever-tightening grip of Enframing, Heidegger’s term for the modern epoch of Being. Yet, by objectifying the world as a whole, geoengineering goes beyond the mere representation of nature as ‘standing reserve’; it requires us to think Heidegger further, to see technology as a response to disorder breaking through. If in the climate crisis nature reveals itself to be a sovereign force then we need a phenomenology from nature’s point of view. If ‘world grounds itself on earth, and earth juts through world’, then the climate crisis is the jutting through, and geoengineering is a last attempt to deny it, a vain attempt to take control of destiny rather than enter a free relation with technology. In that lies the danger. The question of technology dominated Heidegger’s thinking after his ‘turn’ in the 1930s, although it has been argued that the sequence of his works can be read as ‘the gradual emergence of the problem of technology’. 1 Grasping the role of technology in the history of Being was the path to his most penetrating insights into the modern condition. For him, the modern world is technological, but not in the way commonly imagined. Technology does not simply transform the physical world; it reveals the world in a particular way, and thereby defines what is. So technologization is the key to Heidegger’s ontology, at least the later development of it. I would like to suggest that geoengineering or climate engineering represents a radical fulfillment of Heidegger’s understanding of technology as destiny and that, because it takes technological thinking to its most extreme point, climate engineering also contains the seeds of a rupture with that destiny and so represents what might be called ‘the last technology’. Geoengineering is a catch-all term for technologies aimed at countering or offsetting the effects of global warming. 2 They are being developed because, for a number of reasons, the world has failed to respond to scientific warnings by reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 3 Here I focus on those geoengineering technologies that seek to regulate the amount of solar radiation reaching the Earth. The cheapest and most likely intervention is a proposal to shroud the Earth with a layer of sulphate aerosols in the upper atmosphere. A fleet of high-flying aircraft or a 20 kilometre hose held aloft by balloons could be used to inject the aerosols to achieve more-or-less permanent dimming of the globe. Sulphate aerosol spraying aims to regulate the climate of the planet as a whole by manipulating the chemical composition of the atmosphere. It would require elaborate control mechanisms operated from some kind of central office for climate management. Heidegger would probably view geoengineering as the final surge of the will-to-power and a desperate gambit to defend modern subjectivity. ‘The will to mastery’, he wrote, ‘becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human control.’ To foreshadow a later discussion, he would perhaps also see within the extreme danger of climate engineering and the peril it seeks to forestall, the gleam of a saving power. 4 In the spirit of Heidegger my focus is not on the technologies themselves but on what their proposed deployment reveals about the world and human destiny. Echoing Heidegger, we might say: The essence of geoengineering is nothing technological. Geoengineering represents a qualitative leap in human use of technology not because it reaches a new level of sophistication (indeed, spraying sulphuric acid into the upper atmosphere or spreading iron filings on the oceans are crude methods), but because it comprises the first technology of intentional planetary control. It may be viewed as a desperate response to human failing or as monstrous hubris, but beneath all emotional and ethical judgments lies an unexamined conception of the Earth that makes geoengineering imaginable. The obvious place to begin is with Heidegger’s seminal 1953 essay ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, the fullest treatment of his views on the subject. But to come to grips with his argument some prior ground must be traversed. We can best prepare by considering Heidegger’s 1938 lecture titled ‘The Age of the World Picture’. Heidegger began by asserting: ‘Metaphysics grounds an age, in that through a specific interpretation of what is and through a specific comprehension of truth it gives to that age the basis upon which it is essentially formed.’ 6 4 5 Epochs are underwritten by often-hidden understandings of what the Earth is, of existence. Heidegger declares that what is most in need of deeper contemplation, that which most defines the modern age, is science and technology, for it is in science and technology that Being manifests in the modern epoch. The argument here and in subsequent works is, in Hans Ruin’s words, ‘that machine technology is not a consequence of science, but that both science and machine technology are rooted in a more fundamental sense of technology … [in which] being is understood as something represented and visualized so as to be made available for manipulation and domination by a subjective will’. 7 Before technology can be developed, being, that which is, must be represented in a certain way. This alerts us to common misconceptions in thinking about technology. When we attempt to understand the technological age we must be vigilant that we do not do so from within the metaphysics of science and technology, for then we will be unable to see what we are seeking, the essence of technology. 8 So we seek to understand our age—including the paramount fact of global warming—by exposing the metaphysics implicated in science and technology. 9 This is the metaphysics that today secures objects for study. As Hans Ruin, one of the most interesting interpreters of Heidegger, writes: Technology is inextricably tied to the metaphysical impulse to determine the being of beings, as something representable, as substance, force, or as will. … We cannot escape technology, but neither should we hope to become its masters, because in the very ambition to achieve mastery, we are still thinking and operating within the reach and scope of technology. 10 No technological project renders this claim more true than geoengineering’s goal of mastery, no less than to take control of the Earth’s climate.

### Link – Hegemony

#### Hegemony and the drive for security are symptoms of the globalized technological thought apparatus, ordering the world and its inhabitants as standing reserve according to a calculable schema of ontological control.

Joronen 10 (Mikko Joronen, Ph.D. in Geography at the University of Turku, “The Age of Planetary Space”, 2010, <http://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/66733/AnnalesAII257Joronen.pdf>) [Edited for gendered language]

In one of his recent commentaries on critical geography, David Harvey worries about a geography that shuts out any mention “of capital accumulation at a time of intense restoration and reconstitution” of such technological power everywhere around the globe (Harvey 2006:411; See Harvey 2005). John Agnew (2005), in turn, has emphasized globalization in terms of hegemony, through which come a set of originally American consumption-based economic practices that form what Agnew calls the global hegemony of ‘marketplace society’. From the viewpoint of being-historical thinking it is remarkable that both of the examples have correctly expressed the metaphysical sense of Gestell. The endless extension of consumption-based economic practices and the growth of economic profit maximization, both merely for sake of their efficient maximization, are nothing but guises under which the gigantic calculation makes its appearance. However, underneath such developments holds sway the technological way of calculative rationality and the self-strengthening power of ordering, both making possible the expansion of markets to the whole planet. In fact, the notions of ‘hegemony’ and ‘intense restoration’ already imply the gigantic massiveness of technological being. Accordingly, the ordering and exploiting of beings in terms of consumption and accumulation – for the sake of growing consumption and accumulation – is ontologically embedded in the unfolding of things as standing-reserves in the gigantic way of pressing forth everything “into calculation, usage, breeding, manageability, and regulation” (Heidegger 2000:87). Thus, out of these ontological conditions, that underpin not just the epiphenomenal notions of Agnew and Harvey about the logic of contemporary global capitalism, but also some of the contemporary cultural politics of the environmentalism based on green capitalist orthodoxy (See Prudham 2009), the world becomes reduced to the status of a picture, while the earth of things is set before [hu]mankind as nothing but a series of relations for calculative manipulation.

### Link – Hunger

#### **Representations of hunger reduce ethics to the symbolic and hides the profit drive beneath worldwide inequality – ethical actions become calculable and tradable values to justify technological solutions without addressing the underlying causes.**

DeFazio 3 (Kimberly DeFazio, Professor of English @ University of Wisconsin La Crosse, “The Imperialism of ‘Eating Well’”, Red Critique, Spring 2003, http://www.redcritique.org/Spring2003/theimperialismofeatingwell.htm)

Hunger today reflects the deep crisis of capitalist production and its fundamental inability to meet one of the most basic of human needs, the need for food. As recent studies on global hunger indicate, while the world's wealthiest enjoy skyrocketing profits and an unprecedented standard of living, even during a global recession, poor and working people around the globe face an uncertain future without food. A United Nations study in 2002 found that more than 840 million people in the world are malnourished—799 million of them are from the developing world. Even in the United States, the richest nation in history, the number of hungry is on the rise. As a 1999 USDA report indicated, 36.2 million Americans live in food-insecure households, preventing 12.1 million children under the age of 12 from growing up healthy or growing up at all, symptoms of what Loretta Schwartz-Nobel calls in her recent book Growing Up Empty the "hidden epidemic [of hunger] in America" (5). Far from benefiting from what has been represented as the "bread basket" of the world, more and more Americans are forced to wait in bread lines: as a 1998 National Public Radio report indicated, "Hunger in America has reached a point where one in ten Americans now regularly use a neighborhood food bank or soup kitchen in order to eat" (quoted in Schwartz-Nobel 15). Despite the fact that it has become impossible to ignore the contradiction between the growth of hunger and malnutrition around the world alongside tremendous wealth and social resources now accumulated in the hands of a few, any analysis of hunger which goes beyond the effects of hunger to get at the root causes is increasingly difficult to find. In most theoretical analyses of hunger today, hunger is treated as a "symbolic" act of ethical care for the other (what Derrida calls "infinite hospitality"), while activist approaches treat it as a matter of the objective re-distribution of food surpluses to the hungry—or "humanitarian aid". But by focusing on the effects of unequal distribution of social resources, both approaches obscure the material and historical cause of hunger. In fact, the dominant theoretical readings of hunger are outright suspicious of any talk of "causes", since they regard such investigations to be part of a misguided search for origin. My argument here is that neither the high theory nor the activist analyses get to the root of the relations between those who "eat well" and those who do not eat. Hunger is the not the effect of ill distribution of resources, nor inequality in symbolic exchange. Hunger is the direct result of inequality at the point of production. By erasing the cause of hunger in the relations of production, dominant theories ultimately support the global interests of those who already "eat well". They represent the leading bourgeois response to the glaring co-existence of enormous food surpluses alongside desperate world hunger, an antagonism which daily condemns production for profit and its cultural apologists. The U.S. airdropping of food packages on the starving in Afghanistan last year is a useful occasion to begin unpacking some of the dominant assumptions about hunger today, and to examine their actual effects. The event is significant, not as an isolated occurrence, but as an uncanny convergence of the theoretical and the activist positions in support of imperialist "ethics". As the U.S. military onslaught against Iraq continues, and the U.S. and British administrations are attempting to justify their invasion on the basis of the "freedoms" and "liberties" they will supposedly bring in doing so, Afghanistan stands both as an important example of the devastating inequality inherent in capitalism and an index of the ways in which ethics serves to justify the unequal relations between those who eat well and those who starve. The U.S. dropping of yellow food packages in Afghanistan is perhaps one of the most publicized acts of "humanitarian interventions" in recent history, widely discussed and debated in international media and made a showcase of American "generosity" in the U.S. media. The airdrops began in early October 2001 simultaneous with the inauguration of the bombing of Afghanistan that was initially called "Infinite Justice". The mission involved dropping hundreds of thousands of food packages onto the border-regions of Afghanistan where a million people had been forced to flee, to escape U.S. military action. Decorated with an American flag, each contained a single ready meal comprised of American food products, such as peanut butter, bean salad and strawberry jam. The idea, according to White House representatives, was to show that the U.S. did not consider the Afghan people their enemy—only their government—by "donating" to the starving people the surpluses of the richest nation in the world. As reported in the Washington Post, "In order to have credibility, our words must be matched by our actions," said William Nash, a retired Army major general, who now runs a conflict resolution program at the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations. "This is the first time that we have conducted humanitarian operations simultaneously with combat operations. The fact that C-17s were dropping rations at the same time as B-1s were dropping bombs is a pretty powerful image" ("Words and Image: Weapons of Other War", Michael Dobbs; Thursday October 11, 2001, Page A08). It is, of course, a mark of the deep cynicism of the defenders of capitalist "democracy" that the "powerful image" of the food packets falling on Afghanistan, which were meant to reinforce the good will and ethical nature of US leaders and highlight the benefits of the world market and democracy, were the same exact color as the approximately 1,200 cluster bombs the U.S. military was simultaneously dropping on the country's "liberated" citizens and which left, upon conservative estimates, 12,400 unexploded, yellow, food packet-like "bomblets" on the ground.[1] I leave aside for now the many other immanent contradictions of the U.S. airdropping that critics have brought to international attention, such as the cultural arrogance in the choice of food delivered; the reality that not only were the most desperate persons not reached at all—i.e., those who could not travel to the borders—but that the U.S. showed little regard for safe conditions of retrieval of the packages (as many people were left vulnerable to attack by gunfire and bombing as they tried to obtain the scattered meals). And, especially symptomatic, as Arundhati Roy argued in her text "Brutality smeared in peanut butter", is that the planned dropping of 500,000 food packets "only add[ed] up to a single meal for half a million people out of the several million in dire need of food". What needs to be foregrounded are not only these contradictions (which are effects of the more fundamental class relations of global capitalism), but, more importantly, the way the food relief mission in Afghanistan enacts the main "ethical" assumptions structuring the imperialist cultural imaginary, which frames the common sense of what are considered "legitimate" solutions to hunger in ways that reinforce the priorities of capital and profit. At stake are the economic interests served by the structure of assumptions underlying these actions—a structure which rhetorically "grounds" not only the U.S. practices, but all dominant approaches to hunger today. Examining the assumptions and interests that lie behind the cultural imaginary of hunger is an urgent matter because how we understand "hunger" and its solutions impacts billions of people suffering today from either dire starvation or chronic malnutrition. At this moment, however, when virtually all of cultural theory presents culture as autonomous from economic, political or social relations, it is necessary to clarify that I am using "cultural imaginary" to mean those modes of understanding the social that ideologically mystify class relations in the interests of capital. That is, those ideas which represent as "fair" (and "inevitable") the deeply unfair and unjust exploitative relations on which capitalism is based. The Marxist concept of "ideology" has, of course, "gone a little out of fashion" in cultural studies texts published since the mid-1990s, as Graeme Turner notes, and thus "looks like a slightly clumsy instrument for the analyses of cultural institutions and structures" (166). But the "clumsiness" of ideology (its "crudeness"), I am arguing, is itself an ideological effect. It is an ideological effect of the growing need of transnational capital's strategies of accumulation for theoretically "savvy" readings of culture which, in the name of "complexity" and sophisticated reading, focus on the "identity" of the local outside of the global structures of exploitation which produce the local. The institutionalization of theoretical savvy-ness has had devastating effects for cultural studies because, the newer, "more descriptive" cultural studies, Turner himself points out, has meant that "the larger interests being served within this [local] framework tend not to come into sharp focus" (166). This, I would suggest, is putting it mildly. To be crude, cultural analyses today have completely backgrounded the relations of exploitation that structure all sites of culture; they have substituted for ideology critique a dense meditation on the specificities of localities, a "sophisticated" mode of reflection attentive to individual differences, yet providing no way of understanding relations between local sites, or how they can be transformed. "Savvy", in short, is a code for the dismantling of knowledges necessary to understand capitalism as a totality of relations, and perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in the dominant readings of hunger available today. This essay argues for the need for a "crude" analysis of hunger. Although it is not "popular" today, it is necessary—particularly when dealing with such a fundamental social crisis such as hunger—to go beyond the popular and connect culture to the larger social forces it reflects. Such an unpopular approach to social questions is urgently needed because it enables cultural analyses to go beyond the "experiences" of daily life to uncover the root causes of emerging social contradictions, such as the crisis of hunger today. As Marx explains in perhaps what is one of the most influential passages on the study of culture, "Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a period of transformation by its own [i.e., "popular"] consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life" (5). This is another way of saying that it is necessary to uncover the economic relations that undergird the dominant ways in which social issues are represented in the popular consciousness—from the mainstream news, to academic writing, to TV, to films, to the knowledge industry—if cultural theory is not going to merely sophisticatedly "document" the world, but become an active part of a movement for economic and social justice. There is nothing sophisticated about hunger, except the excuses used today to justify prolonging the relations which cause it. Hunger, in short, is crude, and requires crude analyses in order to change it. Two The cultural imaginary in the West today is dominated by the discourse of "ethics". Ethics, in its privileging of the subjective over the objective, turns social structures into modes of personal behavior and thus sees social change basically as a matter of changing individuals' minds and ideas. On these terms, hunger is not viewed as a structure of social relations tied to ownership of property (class)—a view based on the understanding that a transformation in property relation is the necessary precondition of eradicating hunger. Rather, the primary solutions to hunger are individual and subjective ones that promote life-style changes and daily negotiations within existing unequal social structures. For instance: those with food give to those who do not; food pantries redistribute surpluses; understanding that the hungry are not in any fundamental way "different" from the fed, etc. These and other similar reformist practices aimed at addressing only the most intolerable effects of hunger, not its material roots, are widely seen as the only "reasonable" solutions. Ethics, in other words, is one of the main manifestations of theoretical "savvy-ness" today. Ethical theorists regard transforming hunger by eradicating its roots in private property as highly "unreasonable" and "crude", if not deeply suspicious, since transformation of class relations is deemed a "totalitarian" imposition of one subjective will over another. Social change, to put it differently, is only ethical when it deals with one hungry person at a time.

### Link – Oil

#### **Increasing oil production is the endpoint of technological thought – fossil fuel economics enframes the environment as disposable standing reserve for false hope in the infinite productivity of oil technologies.**

Tainter & Patzek 11 (Joseph A. Tainter, Professor of Sustainability, Department of Environment and Society @ Utah State University, Ph.D. in Anthropology from Northwestern, & Tadeusz W. Patzek, Professor of Petroleum and Geosystems Engineering @ UT Austin, Ph.D. in Chemical Engineering from Silesian Technical University, “Drilling Down: The Gulf Oil Debacle and Our Energy Dilemma”, 9/18/11, http://wtf.tw/ref/tainter\_patzek.pdf)

We have a quasi-religious faith that technology will always save us from difficulties. In fact, Figs. 3.14 and 3.15 show us that better technology has resulted in significantly improved petroleum recovery in the United States over and above the fundamental Hubbert cycle. In Fig. 3.15, the difference between actual cumulative oil production in the United States and the cumulative oil produced from the fundamental Hubbert cycle is at least 200 EJ, or 2 years of U.S. primary energy consumption. This incremental oil has been – and will continue to be – produced mostly because of progress in well drilling and completion technologies (better and faster drilling methods, directional wells, horizontal wells, multilateral wells, smart multi-interval wells, etc.), fracturing technology, waterflood and polymer-enhanced waterflood, and enhanced oil recovery methods, mostly steam injection, CO2 injection, and surfactant/polymer flooding. As we have seen in Chap. 2, offshore oil production contributes an increasingly larger share of the U.S. oil supply. At only 50 USD per barrel of oil, the value of incremental oil production in the United States alone would amount to 1.5 trillion in 2008 US dollars. In 1954, the influential philosopher, Martin Heidegger, foresaw the logical progression of modern civilization by describing technology as a “standing-reserve” of energy for humans to order nature and, in turn, be enframed and perhaps consumed by their technology. Heidegger can be translated into plain English as follows. We are an impatient species that regards a standing-reserve of energy as a must. Because we cannot control technology, technology cannot be our tool to control nature. We tend to think of technology as an instrument that is outside us. Instead, we are part of a bigger system that comprises us and technology. Our technological civilization is all about power (the rate of energy use). This power is extracted from the earth with ever-improving technology applied to unlock more fossil fuels. With time, our technology might condition our thinking so completely, that we would not be able to see the earth as more than a source of energy. If you doubt this, a proposed mine in West Virginia, which would have buried miles of Appalachian streams under millions of tons of rock, and obliterated a healthy environment and drinking supply for thousands of people, has been the subject of ongoing controversy and litigation. The mining company and politicians in West Virginia expressed fury at an attempt by the EPA to stop the mine construction, focusing on the economy, but not seeing the potential for an environmental catastrophe.

#### **Oil only enframed as a “necessary” resource within the techno-capitalist framework – the aff’s singular obsession is a reflection of their inability to break free of technological thought that creates historical inequality.**

Huber 11 (Matthew T. Huber, Graduate School of Geography – Clark University, “Oil, Life, and the Fetishism of Geopolitics, Capitalism Nature Socialism, Vol.2 22, No. 3, 32-48, 2011)

Unifying these discourses is a remarkable agency bestowed upon oil itself. How does it do it? It doesn’t do anything. Oil has no inherent power outside the social and political relations that produce it as such a ‘‘vital’’ resource. In fact, according oil such tremendous social and political power is a prime example of what Karl Marx referred to as fetishism.4 According to Marx (1976, 1,005), fetishism is rooted in circumstances where ‘‘certain social relations appear as the natural properties of things in society.’’ As capitalism is governed through abstract, impersonal, and ultimately reified relations of exchange, particular objects or things\*the railroad, the Internet, the nation-state, and oil\*‘‘appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own’’ (Marx 1976, 165). The power of a thing does not appear as it really is\*the product of social relations\*but rather, ‘‘as objective characteristics of the products of labour themselves, the socio-natural properties of these things’’ (Marx 1976, 164165). Thus, the power of oil appears to be rooted in its ‘‘socio-natural properties’’\*rather than the particular historical geographies and social relations that metabolize the capacities of oil in particular ways. Of course, petroleum contains very particular ‘‘socio-natural properties’’ that have become essential to its ‘‘centrality’’ in particular historical circumstances. For example, it contains an unparallelled energy density, a liquid propensity to flow (providing cheap transport), and, in most cases, a subterranean location surrounding tremendous gas and/or water pressure which force it to the surface when tapped (i.e., making it easier to extract than coal or other hard rock minerals). Moreover, petroleum itself is a hydrocarbon assemblage that not only provides energy, but also a molecular drawing board allowing chemists to transfix the molecules into thousands of useful commodities from pesticides to plastics. These properties themselves are ultimately finite products of the millions of years of ‘‘buried sunshine’’ that was once marine plant life such as phytoplankton (Mitchell 2009, 401). Thus, it would be a mistake to ignore the materiality of oil (Bakker and Bridge 2006), though oil’s biophysical capacities are only realizable through particular uneven social relations of culture, history, and power. Indeed, as many have pointed out (e.g., Yergin 1991, 7-8), many cultures through ancient history have made use of petroleum (usually the kind that seeped to the surface) for a variety of purposes from medicine to waterproofing, but it took very particular historical circumstances and sociotechnical relations to produce the ‘‘use values’’ we now enjoy from petroleum.

### Link – Resources

#### **Viewing the Earth as resource is the essence of modern technology – enframing of nature as usable energy necessitates environmental destruction and exploitation.**

Rojcewicz 6 (Richard Rojcewicz, Professor of Philosophy @ Point Park University, “The Gods and Technology: A Reading of Heidegger”, 2006, http://www.mohamedrabeea.com/books/book1\_10597.pdf)

In contrast, today the land is challenged; i.e., it is ravished for its coal and ore. The earth is now looked upon precisely as a coal lode, the soil as an ore depository. The field the farmer of old used to cultivate appeared differently, i.e., when to cultivate still meant to tend and to nurture. The farmer of old did not challenge the soil of the field. In sowing the grain, the farmer consigned the seed to the forces of growth, and then he tended to its increase. In the meantime, the ordering of the field has been sucked into the maelstrom of a different sort of ordering, one that imposes on nature. It imposes on it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now mechanized foodstuffs industry. The air is imposed upon to relinquish nitrogen, the soil to relinquish ore, the ore to relinquish, among other things, uranium, and the latter is imposed upon to disgorge atomic energy, which can be unleashed for destructive or peaceful ends. (FT, 15–16/14–15) This is a clear and vigorous paragraph that scarcely needs commentary. The main point is unmistakable, as illustrated in the example of traditional farming versus modern agriculture. The farmer of old submitted, tended, and nurtured. These are the quintessential activities of poiesis; the old way of farming is midwifery, and what it brings forth is that with which nature is already pregnant. Modern agriculture, on the other hand, hardly brings forth crops; it produces “foodstuffs” or, perhaps we should rather say, ingesta. Modern agriculture does not submit seeds to the forces of growth; on the contrary, it interferes with the seeds, genetically manipulating them. The forces of growth are now in the farmer’s own hands, which is to say that she imposes the conditions that determine growth. The end product, in the extreme case, to which we may be heading inexorably, is astronauts’ food. It would be a travesty to say grace before “eating” a “meal” of such “foods.” They are not gifts; they are human creations. They are not grown; they are synthesized. They are created by someone playing God, and it would make no sense to pray to God before ingesting them. What Heidegger means by “imposing” is “playing God.” To play God is to place oneself above nature, to look upon nature as subservient to one’s own bidding. For Heidegger, this is an imperious, adolescent, violent attitude. Modern technology violates nature; it forces nature to hand over its treasures, it throttles them out of nature, and nature then must precisely “disgorge.” According to Heidegger, the earth, the air, and the fields now look different. We see the earth as an enormous mineral lode, we see the air as anemo-energy, we see the river as hydraulic power. There is an obvious sense in which this is true, but the correct order of motivation is not so obvious. It is not because the earth is ravished that it now looks like a store of minerals; on the contrary, the earth comes to be ravished precisely because of the way we now see it. The disclosive looking comes first; the possibilities come before the actualities. We must first look upon the earth, upon nature in general, in a certain way; then we can exploit what we see. And that way of looking is the way of modern technology; i.e., it is the disrespectful way that sees in nature something there merely to satisfy, as efficiently as possible, human needs and whims. That is the most basic outlook of modern technology; concretely, it amounts to seeing in nature energy as such, minable, hoardable, exploitable energy. Nature is exploited because it is disclosed as something exploitable; the disclosure of the exploitable possibilities precedes the actual exploiting. It requires scientific advancements to exploit nature; but the precedent seeing of nature as exploitable is not a matter of science. It is a theoretical and not a practical or experimental affair; it is a way of disclosive looking that expresses, for Heidegger, the essence of modern technology.

#### **Resource accumulation technology turns the Earth into standing reserve – nature is challenged forth to provide for humanity’s controlling will.**

Heidegger 49 (Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology”, 12/1/1949, http://www.wright.edu/cola/Dept/PHL/Class/P.Internet/PITexts/QCT.html)

Technology is a mode of revealing. Technology comes to presence [West] in the realm where revealing and unconcealment take place, where aletheia, truth, happens. In opposition to this definition of the essential domain of technology, one can object that it indeed holds for Greek thought and that at best it might apply to the techniques of the handcraftsman, but that it simply does not fit modern machine-powered technology. And it is precisely the latter and it alone that is the disturbing thing, that moves us to ask the question concerning technology per se. It is said that modern technology is something incomparably different from all earlier technologies because it is based on modern physics as an exact science. Meanwhile we have come to understand more clearly that the reverse holds true as well : Modern physics, as experimental, is dependent upon technical apparatus and upon progress in the building of apparatus. The establishing of this mutual relationship between technology and physics is correct. But it remains a merely historiographical establishing of facts and says nothing about that in which this mutual relationship is grounded. The decisive question still remains : Of what essence is modern technology that it happens to think of putting exact science to use? What is modern technology? It too is a revealing. Only when we allow our attention to rest on this fundamental characteristic does that which is new in modern technology show itself to us. And yet the revealing that holds sway throughout modern technology does not unfold into a bringing-forth in the sense of poiesis. The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging [Herausfordern] ,13 which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such. But does this not hold true for the old windmill as well? No. Its sails do indeed turn in the wind; they are left entirely to the wind's blowing. But the windmill does not unlock energy from the air currents in order to store it. In contrast, a tract of land is challenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit. The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order [bestellte] appears differently than it did when to set in order still meant to take care of and to maintain. The work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field. In the sowing of the grain it places the seed in the keeping of the forces of growth and watches over its increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon [stellt] nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, for example; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy, which can be released either for destruction or for peaceful use. This setting-upon that challenges forth the energies of nature is an expediting [Fordern] , and in two ways. It expedites in that it unlocks and exposes. Yet that expediting is always itself directed from the beginning toward furthering something else, i.e., toward driving on to the maximum yield at the minimum expense. The coal that has been hauled out in some mining district has not been supplied in order that it may simply be present somewhere or other. It is stockpiled; that is, it is on call, ready to deliver the sun's warmth that is stored in it. The sun's warmth is challenged forth for heat, which in turn is ordered to deliver steam whose pressure turns the wheels that keep a factory running.

### Link – Technology

#### **Modern technological solutions order the world into calculable resources – this machinic enframing posits all being as merely standing reserve for productive use.**

Joronen 10 (Mikko Joronen, Ph.D. in Geography at the University of Turku, “The Age of Planetary Space”, 2010, <http://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/66733/AnnalesAII257Joronen.pdf>) [Edited for gendered language]

Even though modern technology has transformed the earth and the world we live in for centuries now, we have just come to witness its intensity in terms of spatial magnitude. Modern technological devices have not just succeeded in overcoming the physical distance of space in relation to time – to create a ‘time-space compression’, as David Harvey puts it (1989:240–242) – but they have brought, as already adduced above, a broader change in how the space takes place. The emergence of technological devices, capable of shrinking once unsurmountable distances, is thereby taken in most fundamental sense: as an outcome of the broader way of revealing things (i.e. as a technological revealing broader than technology), which conceals the openness of being. In other words, even though technology is a way of revealing, it is also a transformation of revealing into ordering that gathers things only in terms of orderable resource set ready for optimal use, thus concealing its own mode of revealing. Accordingly, since technological unfolding does not present itself as a one mode of unfolding among other ones, it does not show itself as a particular finite mode of unfolding, but as a way of grounding things as all that they are; that is, as an orderable resource set ready for the calculative powers of human ordering and manipulation. Indeed, a mere instrumental-anthropocentric definition of technology cannot reveal the metaphysical explanation that underpins it: technology does not just consist of production and use of tools and machines, but of a way of revealing (Heidegger 2006:151). To gain a proper grasp on the planetary networks, enabling the handling and exchanging of flows of energies, materials, information, resources, and human beings that modern technologies have brought within, we should consider their epochal character, the historical unfolding of being such technologies are based on. Thus, modern technology does not just signify a mere domain of machines, but a completion of metaphysical way of thinking through the planetary factor indicated by the metaphysical ambition to ground permanent and total ways of unfolding. As already mentioned, in his late 1930’s writings Heidegger calls the fundamental ontological condition behind such a technological way of unfolding as a ‘machination’ (Machenschaft). Instead of denoting an unwanted plot, a scheming, machination means above all an intensification of ‘makingness’ (Mache), thus bearing a close relation to power (Macht) of making (Machen): machination is an unfolding that operates in terms of power that brings forth everything as makeable (Machbar) (Heidegger 1991c:174–175, 180–181; 1998a:46–49; cf. Dallmayr 2001:253, 2005:39–44; Sinnerbrink 2005:242). As Bernard Stiegler (1998:24) defines the matter, now “technics command (kubernao, the etymon of cybernetics) nature. Before, nature commanded technics.” Machination thereby, as will be further discussed in Part III of the study, indicates an endgame of the historical maturation of the relation between notions of tekhne and will: the contemporary positioning of all beings as resources orderable at will signifies the outgrowth of the early Greek notion of tekhne (the craftsman’s ‘know-how’ that brings forth (artefactual) things not emerging by nature (phusis)) in terms of willfull power of manipulative commanding of things. It is this ‘commanding’, the figure behind calculative ordering, domination, making, and manipulation, which machination characterizes: machination refers to the emergence of the power (Macht) of manipulative domination (Machenschaft), which installs itself through what Heidegger later called a calculative and provocative challenging (Herausfordern) of things, their ‘enframing’ (Gestell). Even though in German Gestell normally refers to a ‘rack’ or a ‘frame’, since in German the prefix ge- denotes a sense of total, the noun Stell a ‘position’, and the verb stellen ‘positioning’ or ‘setting up into position’, Ge-stell eventually names the overall Framework, the ‘enframing’ or ‘com-positioning’, through which the manipulative commanding of machination works; i.e., a set up under which everything is makeable and thus ordered in a position to wait calls for duty (Lovitt 1973:52; Taminiaux 1998:199-200). No wonder such unfolding has a planetary completion: for the willfull power of ordering, for the technological might of Gestell, everything not-yet-known is opened as not-yet-ordered and hence as something not-yet-explained-and-taken-into-control of efficient production. It is thus not just that this power is total in its positioning, but also that “the whole planet is used as product of power”; in other words, that the calculative commanding is extending its control to the limits of “inhabited earth”, even to the “atmosphere” and “stratosphere” (Heidegger 2006:14; cf. 1968:160). In an essay The Question Concerning Technology Heidegger explicitly discusses this challenging revealing in terms of a ‘Framework’ (‘enframing’/‘com-positioning’) that positions human beings to stand as commanders in the set-up of resource of orderable things. As a challenging revealing (Herausfordern), the apparatus of ‘enframing’ means unfolding which situates man by challenging “him forth, to reveal the real in a mode of ordering” and hence gathers together a controllable setting-upon of beings (Heidegger 1977a:20). In this ordering setting-up, the real itself is challenged and revealed in terms of standing-reserve (Bestand). Instead of being a phusis that emerges by itself, nature becomes a large set up of orderable resource, ready to reply to the challenges cast upon it. Whatever then is ordered through the Gestell has its standing as a resource on call for further ordering (Heidegger 1977a:17; Heidegger 1977b:37). While enframing gathers beings together as a utilized standing-reserve that has its standing only from the ordering of what is orderable, as humans, we become part of the technological Dasein predetermined by the challenging-revealing of enframing (Heidegger 1977e:173). [Hu]Man[ity] then does not gather the functions of modern technology, but rather, the technological unfolding sets, gathers, frames and challenges [hu]man[ity] as a part of the standing-reserve.

### Link – Science

#### **Scientific naturalism imposes calculative rationality on the world to manipulate and control it as a knowable object – the Earth is only studied to be ordered and used.**

Joronen 10 (Mikko Joronen, Ph.D. in Geography at the University of Turku, “The Age of Planetary Space”, 2010, <http://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/66733/AnnalesAII257Joronen.pdf>)

Through the rise of the technological subjugation of nature, that is, through the over-ruling of the dependence of tekhne from phusis through the schema of willfull control and manipulation, in modern epoch science no more aims to know nature in a Greek manner. Modern knowing rather presents itself as a form of techno-science delivering human mastery over nature through the mathematical ordering. When Aristotle thought nature in terms of final causes with telos internal to things, for modern technoscience nature is limited to mere objects moved by the external causes. Therefore, the motion (kinesis) is no more animated teleologically in terms of final cause internal to this movement, but rather as something limited to the interaction between external forces (causes) and their effects. Newton, for instance, did not thought things of nature according to their function towards the end (telos) as the Greeks’ as wells as the middle age Scholastics did, but saw nature as a stock of bodies with different universal attributes, such as extension, hardness, and gravity; altogether as a reserve of objects subject to forces that can be measured, ordered, controlled and manipulated through mathematical projection (Glazebrook 2004:148; Elden 2005a:12; Braver 2009:72, 76). In fact, before Newton Galilei Galileo had already claimed that the universe “is written in the language of mathematics” and hence among Francis Bacon and Rene Descartes manifested the breaking point, or better, the centuries long slow fall of the teleological understanding of nature. What is important here is that in modern science nature becomes understood as consisting of objects that exist in as far as they are subjugated under the mathematical sketch ordered by the self-certain self, the willing and calculating subject. Through the ‘experiments’ of these calculative sketches nature is challenged to follow the leading strings of human conquest. As Glazebrook writes, “once nature is freed of teleology, it is readily conceived as serving no other end than human” [my emphasis] (2004:147).

### Link – Wind

#### **Modern wind technology challenges nature to provide energy for human storage and use – this view of wind as “energy as such” reduces nature as mere resource for our exploitation and reflects a mindset of hubristic domination over the environment.**

Rojcewicz 6 (Richard Rojcewicz, Professor of Philosophy @ Point Park University, “The Gods and Technology: A Reading of Heidegger”, 2006, http://www.mohamedrabeea.com/books/book1\_10597.pdf)

Heidegger begins by characterizing the attitude of modern technology as a “challenging” (Herausfordern), meant in the sense of a challenging to a duel. Duelling stems from an imperious and adolescent-minded bravado, and to challenge someone to a duel is to say: “I demand that you come out here and give me satisfaction.” What is to be satisfied, of course, is the person’s claim that he has a right to take the life of the other. Now, duelling is done honorably. That is, the challenger exposes himself to the danger of being killed himself. The other man is given a chance to defend himself. For Heidegger, not only is modern technology a challenging, it is a dishonorable one; nature is given no chance to defend itself and is instead forced to give satisfaction. What demand does modern technology place upon nature, what is the satisfaction claimed in the challenge? It is the demand that nature yield up its energies and resources so that they might be on call, i.e., readily available for human use. The claim is made that nature’s treasures are merely there to satisfy, as efficiently as possible, human needs and whims. This attitude is diametrically opposed to the one of respect. That is why, for Heidegger, the making or producing that issues from the outlook of modern technology is not a poiesis: “The particular disclosive looking that prevails in modern technology does not unfold into a bringing-forth in the sense of poiesis. The disclosive looking that holds sway in modern technology is a challenging, one that imposes upon nature the presumptuous demand to hand over energy, energy as such, energy which, once it has been ravished out from nature, can then be hoarded” (FT, 15/14). Poiesis is the way of production that embodies the attitude of respect. Poiesis “goes with the flow”; i.e., it defers to the natural ends, the ends with which nature is already pregnant. Ancient technology is primarily a disclosive looking at those ends, those natural possibilities, and poiesis is the midwifery that assists those ends to come forth into full visibility. Modern technology, as well, is a disclosive looking at possibilities, but these possibilities are imposed on nature, and that, for Heidegger, is what is novel about modern technology. Modern technology is not a deferential looking but a presumptuous one. Modern technology makes an excessive, hubristic, unnatural demand upon nature. How so? It might at first seem that the demands placed upon nature by modern technology are not in the least excessive, since, after all, nature does fulfill those demands. Modern technology works, which is to say that nature lives up to expectations. What then is disrespectful or, so to speak, unnatural about the modern attitude toward nature? Heidegger does not answer this question directly; instead, he provides examples that are meant to make obvious the presumptuousness of the demands placed upon nature by modern technology. The first example continues the passage just cited above. Heidegger asks whether the old-fashioned windmill did not make the same demand upon the energies of nature: “But does this not also apply to the old windmill? No. Its vanes indeed turn in the wind; they are in fact immediately dependent on the blowing of the wind. But that windmill does not exploit the energy of the air currents, with the aim of hoarding it” (FT, 15/14). The idea of exploiting here is that of making accessible or opening up, as a developer exploits or opens up new markets. Heidegger’s word could also be translated as “working,” in the sense of working a mine, opening it up for all it is worth. Heidegger is saying that the old windmill does not work the wind for all it is worth; on the contrary, the wind works it. Furthermore, not only does the wind work it, but the wind works it “immediately” (unmittelbar). The latter is perhaps the most telling word in the passage. The old windmill is precisely a mill; i.e., it mills grain. It indeed prevails upon the winds for its own purposes, for human purposes, since, left to itself, a wind would never mill grain. Yet the mill merely gears into the wind, which is true in the literal sense that the connection between the millstones and the wind is accomplished through gears. The modern windmill, however, is not designed to mill anything; it is not a mill but a dynamo. It generates electricity, which is stockpiled and distributed to remote places for remote uses. The connection between the wind and these remote uses is an indirect one; it is not accomplished through rude gears but through exact capacitors. The difference between the old windmill and the modern one, between an immediate connection to the wind and a mediate one, thus comes down to the difference between the gear and the capacitor. What is this latter difference, from a Heideggerian standpoint? The gear of the old windmill is “immediately dependent on [or immediately submissive to] the blowing of the wind.” The gear works only while the wind is actually blowing and only while it is blowing in a certain manner: the wind must blow above the threshold force needed to overcome the resistance of the gears, and the wind must blow from a certain direction. Furthermore, the energy of the wind channeled by the windmill is not stored but is immediately exhausted in turning the gears. On the other hand, the capacitor (one charged by a wind-driven generator) is also entirely dependent on the blowing of the wind, but it is not immediately dependent on the wind. The capacitor will still work after the wind has stopped, and the capacitor offers no resistance the wind must overcome. Furthermore, the charge of a capacitor can be built up to the full by increments of infinitesimal amounts. Gearing, on the other hand, obeys the law of all or none: below the threshold, the wind has no effect on the gears. Practically speaking, there is no threshold for a modern windmill; the slightest movement of the air can be put to use. That is to say, the modern windmill works the wind for all it is worth. Finally, the capacitor does not exhaust the energy that has been expended to charge it; quite to the contrary, the whole purpose of the modern windmill is to amass that energy and keep it on call. Briefly, then, in Heidegger’s eyes, the modern windmill wrings out energy from the wind, ravishes the wind for its energy, and then hoards that energy. What is disrespectful or excessive about the modern windmill? Why does Heidegger find it necessary to describe it with such pejorative terms as “ravish” and “hoard”? We can begin to respond to these questions by asking what must be seen in advance in order to construct a windmill. What must be seen in the wind—i.e., under what aspect must the wind be disclosed—in order to conceive the possibility of a windmill? From a Heideggerian standpoint, there is an essential difference between the seeing in advance that gives rise to the old windmill versus the seeing that lies at the basis of the modern one. What did our predecessors see in the wind, and what do we now see in it? It could be said that, in general, both the ancients and the moderns see force or energy in the wind. But there is an essential difference. The ancients do not see in the wind energy as such. Perhaps we could call what they do see in the wind the natural blowing of the air. They see the wind entirely in its natural context, and they respect its natural context. That is why the old windmill has to wait for a “windy” day. To a modern windmill, every day is a windy day, since the air is always in motion and always contains some exploitable energy. The ancients do not see the wind as a source of energy as such, energy that could be put to any sort of use, but instead they see the wind as a force in a certain direction. The ancients see a directedness in the wind, i.e., they see the wind as already pregnant with something. The old windmill is designed to bring that pregnancy to fruition. With what is the wind naturally pregnant? That can be answered by taking a walk on a windy way and feeling the wind blowing in your face or at your back. The wind is naturally connected to movement: it helps or hinders things in their movement. The old windmill taps into this potential of the wind; the old windmill puts this potential to good use. It does so by harnessing the wind to a turning apparatus. The old windmill does nothing but turn, and turning is nothing but a natural motion the wind may or may not assist. The gears of a windmill merely serve to transfer the turning motion from the vanes to the millstone. The entire windmill then merely taps into and transfers the natural directedness of the wind toward motion. A modern windmill, composed of vanes, generator, and capacitor, does not simply tap into and transfer, but instead exploits, transforms, and stores. The vanes do indeed turn, but, since they offer practically no resistance, it does not require wind, a windy day, to turn them but any sort of air current; that is how the modern windmill exploits the wind. Secondly, a modern windmill needs no gears, and the generator does not transfer motion but instead transforms it into electrical potential. The capacitor, finally, does not use or use up that new form of energy but instead hoards it, so that it may be discharged when and where humans see fit. Heidegger describes this process as follows: The disclosive looking that holds sway in modern technology has the character of a . . . challenging. The challenging amounts to this, namely that the energy latent in nature is exploited, the exploited is transformed, the transformed is stored, the stored is, in turn, distributed, and the distributed is converted anew. Exploiting, transforming, storing, distributing, and converting are characteristic modes of this disclosive looking. (FT, 17/16) What sort of disclosive looking makes possible these modes? That is, more specifically, what must be seen in advance in order to conceive of the possibility of an exploiting, transforming, and storing modern windmill? The answer is that what must be seen in the wind is not merely that with which the wind is naturally pregnant, namely movement, but energy as such. The wind must be seen out of its natural context, where it assists or hinders some thing’s own movement. The wind must be seen not so much as wind, as that which we feel in concreto when we walk outdoors, but rather as mere anemo-pressure. This anemo-pressure or anemo-energy is not Boreas, nor the West Wind, nor any wind with which we are familiar. It is something we do not experience at all, for it is the result of an abstract way of looking at the wind. Anemo-pressure is the wind viewed only in terms of the energy that may be extracted from it, and anemo-pressure is no more the wind than H2O is water. What does it take to view the wind in this artificial way as anemo-energy? From a Heideggerian standpoint, it takes hubris. It takes disrespect for nature; it requires an imposition of a foreign standpoint, one that sees in nature only what can be extracted out of it for human needs and whims. That, for Heidegger, is what is excessive or unnatural about modern technology. It reduces nature to something at the beck and call of humans, rather than respecting nature and nature’s own ends. Modern technology is a reductionistic looking upon nature; what is disclosed in such a looking is a reduced face of nature, reduced from the concrete to the abstract, reduced from nature as it presents itself in our experience to nature in the form that allows us to exploit it. We can exploit water, understood as H2O; we can exploit it for its hydrogen and oxygen. But no one swims in H2O Part II: Modern Technology 75 O; no one baptizes with H2O. To see in water H2O is equivalent to looking upon a woman as a mere sexual object: in both cases, we have the same reductionism, the same violation, the same exploitation. For Heidegger, it is indeed science that teaches us water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen, but it is technology that actually performs the reduction, since the technological outlook is what motivates science to see in water a chemical compound in the first place. Likewise, it is science that teaches us how to build a modern windmill, but it is modern technology that supplies science with its motivating idea, namely the idea that the wind is a source of energy as such. The modern windmill certainly arises as the application of scientific discoveries; but it is modern technology that motivates that application in the first place. Modern technology supplies the idea of nature as something exploitable; that is what motivates the actual exploitation by science.

## Impacts

### Impact – Value to Life

#### Technological thinking erases Being – individual essences are enframed and replaced with ordered machinery.

Belu & Feenberg 10 (Dana S. Belu, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Philosophy @ California State University Dominiguez Hills & Andrew Feenberg, Research Chair in Philosophy of Technology @ Simon Fraser University, “Heidegger’s Aporetic Ontology of Technology”, February 2010)

In “Das Ge-Stell” Heidegger tends toward a totalized account of enframing. Ordering is a fundamental feature of the technical lifeworld. Its essence is something more than “merely a machination (Machenschaft) of people, consummated in the way of exploitation,” (GA 79, p. 29) because in the technical age people are themselves constrained to order. This constraint is, presumably, most evident in our handling of machine technology but is not restricted to this realm. This power of ordering allows the supposition that, what is here called “ordering” is not merely a human doing, even though the human being belongs to its execution [. . .] Insofar as human representation readily sets up what presences as the orderable in the calculation of ordering, the human being remains in its essence, whether consciously or not, set up as something to be ordered by ordering [. . .] The human being is ordering’s man [. . .] The essence of man is consequently set-up, bringing ordering into human ways Thus we in the technological age are determined or “set-up” by being as enframing. The truth or unhiddenness (aletheia) of technical beings and things remains concealed. “Ordering strikes nature and history, everything that is, and in all ways, how what presences is. What presences is set-up as orderability and is in advance represented as permanence whose stand is determined from out of ordering. What is permanent and constantly present is standing-reserve.” Heidegger’s description of this system in these essays is remarkable. Enframing “snatches everything that presences into orderability and is in this way a gathering of this snatching. Enframing is: Ensnatching (Geraff)”. The possibilities of relating to any and all types of machine technology are summed up by enframing. Enframing describes the on-going commotion (Betrieb) of rotation and turning or spinning (Drehung) of gears (Getriebe), that orders (bestellt) hydroelectric power plants, automobiles and business (Betrieb) round and round (Kreisgang) in a chain of ordering (Kette des Bestellens), without substantive goals and meaning. Thus, a leveled down, impersonal and mechanical form of exchange defines all human activity. Furthermore, the rotating mechanism that sets wheels and gears in motion is the same as the circulation of industry, information and the flow of markets. Heidegger writes, Machine technology does not exist separately . . . Machine technology does not merely replace equipment and mechanisms. It is just as little an object. It stands only insofar as it moves. It moves insofar as it runs. It runs in the hustle and bustle of business. The hustle and bustle drives as the intrigue of the ordering of the orderable. When the machine idles, then its rest constitutes a circumstance of business, its stopping or disturbance. Machines belong inside a machinery. But this machinery is not a heap of machines. **This machinery runs** out of the ensnatching of business as **that which is ordered as resource by enframing**

#### Loss of being destroys value to life – outweighs extinction.

Zimmerman 94(Michael, Prof of Philosophy @ Tulane, “Contesting Earth’s Future”, p.119-120)

Heidegger asserted that human self assertion, combined with the eclipse of being, threatens the relations between being and human Dasein. Loss of this relations would be even more dangerous than a nuclear war that might “bring about the complete annihilations of humanity and the destruction of the earth.” This controversial claim is comparable to the Christian teaching that it is better to forfeit the world than to lose one’s soul by losing one’s relations to God. Heidegger apparently thought along the lines: it is possible that after a nuclear war, life might one again emerge, but it is far less likely that there will ever again occur an ontological clearing through which such life could manifest itself. Further, since modernity’s one-dimensional disclosure of entities virtually denies them any “being at all,” the loss of humanity’s openness for being is already occurring. Modernity’s background mood is horror in the face of nihilism, which is consistent with the aim of providing material “happiness” for everyone by reducing nature to pure energy. The unleashing of vast quantities of energy in nuclear war would be equivalent to modernity’s slow motion destruction of nature: unbounded destruction would equal limitless consumption. If humanity avoided nuclear war only to survive as contented clever animals, Heidegger believed we could exist in a state of ontological damnation: hell on earth masquerading as material paradise. Deep ecologists might agree that a world of material human comfort purchased at the price of everything wild would not be a would worth living in, for in killing wild nature, people would be as good as dead.

#### **Technological rationality eliminates all meaning to life – subjective value is erased as all beings become objects within a technical framework of power.**

Joronen 10 (Mikko Joronen, Ph.D. in Geography at the University of Turku, “The Age of Planetary Space”, 2010, <http://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/66733/AnnalesAII257Joronen.pdf>)

It was precisely the transmutation of the basic attunement of wonder into calculative willing and ordering, where the production of artefacts through the know-how of tekhne became translated into challenging revealing based on arbitrary willing of technological machination. As already mentioned in previous sub-sections, the process that unleashed the arbitrariness of willing eventually led to the union of manipulative power of willfull machination and lived-experience, to the union through which the coercive power of machination became integrated to the arbitrariness of subjective willing. In short, the power of Gestell is equally a rise of the power of arbitrariness. As Heidegger writes, in modernity life as such turns into technically producible artefact: modernity’s goal is to “produce itself technologically” so that “the absolutely meaningless is valued as the one td only meaning” and where “the preserving of this value appears as the human domination of the globe” (1998c:197). In this ‘technologization of life’ human beings lost their general openness to be-ing and turn into technical animals armed with arbitrary will of subjective valuing, with a power that orders every thing, and thus life as such, by framing it to stand as technically producible and exploitable product. Technological imperative, the constant organization of the selfsame out of the growing modalities of power, as well as planetary systems of orderings this imperative constituted, are an outgrowth of the emergence of the ontology of the self-strengthening coercive power capable of manipulating things out of the arbitrariness of human will. In spite of the historical discontinuity implied by the turn from the wonder of beings to their willfull ordering – to the power of arbitrary calculations – Heidegger evidently holds that the rise of the will is equally constituted by the first beginning of Greeks. As Heidegger writes, already in Greek understanding of tekhne as something proceeding against the phusis, “lies the possibility of arbitrariness, of an unbridled positing of goals and thereby the possibility of escape out of the necessity of the primordial need”. And if this happens, “then in place of the basic disposition of wondering, the avidity for learning and calculation enters in” (1994:155, see also 153–154). Modern technological revealing, thus, is an outgrowth of the rise of this arbitrariness in terms of the allmakeable power of human willing, the will-full machination of calculation. As the insatiate will takes the place of the basic disposition of wonder, also the original idea of revealing, the aletheia, is lost. We end up in double concealment: when Greeks thought revealing (aletheia) in terms of teleological production but not the revealing as such (i.e. its Appropriation), modern technological thinking has lost the whole idea of revealing and hence has led to the further darkening of the question of being – it has forget and even forget that anything profound has been forgotten at all. In Gestell ontic beings and their manipulation become the sole matter of thinking, which means equally a total darkening of the question of be-ing and its Event of revealing. According to Heidegger, the crucial turn in proportion to such darkening takes place in the beginning of the modern epoch: it is precisely when the notion of truth as aletheia changes into correspondence and certainty that the revealing becomes inextricably connected to as well as obscured by the willing subject in a manner that knowing becomes a matter of representing beings as mere objects (Heidegger 1994:156–157; Heidegger 1973b:20). Accordingly, the self turns into subjective will conquering the world through the empirical knowing based on representative calculations. Or if read from the opposite direction, knowledge turns into a matter of certainty of representation that posits the world as a collection of objects corresponding to the calculative planning of willing subject. Thus, truth becomes a certainty of representation: the plausibility of claims becomes determined by the uncritical ambition that the certainty (of a knower) is the authorative mode of knowledge, the truth about the real constituted by the bearer, the human subject.

### Impact – Environment

#### Technological thought is the root cause of environmental destruction – their technological fix only makes things worse – only the alt solves.

McWhorter 92 (Ladelle McWhorter, Professor of Philosophy, Environmental Studies, Women, Gender, and Sexualities Studies @ Thomas Jefferson University, “Heidegger and the Earth: Essays in Environmental Philosophy”, 1992)

Thinking today must concern itself with the earth. Wherever we turn - on newsstands, on the airwaves, and in even the most casual of conversations everywhere - we are inundated by predictions of ecological catastrophe and omnicidal doom. And many of these predictions bear themselves out in our own experience. We see the expanding muddy landscapes and contracting glaciers at the extremities of our inhabited planet. We see the horrific damage that increasingly powerful hurricanes do to tropical and temperate coastlines whose wetlands and dunes have given way to high-rise condominiums and oil and natural gas refineries. We know there is a dead zone in the Gulf of Mexico the size of a New England state, the result of poisons draining into the sea along with the topsoil from Midwestern factory farms. We see and hear and pay the medical bills for millions of children with asthma whose lungs are scarred or underdeveloped as a consequence of the regular inhalation of toxic industrial and vehicular effluent. We live everyday with the ugly, painful, and impoverishing consequences of decades of technological innovation and expansion without restraint, of at least a century of disastrous "natural resource management" policies, and of more than two centuries of virtually unchecked industrial pollution - consequences that include the fact that millions of us on any given day are suffering, many of us dying of diseases and malnutrition that are the results of humanly produced ecological devastation; the fact that thousands of species now in existence will no longer exist on this planet by the turn of the century; the fact that our planet's climate has been altered, probably irreversibly, by the carbon dioxide and chlorofluorocarbons we have heedlessly poured into our atmosphere; and the mind-boggling fact—though few minds take the time to boggle in fact anymore—that it may now be within humanity's power to destroy all life on this globe. Our usual response to such prophecies of doom is to ignore them or, when we cannot do that—when they really are in our own backyards—to scramble to find some way to manage our problems, some quick and preferably inexpensive solution, some technological fix. But over and over again new resource management techniques, new solutions, new technologies disrupt delicate systems even further, doing still more damage to a planet already dangerously out of balance. Our ceaseless interventions seem only to make things worse, to perpetuate a cycle of human activity followed by, ecological disaster followed by human intervention followed by a new disaster of another kind. In fact, it would appear that our trying to do things, change things, fix things cannot be the solution, because it is part of the problem itself. But, if we cannot act to solve our problems, what should we do? Heidegger's work is a call to reflect to think in some way other than calculatively, technologically, pragmatically. Once we begin to move with and into Heidegger's call, and begin to see our trying to seize control and solve problems as itself a problematic approach if we still believe that thinking's only real purpose is to function as a prelude to action, we who attempt to think will twist within the agonizing grip of paradox, feeling nothing but frustration, unable to conceive of ourselves as anything but paralyzed. However, as so many peoples before us have known, paradox is not only a trap; it is also a scattering point and passageway. Paradox invites examination of its own constitution (hence of the patterns of thinking within which it occurs) and thereby breaks a way of thinking open, revealing the configurations of power that propel it and hold it on track. And thus it makes possible the dissipation of that power and the deflection of thinking into new paths and new possibilities.

### Impact – Disposable Earth

#### Technological enframing turns the entire globe into disposable standing reserve – causes global extinction to be viewed as an acceptable consequence of human use.

Joronen 10 (Mikko Joronen, Ph.D. in Geography at the University of Turku, “The Age of Planetary Space”, 2010, http://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/66733/AnnalesAII257Joronen.pdf)

Accordingly, Heidegger understands modern technology above all as a metaphysical project. Modern technological devices, from the “manual technology and manufacture” of the industrial age to the revolutions made first by the “engine technology” and then by what Heidegger (1998h:132–133) calls the ruling determination of modern technology as “cybernetics” (i.e. the rise and irruption of the systems of maximum possible automation of command), all manifest a peculiar mode of revealing that is not just total in nature, but an ever-growing imperial drive structured to constantly reach towards global enlargement and intensificatio**n**. Eventually such technological unfolding leads to a diversity of phenomena, including the worldwide homogenization of modes of living, the constant mobilization of cultural and economic practices, the global circulation of information, goods, capital, people, and knowledge, the establishment of colossal stocks of energy with massive potentiality of destruction as well (with the weapons of mass destruction), and the commodification and productisation of all aspects of life from nature to culture, from genetic information to consumption culture – even a certain insensibility with regard to tragedies of suffering (for instance through the television spectacles of war and catastrophe), as Haar adds (1993:80; see also Gillespie 1984:128; Mugerauer 2008:xv-xviii). In spite of the seemingly diverging characters, the former phenomena are nothing but epiphenomena of the age defining metaphysical scaffolding of technological revealing; it is the ‘framework’ of calculative drive, the technological revealing of ‘enframing’, which allows for multiple set of phenomena to emerge. As will be later shown in more detail, such sense of unity is first and foremost typical for a metaphysical mechanism of unfolding operative throughout the 2300 year tradition of Western thinking, a mechanism still being constitutive for the contemporary technological ‘enframing’ (Gestell) and self-heightening ‘machination’ (Machenschaft) of all things. As a matter of fact, it is the planetary outcome of such a technological mode of unfolding, which according to Peter Sloterdijk (2009) was first initiated and started as a ‘mathematical globalization’ – as a project that in Heideggerean reading was boosted into its technological form by early modern philosophers and mathematical physicists – further proceeding as a ‘terrestrial globalization’, finally leading to an age of ‘planetary globe’, which eventually turned the earth into a mere planet under totally penetrable networks of orderings (Thrift 2008:234–235; Morin 2009; See also Heidegger 1998h:133; Dallmayr 2005:44; Radloff 2007b:36–48). As the thesis will show, the contemporary planetary unfolding was first initiated by the latent ground of thought behind the metaphysical formulations of early Greek philosophers, further boosted by the mathematical developments of early modern thinkers, finally coming forth as cybernetic systems of ordering cast upon the planet. In such a planet, conceived as a mass of matter wandering in empty universe, everything is called to be useable, penetrable, mouldable, ‘decodable’ and mobile.

### Impact – War

#### Technological thought is the root cause of war and militarism.

Burke 7 (Anthony Burke, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations @ The University of New South Wales, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory & Event, Vol. 10 Iss. 2, 2007, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html>)

This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'. The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'.

#### **Western technological thought makes war inevitable – accelerates the human drive for control and mastery of nature and each other.**

Kateb 97 (George Kateb, Professor of Politics @ Princeton, “Technology and philosophy”, <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2267/is_n3_v64/ai_19952031/pg_6>, 1997)

Heidegger and Arendt amplify the story told by Weber, and also told, well before him, by Thoreau and Melville and others in the United States. In such essays as "The Age of the World Picture" (1938), "The Question Concerning Technology" (1949-50), and "Science and Reflection" (1954) (all three in Heidegger, 1977), Heidegger finds the origin of modern technology in Western metaphysics. He emphasizes the outlook of thinkers as lawgivers, and sees in them the true bearers of the passions and drives and motives that are the foundation of modern technology, rather than assigning the inspiration to common Western humanity as a whole. When philosophers are not content to awaken wonder at the world, but instead strive to remake the world, they sometimes succeed. Their greatest success is modern technology. Modern technology is, to repeat our phrase, a certain relation to nature or reality or the world; it is therefore not merely the inevitable application of that immense scientific knowledge that grows once humanity is rid of communal or religious superstition and repression. Certainly that is part of the story, but for Heidegger it is not the principal part. Rather, modern technology is the materialization of Western metaphysics, which is the parent of both modern technology and modern science. Indeed, the technological aim drives the development of modern science. Western metaphysics is just one interpretation of reality, just as its offspring--modern science and modern technology--are particular relations to reality, to what is given. Heidegger means to show that Western metaphysics--and metaphysics includes theology--is a continuously if sometimes covertly reiterated Platonism. By his method of exegesis, Heidegger tries to persuade us that Platonic metaphysics converts the world into a picture for the mind's eye, and by doing that, prepares Western humanity to lose sight of the mere fact of existence, the unsummoned thereness of reality, of the given. Metaphysics inveterately reduces the world. The purpose of the reduction is to make the world intelligible and hence manageable, fit to be worked on, and made ready to have practical order imposed on it. The world, as given, is disliked; it is disliked in large part just because it is given; the dislike engenders anger, and from anger comes rebellion. Western humanity is and has always been at war with given reality, to a much greater degree than the rest of humanity, and in a remarkably distinct manner. Technology is the most spectacular campaign in the great war waged by Western humanity against nature or reality as given. To repeat: the deepest cause of that war is not scarcity, not the failure of nature to make better provision for a necessitous humanity, but, instead, a Western willfulness, a will to power, to mastery, an overflow of energy that wants to shake the world to pieces and make it over. The craving is either to put the human stamp on reality or at least to rescue nature from the absence of any honestly detectable stamp, any detectable natural purpose or intention. As Nietzsche says: humanity, in its asceticism, "wants to become master not over something in life but over life itself, over its most profound, powerful, and basic conditions" (Nietzsche, 1969, sec. 11, pp. 117-18). Western humanity cannot let things be on their own terms or coax gently from them their own best potentiality; it is so far unable to practice what Heidegger calls Gelassenheit. Western metaphysics is the sponsor of anger and hence of repeated violence towards nature.

### Impact – Turns Case

#### **Technological thought prevents any possibility of reform – the aff’s “quick fix” only re-entrenches the same system that causes their impacts.**

Swazo 2 (Norman K. Swazo, Professor of Philosophy @ University of Alaska, “Crisis Theory and World Order: Heideggerian Reflections”, 2002, http://muse.jhu.edu/books/9780791488003)

Whether the subject was understood as world order studies, global policy analysis, or futurology, a sense of the problem and the need for drastic global reform came of age. The report of the first phase of the Club of Rome's Project in the Predicament of Mankind perhaps served most to generate awareness of the imminent crisis. Concerned with "five basic factors that determine and therefore, ultimately limit, growth on this planet-population, agricultural production, natural resources, industrial production, and pollution," this research group constructed a world model "built specifically to investigate five major trends ```of global concern accelerating industrialization, rapid population growth, widespread malnutrition, depletion of nonrenewable resources, and a deteriorating environment."' The main conclusion of the report is that "If the present growth trends in world population, industrialization, pollution, food production and resource depletion continue unchanged, the limits to growth on this planet will be reached some time within the next one hundred years."' Scenarios of the future, as I have noted, depend on methodological orientations, on whether the analysis is concerned with empirical norms primarily or some balance of empirical norms with moral norms. Futures research concerned more with empirical norms tends to concentrate on quantitative methods and computer analysis, producing "hard" models or scenarios of alternative futures. Robert Clute describes such efforts thus: International futures research attempts to examine current interrelated global issues in order to project or forecast the future consequences of past and present trends and to suggest alternative scenarios in an attempt to avoid undesired consequences. This work has become known as futurology, which, according to Victor Ferkiss, "combines the knowledge of the scientist, the will of the utopian and the imagination of the writer of science fiction." The policy aspect of international futures is in essence an attempt at long-term planning.' The problem with futures research, however, notes Clute, is that the most visible works which "purport to be global in approach are, in the main, biased toward scenarios that are concerned with maintaining the systems and values of the market economy, developed states. ... Indeed, many of the major futures studies are extremely ethnocentric and are therefore resisted by much of the world."'

## Alternative

### Alt Ext. – Experience 1st

#### Our immediate experience of the environment is a prerequisite – how we perceive and reflect on environmental problems comes before our ability to resolve them.

Casey 3 (Edward S. Casey, Professor of Philosophy at Stony Brook University, past president of the American Philosophical Association, PhD from Northwestern, “Taking a Glance at the Environment”, in “Eco-Phenomenology: Back to the Earth Itself”, 2003, http://muse.jhu.edu/books/9780791487280)

An ethics of the environment must begin with the sheer and simple fact of being struck by something wrong happening in the surrounding world. It is by noticing that something is out of joint—does not fit or function well—that a response is elicited and an action induced. Responsive action begins with what John Dewey called the “problematic situation.” Unless this situation is apprehended in its very problematicity, it will remain noxious, troublesome, harmful. People will go on being persecuted and tortured, chemicals will circulate freely in the air, and food and water will be poisoned—unless attention is given to what is awry in these circumstances. Not that notice is enough; the full force of ethical action requires reflection and consultation: in a word, followthrough. But the first moment of noticing is indispensable; without this, nothing will happen, nothing will ensue. In what follows I will examine this first moment of ethical responsiveness: the moment of the glance. My claim is that the human glance, meager as it seems to be, is indispensable for consequential ethical action. This is so despite the fact of its almost complete neglect by ethical theorists, who tend to find in it something merely trivial—at most, a predecessor to significant action but not part of this action itself. And yet it is of enormous significance, both in delimited interhuman settings and in the broader field of environmental ethics.

### Alt Ext. – Environment Solvency

#### **Phenomenological analysis is a necessary prerequisite to developing environmental ethics – only starting with our experience of nature allows us to break free from the calculative rationality of naturalism.**

Brown & Toadvine 3 (Charles S. Brown, Professor of Philosophy at Emporia State University, & Ted Toadvine, Professor of Philosophy & Environmental Studies at the University of Oregon, “An Introduction” in “Eco-Phenomenology: Back to the Earth Itself”, 2003, http://muse.jhu.edu/books/9780791487280)

Originating in the work of Edmund Husserl and developed and enriched by thinkers such as Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Emmanuel Levinas, phenomenology has won a worldwide following, not only among philosophers, but also among scholars in fields ranging from anthropology and architecture to geography and nursing. While there have been methodological divergences over the course of phenomenology’s first century, phenomenologists have continued to share the rallying cry first introduced by Husserl himself: “To the things themselves!” Phenomenology takes its starting point in a return to the “things” or “matters” themselves, that is, the world as we experience it. In other words, for phenomenologists, experience must be treated as the starting point and ultimate court of appeal for all philosophical evidence. 1 Although phenomenologists do not all agree on the best manner of characterizing or describing experience, or on the nature of the subject that experiences, this general tendency to start from experience—here taking this term in a broad sense—already demonstrates a basic convergence of the phenomenological method with the concerns of contemporary environmental thought. Our conviction that nature has value, that it deserves or demands a certain proper treatment from us, must have its roots in an experience of nature. As Neil Evernden has argued, those approaches to nature that strip it of all experienced qualities leave us with an unrecognizable abstraction, and certainly not with any version of nature that could have inspired our initial appreciation. 2 From the beginning, phenomenologists have taken an interest in this process of abstraction by which the world as we experience it is gradually transformed into the naturalistic conception of the world taken for granted by contemporary science. One point of agreement among phenomenologists is their criticism and rejection of the tendency of scientific naturalism to forget its own roots in experience. The consequence of this forgetting is that our experienced reality is supplanted by an abstract model of reality—a model that, for all of its usefulness, cannot claim epistemological or metaphysical priority over the world as experienced. The return to “things themselves” and the critique of scientific naturalism both point in the direction of much contemporary environmental thought. Throughout its development, phenomenology has seemed to promise a methodological route toward the disclosure of an “alternative” conception of nature—one that would avoid the reductionism of scientific naturalism as well as the excesses of speculative metaphysics. It should not surprise us, then, that today’s environmentalists see promise in the methods of phenomenology. Phenomenology is set apart from other theoretical methods by its unique capacity for bringing to expression, rather than silencing, our relation with nature and the experience of value rooted in this relation. For environmental philosophers, phenomenology suggests alternatives to many of the ingrained tendencies that limit our inherited perspectives: our myopic obsession with objectivity, our anthropocentric conceptions of value, and other legacies of Cartesian dualism. Phenomenology opens a space for the interdisciplinary examination of our relation with nature, for a scrutiny of the historical and institutional construction of the “natural,” and even of the role this concept plays in the formation of our cultural and self-identities. From its starting point in experience, phenomenology provides an open horizon for the exploration of all facets of our relation with nature outside of narrowly prescribed disciplinary boundaries. By doing so, phenomenology makes it possible, perhaps for the first time, for philosophical thinking to express and respond to the full range of our natural experiences. Even as environmental thinkers have begun to gravitate toward phenomenology, phenomenological philosophers have found the momentum of their own field always returning them to the question of nature. A careful examination of the history and development of the phenomenological tradition throughout the twentieth century reveals numerous interwoven strands that lead, through their own internal tensions, toward the emergence of ecological reflection—from Husserl’s critique of naturalism to Heidegger’s disclosure of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, from MerleauPonty’s descriptions of the lived body’s perceptual dialogue to Levinas’s attestation of the singularity of the face. Admittedly, each of these “classic” phenomenological authors stops short of developing an “environmental” philosophy. And yet, there is the growing conviction, evident among the authors collected here, that the fulfillment of these classic phenomenological truths points us in the direction of ecological investigation. Of course, after Hegel’s tutelage in the historical nature of concepts, we should not be surprised to find the concept of phenomenology unfold in novel ways at the dawn of its second century, especially as it draws on its task of exploring and disclosing the complexities and novelties of our experience of the world. The intersection of ecological thinking with phenomenology, the momentum that drives each toward the other, begets a new cross-disciplinary inquiry: eco-phenomenology. Eco-phenomenology is based on a double claim: first, that an adequate account of our ecological situation requires the methods and insights of phenomenology; and, second, that phenomenology, led by its own momentum, becomes a philosophical ecology, that is, a study of the interrelationship between organism and world in its metaphysical and axiological dimensions. Of course, this cross-disciplinary inquiry is still in its infancy; how the dialectical exchange between ecological thinking and phenomenology will operate is a matter that only future work can determine. Nevertheless, the essays we have collected here provide a first sketch of the contribution ecophenomenology can make for us today.

### Alt Ext. – Oil Solvency

#### **Rethinking our approach to resource use and capitalist production solves oil dependence – moving to a postpetroleum society requires the alt’s ecological imagination.**

Huber 9(Matthew T. Huber, Graduate School of Geography – Clark University, “Lifeblood: Geographies of Petro-Capitalism in the United States”,” Graduate dissertation, Submitted to the faculty of Clark University-Worcester-Massachusetts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Geography, May 2009)

Although chapters two, three and four explain the generalization of petrocapitalism during the postwar era, this conclusion reveals that the relations between oil and capitalist society will likely be best by crisis and instability in the coming years. Although the process will be driven by social and political forces, supply constraints make it likely that the 21st century will end with substantially less oil consumption across the world economy (including the United States). In this dissertation, I assert that understanding this process over the long term requires a mode of political economic analysis that approaches energy, in general, and oil, in particular, as a central element to the social regulation of capitalism. Such an energy-capitalism analytic is not only necessary for understanding, but also in crafting political challenges to the ecological contradictions of capital accumulation entwined with the fossil fuel economy. Changing the relationship between energy and economy requires an approach that does not simply see energy as a "technical" problem, but rather, requires re-thinking and contesting the very basis of capital accumulation itself - the majority of workers' livelihoods deepening upon the wagerelation and commodity relations for survival. Thus, struggles to move into a "postpetroleum" age should also consider the social basis of energy profligacy - capitalist promotion of growth and accumulation. Moving away from fossil fuel, but retaining the capitalist imperative of profit over any consideration of social and ecological needs will not result in a sane ecological future. It seems to me that a socially just and ecologically sustainable direction depends upon imagining a society beyond capital.

## Answers-to-Answers

### AT: Permutation – Crowdout

#### Perm fails – tacking on the alt as an afterthought only allows unchecked expansion of technological thought to continue – the aff crowds out any possible mindset shift.

Kohák 3 (Erazim Kohák, Professor of Philosophy Emeritus, Boston University, Ph.D. from Yale, “An Understanding Heart: Reason, Value, and Transcendental Phenomenology”, in “Eco-Phenomenology: Back to the Earth Itself”, ed. Charles S. Brown & Ted Toadvine, 2003, http://muse.jhu.edu/books/9780791487280)

Rather than risk contaminating the vaunted objectivity of its judgments with the alleged subjectivity of value, Western thought accepted a reality reduced to the quantifiable while consigning judgments of value and meaning to the outer darkness of the irrational, which respectable scholars could dismiss as unscientific, leaving questions of good and evil to prophets, poets, and postmodernists. Yet relations of meaning and value, though qualitative and subject related, are utterly fundamental to human decision making. Ignoring them would be difficult—and dangerous. Some contemporary thinkers have attempted just that, claiming value decisions to be a matter of indifference. Others, while considering them no less irrational, have sought to treat the irrational—instinct, intuition, or custom—as a legitimate counterpart of reason for dealing with questions of value and meaning. Though they seldom stated it explicitly, they assumed that constructing a nuclear bomb is legitimately a question of reason while dropping it is a matter of personal preference. 14 Having been on the receiving end of airborne ordnance, I find this most troublesome—and not only because of my generation’s experience with the cult of Blut und Boden, blood and soil. More basically, the problem is that instinct grows over millennia and custom over centuries, while culturally induced changes require an effective response in a matter of years. Were we to wait for instinct and custom to catch up with such changes, we should be rather likely to destroy ourselves long before we developed an instinctive or a traditional fear of firearms or automobiles, not to mention genetically modified crops. 15 A civilization basing itself on instrumental reason while leaving value decisions to an intuitive reliance on the irrational—as in the case of the Nazi attempt to entrust the direction of a technically rational civilization to an intuitive call of Blut und Boden —is a highly unstable compound. Technical reason is not enough and supplementing it with a dose of irrationality will not make it so. Communing with Gaia, however salutary, does not render quantitative expansion any more benign. 16 17 I believe that long-range, sustainable coexistence of humans with the community of all life requires more than an intuitive supplement to technical rationality, a peripheral Ouija board attached to our computers. Yet if quantification were the only form of rationality, that would indeed be the only way of modifying the supremacy of the quantitative. I believe the most provocative contribution of Edmund Husserl’s project of transcendental phenomenology is his persistent quest for an alternative conception of rationality based on the world constituted by the activity of life, not theory, a value-laden world structured by meaning. That is what Husserl with his unerring knack for choosing the most unfortunate term possible called transcendental subjectivity and what I have called, hardly less misleadingly, qualitative rationality. Thereof I would write, hoping to make those words a shade less obscure.

#### **Calculation crowds out the alt – any inclusion of the aff makes technological utilitarianism the only option.**

Botha 2 (Catherine, Dept of Philosophy @ Univ of Pretoria, “Heidegger, Technology, and Ecology,” South African Journal of Philosophy, Vol 22, Issue 2)

Technology is ontologically devastating, because it usurps all other modes of revealing. With every thing standing in reserve for our use, “distance” disappears (Heidegger, 1993:331). Here, Heidegger is referring to distance as an existential sense of our proximity to horizons: those between earth and sky, mortals and immortals. This blurring of borders is the main indicator of an unchecked anthropomorphism. This anthropomorphism that objectifies the world in order to exploit it is also one that creates the world in its own image, where everything that human kind comes into contact with becomes an extension of itself. Yet, human being as Dasein necessarily inhabits a “there” and so can never encounter only herself (Heidegger, 1993:332). Since human being is a thinking being-in-the-world, a situated and limited being, Heidegger can claim that the ultimate victory of technological human kind is a delusion. Its sovereignty would, however, not be any less catastrophic, because delusion may be come accepted as reality. Human nature and human freedom, in Heidegger's special sense of the word (1993:330), still lie in the balance. The Danger. The danger, therefore, is for Heidegger not the potential physical self-annihilation of humanity, but rather that intensive technological production will over power human's capacity for diverse modes of disclosure. Philosophic thought would be re placed with utilitarian cognition; artistic creativity would atrophy as a result of endless innovative production, and political action would be obviated by social en engineering. Heidegger's fear is that someday, calculative thinking would be accepted and practised as the only way of thinking. Calculative thinking is the type of thought that deals only with the quantifiable and the measurable. “Calculation refuses to let anything appear except what is count able ... Calculative thinking compels itself into a compulsion to master everything on the basis of the consequential correctness of its proce dure” (Heidegger, 1998:235). Most disturbing is that technological calculation and innovation may satisfy our needs to such an extent that we would not even notice what we had lost.

### AT: Permutation – Think 1st

#### **Reflection without action is key – the perm ruins the purity of thinking alone – nothing else allows nature to reveal itself on its own terms.**

McWhorter 92 (Ladelle McWhorter, Professor of Philosophy, Environmental Studies, Women, Gender, and Sexualities Studies @ Thomas Jefferson University, “Heidegger and the Earth: Essays in Environmental Philosophy”, 1992)

Some might find this unnecessarily harsh. We academicians may wish to contest the accusation. Surely, in the universities of all places, thinking is going on. But Heidegger had no respect for that or any other kind of complacency. The thinking he saw as essential is no more likely, perhaps unfortunately, to be found in universities or among philosophers than anywhere else. For the thinking he saw as essential is not the simple amassing and digesting of facts or even the mastering of complex relationships or the producing of ever more powerful and inclusive theories. The thinking Heidegger saw as essential, the thinking his works call us to, is not a thinking that seeks to master anything, not a thinking that results from a drive to grasp and know and shape the world; it is a thinking that disciplines itself to allow the world - the earth, things - to show themselves on their own terms. Heidegger called this kind of thinking 'reflection'. In 1936 he wrote. "Reflection is the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called in question” Reflection is thinking that never rests complacently in the conclusions reached yesterday; it is thinking that continues to think, that never stops with a satisfied smile and announces: We can cease; we have the right answer now. On the contrary, it is thinking that loves its own life, its own occurring, that does not quickly put a stop to itself, as thinking intent on a quick solution always tries to do.

#### **The desperate call for action is only a symptom of technological thought – we must call into question our ability and reasons to act before we rush to solutions – the permutation that foregrounds action will inevitably fail.**

McWhorter 92 (Ladelle McWhorter, Professor of Philosophy, Environmental Studies, Women, Gender, and Sexualities Studies @ Thomas Jefferson University, “Heidegger and the Earth: Essays in Environmental Philosophy”, 1992)

Heidegger frustrates us. At a time when the stakes are so very high and decisive action is so loudly and urgently called for, Heidegger apparently calls us to do - nothing. If we get beyond the revulsion and anger that such a call initially inspires and actually examine the feasibility of response, we begin to undergo the frustration attendant upon paradox; how is it possible, we ask, to choose, to will, to do nothing? The call itself places in question the bimodal logic of activity and passivity; it points up the paradoxical nature of our passion for action, of our passion for maintaining control. The call itself suggests that our drive for acting decisively and forcefully is part of what must be thought through, that the narrow option of will versus surrender is one of the power configurations of current thinking that must be allowed to dissipate. But of course, those drives and those conceptual dichotomies are part of the very structure of our self-understanding both as individuals and as a tradition and a civilization. Hence, Heidegger's call is a threatening one, requiring great courage, "the courage to make the truth of our Own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called in question”3 Heidegger's work pushes thinking to think through the assumptions that underlie both our ecological vandalism and our love of scientific solutions, assumptions that also ground the most basic patterns of our current ways of being human.

### AT: Permutation – Econ

#### Perm overrides the alt – the technological nature of economic rationality dominates and forces out all other modes of being – nothing is allowed in without being calculated.

Joronen 10 (Mikko Joronen, Ph.D. in Geography at the University of Turku, “The Age of Planetary Space”, 2010, http://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/66733/AnnalesAII257Joronen.pdf)

Even though calculative grasp on planetary globe offers flexible networks and accelerating motion, contemporary global capitalism gives them through the commanding figures of market value and profit accumulation. Such subjugation always requires growing control, predictability, gigantic domination, and total manipulation of beings. It hence requires a power that forces beings under the frame of total productability, makeability, and ordering; it requires a gigantic calculation, which in turn is always total by nature, since it does not tolerate any options that could not be used according to its logic. Global spread of capitalism, then, is essentially totalizing in its nature: it offers technization of life, which in turn works as a frame for the struggle and competition between powers of business calculation. No matter how flexible, circular, or moveable the planetary networks are, they are systems of orderings gaining growing control of things. When the whole earth has been abated to networks of interchangeable linkages, there are not just subjects facing the objects, but rather a global nexus of orderings, a pure relational and interchangeable functioning between entities under constant mobilization. In other words, the gigantic circulation, processing, mobilization and exchange of energies, materials, information, needs, capital, products and people flows are all parasitic to the ordering of things into standing-reserves, and therefore, to the technological system of calculative orderings. As Heidegger puts the matter through his discussion of forester in The Question Concerning Technology, “the forester who, in the wood, measures the felled timber and to all appearances walks the same forest path in the same way as did his grandfather is today commanded by profit-making in the lumber industries, whether he knows it or not” (Heidegger 1977a:18). Most of all, the forester, like the hewed wood, is entangled to the networks of profit-making from which they have their standing to be on call for flexible use, mobilization, and ordering. Out of such flexible networks of orderings, forester is “made subordinate to the orderability of cellulose, which for its part is challenged forth by the need for paper, which is then delivered to newspapers and illustrated magazines”. In such process of expanding distribution nature, as Heidegger writes in Traditional Language and Technological Language (1998h:137), is “developed into various, mutually dependent, phases and forms”: “the energy that is locked to nature is unlocked, what is disclosed is transformed, what is transformed is reinforced, what is reinforced is stored, what is stored is distributed”. Since such flexible and malleable ordering of entities takes its fuel from the gigantic calculation – from the ever-growing reign of growth, accumulation, efficiency and speeding up – beings are eventually unfolded through the field of relations that are torn apart from the earth. In other words, out of their manipulative grip these relations do not let the earth aspect of things to come forth in terms of its own (i.e. self-emerge). Accordingly, things become resources subjected under the technological manipulation and thus victims of machination, but above all they are forced under the functional clarity of technological rationality that sets things ready for the orders of profit-making. Given the ongoing process of globalization, and especially the global economic standardization, Heidegger’s notion about the struggle between 20 century’s worldviews over planetary control evidently carries significant lessons for our time. Perhaps one could say that the “struggle of world-views” to which Heidegger refers at late 1930’s has turned into a struggle between forces of business calculation (1977d:135). The fact that such business powers are now globalizing even more rapidly and extensively than ever, and reaching over the stratosphere as well, is clearly an outcome of growing efficiency, pervasive, and totalizing giganticism, and self-strengthening positioning of calculative manipulation. Altogether, the power of ordering functions out of multiple guises, because its calculative logic guarantees the whole of beings in advance according to its mission of efficiency, while seeing all strange simply as something not-yet-beingtaken-in-control. Technology apparently does not just involve the ‘dangers’ of the total oblivion of open be-ing and hence an oblivion of the nature of its own happening, but also a danger of becoming a global totality that lets no other modes of revealing to emerge. Thus, it is not that every thing on the planet is now determined technologically; Gestell is rather a drive, an intelligibility of expanding power, which unfolds everything under its total and limitless reign, hence increasingly subjugating different things under its logic of constant optimization. It is out of such instrumental serving of greater efficiency that calculative rationality of Gestell eventually unfolds the circular functioning that is hidden to modern technological intelligibility: the production-consumption cycle, the circuit of capital, the organization of any arrangements for the sake of their further ordering, the will that wills its own power and strengthening, the elevation of the pursuit of goals into fundamental goal itself, the indefinite circulation of the stocked energy, the ever-more-efficient accumulation of profits, the eternal growth of whatever is growing, the inexorability of the limitless reign of power, and thus the everexpanding networks of orderings. Just like the outbreak of total giganticism that tolerates nothing outside of its own logic, circular strengthening is the ultimate way being holds sway through the variety sets of contemporary phenomena, including the perhaps most decisive global power of our time: the expanding and pervasive economic power of profit-making that subjugates things, in proportion to their market value, under its total logic of accumulation. [Circular Functions of Power: Calculation as Nihilism of Spatial Ordering] Now that it has been shown how the rise of the expanding world-views, from Communism to National Socialism and contemporary global capitalism, is inevitably connected to the technological unfolding, it is possible to deepen our understanding concerning the operational nature of self-strengthening and self-overpowering power of machination; a power, which eventually constituted the process of overpowering conquest of (planetary) space by calculating and arranging things as functions according to its own power. Globalization evidently is not grounded upon machines with ability to annihilate mammoth distances, but upon calculative systems of orderings gaining enhanced and broadening control of things through the nullification, abolition, and homogenous levelling of spatial relations of things into orderable networks. As a reserve for this manipulative power, the earth upon which man dwells turns into a conquered globe, into a measured planetary ball subjugated under the networks of orderings as well as moulded into controllable framework of uniform distancelessness (Heidegger 1973b:4; Kisiel 2001b:246). The functional rationality of these planetary-wide networks of orderings – the implicit order to spread and increase – in turn is a derivative of the dynamic and circular character of self-strengthening and self-overpowering power of machination. Power of machination, then, does not just order beings into constantly present standing-reserve; it also forces beings into gigantically growing, circularly functioning, and remoteness abolishing standing-reserve. Accordingly, it is not just the manipulative levelling of all beings into uniformly makeable reserve, but added to this, the circularly heightening nature of calculative ordering, which holds sway, for instance, through the global hegemony of dissolving all things into calculated market value through the mantras of competitiveness and growth (See Haar 1993:80; Heidegger 2001b:112,124). Such guises through which the gigantic calculation makes its appearance above all help to show how Gestell truly is a way of unfolding that functions by setting things available for its own circularly extending logic. The ongoing march of neo-liberalism is an example par excellence about the implementation of the power of machination: when all things are made producible by the manipulative power, and thus when all things are merged into calculated market value, the whole planet turns into a resource for manipulative powers of production and consumption – into a global market place under the networked chains of strengthening orderings of production and consumption. The circular and gigantic imperatives of globalization then rest upon one specific detail: the historical dynamics of how power work in contemporary world. The present sub-section aims precisely to show how the functional intelligibility of planetary system of orderings is fuelled by the ever-reaching, ever-growing, overpowering and self-strengthening power to master and order, by the will that wills more of its own power. It also describes how such an arbitrary functioning of power creates a “horizon of meaninglessness” through its fundamental goal of evermore efficient handling and management, where things do no come forth on their own, but as uniformly available reserve of use.

### AT: Science Good

#### **Alt doesn’t reject science, only scientism – we must create space for alternate conceptions of nature beyond as a completely calculable object of mastery.**

Embree 3 (Lester Embree, Professor of Philosophy at Florida Atlantic University, Ph.D., New School for Social Research, “The Possibility of a Constitutive Phenomenology of the Environment”, in “Eco-Phenomenology: Back to the Earth Itself”, ed. Charles S. Brown & Ted Toadvine, 2003, http://muse.jhu.edu/books/9780791487280)

Although the expression “ecology” is often extended to encompass much more, particularly in Europe, in the United States it chiefly designates a biological discipline concerned with organisms and their environments. This discipline also includes work in chemistry, geology, meteorology, and other naturalistic sciences. What it centrally addresses can be called vital or organic nature—that is, living things—and the theoretical attitude in which it addresses them is, in the terminology of Husserl’s Ideen II, “naturalistic,” the naturalistic attitude being a specification of the natural attitude coordinate with the specifically personalistic (=cultural) attitude in that work. On the basis of theories about aspects of this sort of nature, there can be scientific technologies, including what is sometimes called environmental engineering, which is not a science but is nevertheless scientific, that is, science based. Both the naturalistic science and the naturalistic-scientific technology that relate to the environment have been exploited in the naturalism in human thought that has been spreading since the Renaissance. While good science, and technology based on it, are self-critical and modest enough to avoid construing their cognitive approach as paradigmatic for epistemology and their findings as metaphysical claims, naturalism— whether in philosophy or common sense—willfully does so in both respects. Phenomenologists ought to oppose scientism, but not science. The first contribution of a constitutive phenomenology of the environment is therefore to provide the analysis in terms of which the “nature” correlative to the naturalistic attitude is an abstract part of the cultural world. This is not a matter of the subtle and sophisticated construction produced and constantly refined in the astonishing history of naturalistic-scientific thinking over recent centuries, which is one of humankind’s greatest achievements. Instead it is the nature that phenomenologists increasingly call “lifeworldly nature” and that is encountered in sensuous perception and hence prior to all construction in thinking. Once abstracted from the remainder of the concrete cultural world, this perceived nature is premathematically spatial, temporal, and causal and includes physical things, vital or organic things, and among the latter, things that also have mental lives—that is, humans as well as nonhuman animals. 4 3 In the grip of naturalism, one might well wonder how such a sensuously perceivable nature, which includes the nature of ecological science, could be considered an abstraction. But if one is willing to suspend what is habitually taken for granted and to reflect carefully, one can recognize that the world in which one finds oneself living is always already fraught with values and uses for us. Since the students in a professor’s classes play roles in the educational situation as much as the professor does, they are more than specimens of homo sapien sapiens. Similarly, desks and lawns are more than geometrically shaped wooden (or plastic) objects and curious monocultures of exotic flora. Phenomenologically, they are “cultural objects” and make up “cultural situations” within “cultural worlds.”

### AT: Tech Essentialism

#### **The problem isn’t technology itself, it’s technological thought – machines can be used but our relationship towards machination is a prerequisite – the alt allows for a reorientation of our openness towards technology without rejecting it.**

Joronen 10 (Mikko Joronen, Ph.D. in Geography at the University of Turku, “The Age of Planetary Space”, 2010, http://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/66733/AnnalesAII257Joronen.pdf)

Lastly, what it comes to the objection about one-dimensional essentialism, according to which all technological apparatuses share the same mode of revealing so that such an essentialist understanding eventually leads to a situation where one needs to either reject or embrace technology as a whole, the case of Heidegger is not that straightforward. Firstly, even though the aforementioned condition of one-dimensionalism may hold true – instead of searching the margins or pointing the differences, Heidegger’s way of thinking traces the centre, the gathering power of being (See Polt 1999:179; Mugerauer 1994:93–94; Ziarek 2002:175–176) – it is precisely the richness of Heidegger’s thought to convincingly show how modern technological devices and seemingly different phenomena grow out from a particular unfolding, and thus from a peculiar self-understanding of an age, that is not just limited to the way modern technological devices work. Secondly, as already adduced above, technological devices are not mere copies that stand against their perfect platonic essences, against the original presence that one could fully represented. We rather aim to hear and articulate the way things work by hiding their original ontological happening (i.e. presencing), by listening how the ‘thing things’, how it reflect us back our ontological self-understanding, the paradigmatic nature of the Event of unfolding (Heidegger 2001d:172; Thomson 2000b:439). Such coming into view of Ereignis is not a based on articulation of axiomatic rationalities that define the characteristics of a genus of technological apparatuses, but, as Richard Polt argues (2006:33), a “state of emergency”, a moment that “founds our belongingness by unsettling us”, thus enabling a change in our existential relation to things by uncovering the finitude and limitedness of the grasp of prevailing unfolding. In short, the aim of such hermeneutic receptivity to the fluid phenomenological nature of things is not to define the genus or class of particular kinds of things, such as technological devices, but to think the meaning of particular modes of being, such as calculative revealing, that modern technological devices seem to share and reflect in their way of functioning. The motion of thought is not from the technological things to their essential conditions – such thinking would obviously follow the metaphysical logic of thought – but from the pre-conceptual intimation and inconspicuous positioning made by historical understanding towards its articulation. Moreover, even though at some extent the claim about one-dimensional essentialism of Heidegger’s notion of Gestell seems correct, at least in a manner that the points above clarified, in Heidegger’s case this clearly does not mean that we should reject modern technology as a whole. Heidegger does not say ‘no’ to modern technology, but both, ‘yes’ and ‘no’. As Heidegger writes, “we let technical devices enter our daily life, but at the same time leave them outside, that is, […] as things which are nothing absolute but remain dependent upon something higher” (1966a:54). In other words, we can say ‘yes’ to technological devices, if we at the same time say ‘no’ to the hidden demand they make for us to become insatiable machines of calculation and management, efficiently planning and controlling things as mere standing-reserves of our own needs. We cannot reject modern technology by simply destructing it; what we are capable of is to free ourselves from the grasp of its mode of revealing through phenomenological openness Heidegger calls the “releasement towards things” (Gelassenheit) (Heidegger 1966a:54; for a more detailed discussion concerning these three objections, see Feenberg 2000a, 2000b; Thomson 2000a, 2000b, 2005:44–78; Verbeek 2005:61–76). Accordingly, we do not have to reject modern technology as a whole, but to change our relation to the intelligibility their functioning constitutes.

### AT: Tech Inevitable

#### **Alt isn’t a blanket rejection of technology but transcendence of the technological mindset – obviously we aren’t advocating going back to the Middle Ages.**

Thomson 2K (Iain Thomson, Professor of Philosophy of the University of New Mexico, Inquiry, “What’s Wrong with Being a Technological Essentialist? A Response to Feenberg”, in “Democratizing Technology”, ed. Tyler J. Veak, January 2000, https://muse.jhu.edu/books/9780791480960)

This may sound mysterious, but in his 1949 essay on ‘The Turning’ Heidegger unequivocally states that he is not advocating anything as ridiculous as the abandonment of technology. In the post-nihilistic future that Heidegger worked philosophically to help envision and achieve, ‘Technology’, he repeats, ‘will not be done away with. Technology will not be struck down, and certainly it will not be destroyed.’ Indeed, Heidegger can no longer be confused with a Luddite longing for a nostalgic return to a pretechnological society; in his  nal interview (given in 1966), he reiterates that the technological world must be ‘transcended, in the Hegelian sense [that is, incorporated at a higher level], not pushed aside’. Heidegger’s critics may object that he does not provide enough guidance about how practicing an open phenomenological comportment will allow us to transcend our current technological understanding of Being, but he cannot be accused of a reactionary rejection of technological devices, and even less of wanting to reject the essence of technology, which, he says, would be madness, ‘a desire to unhinge the essence of humanity.’

### AT: Renewables Solve

#### **Renewable energies are technological thought in disguise – they maintain the same attitude towards nature, only making the exploitation last longer.**

Rojcewicz 6 (Richard Rojcewicz, Professor of Philosophy @ Point Park University, “The Gods and Technology: A Reading of Heidegger”, 2006, http://www.mohamedrabeea.com/books/book1\_10597.pdf)

In this first example we also see, in a preliminary way, that for Heidegger the antidote to the danger of modern technology is not conservation, or, at least, it is not merely conservation. A modern windmill is “environmentally friendly”; it exploits a renewable energy source and does not pollute. For Heidegger, however, such a windmill is not the solution but is part of the problem. The solution must go deeper than conservation, must go all the way to the root of the problem, which is the attitude toward nature at the heart of modern technology. Conservationism may actually include the exact same attitude that nature is merely there to be exploited, only now it is recognized that nature’s treasures are finite and we must make them last. For Heidegger, such an attitude is essentially the same as the one of rampant exploitation of nature; they both embody the same view of nature, and it is that view that holds the danger. Thus for Heidegger, as we already hinted and will take up more fully in Part III, the danger is not that technology might get out of hand and make the world uninhabitable; the danger is not merely to human life but to something even more precious, to something even more worthy of defending, namely, human freedom and dignity.

### AT: Passivity

#### **Rethinking comes before action – mindless intervention only reproduces the same impacts – reject the call to manage the environment in favor of self-reflection.**

McWhorter 92 (Ladelle McWhorter, Professor of Philosophy, Environmental Studies, Women, Gender, and Sexualities Studies @ Thomas Jefferson University, “Heidegger and the Earth: Essays in Environmental Philosophy”, 1992)

When we attempt to think ecologically and within Heidegger's discourse (or perhaps better: when we attempt to think Heideggerly within ecological concerns), the paradoxical unfolds at the site of the question of human action. Thinking ecologically - that is, thinking the earth in our time - means thinking death; it means thinking catastrophe; it means thinking the possibility of utter annihilation not just for human being but for all that lives on this planet and for the living planet itself. Thinking the earth in our time means thinking what presents itself as that which must not be allowed to go on, as that which must be controlled, as that which must be stopped. Such thinking seems to call for immediate action. There is no time to lose. We must work for change, seek solutions, curb appetites, reduce expectations, find cures now, before the problems become greater than anyone's ability to solve them - if they have not already done so. However, in the midst of this urgency, thinking ecologically, thinking Heideggerly, means rethinking the very notion of human action. It means placing in question our typical Western managerial approach to problems, our propensity for technological intervention, our belief in human cognitive power, our commitment to a metaphysics that places active human being over against passive nature. For it is the thoughtless deployment of these approaches and notions that has brought us to the point of ecological catastrophe in the first place. Thinking with Heidegger, thinking Heideggerly and ecologically, means, paradoxically, acting to place in question the acting subject, willing a displacing of our will to action; it means calling ourselves as selves to rethink our very selves, insofar as selfhood in the West is constituted as agent, as actor, as controlling ego, as knowing consciousness. Heidegger's work calls us not to rush in with quick solutions, not to act decisively to put an end to deliberation, but rather to think, to tarry with thinking unfolding itself, to release ourselves to thinking without provision or predetermined aim.

### AT: Policymaking

#### Only the alt prevents serial policy failure – ontological investigation is key to problematize failed approaches to political problems.

Dillon & Reed 2K [Michael, Professor of Politics at Lancaster, and Julian, Lecturer in International Relations at Kings College, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, Complex Emergency,” in *Alternatives* 25:1]

As a precursor to global governance, governmentality, according to Foucault's initial account, poses the question of order not in terms of the origin of the law and the location of sovereignty, as do traditional accounts of power, but in terms instead of the management of population. The management of population is further refined in terms of specific problematics to which population management may be reduced. These typically include but are not necessarily exhausted by the following topoi of governmental power: economy, health, welfare, poverty, security, sexuality, demographics, resources, skills, culture, and so on. Now, where there is an operation of power there is knowledge, and where there is knowledge there is an operation of power. Here discursive formations emerge and, as Foucault noted, in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.[ 34] More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure—the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it. In consequence, thinking and acting politically is displaced by the institutional and epistemic rivalries that infuse its power/ knowledge networks, and by the local conditions of application that govern the introduction of their policies. These now threaten to exhaust what "politics," locally as well as globally, is about.[ 36] It is here that the "emergence" characteristic of governance begins to make its appearance. For it is increasingly recognized that there are no definitive policy solutions to objective, neat, discrete policy problems. The "subjects" of policy increasingly also become a matter of definition as well, since the concept population does not have a stable referent either and has itself also evolved in biophilosophical and biomolecular as well as Foucauldian "biopower" ways.

### AT: Pragmatism/Utopian Alt

#### **Voting neg is the only way to access true pragmatism – without an ontological shift, our so-called pragmatic use of technology will only end in self-destruction – this reorientation of will is both necessary and possible. The only utopian thought is thinking that we can go on as we do now and have the environment survive.**

Bonner 11 (Charles Bonner, Department of Philosophy @ Providence College, “Images of Environmental Disaster: Information and Ontology”, Forum on Public Policy, June 2011, http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/85643653)

In shifting attention toward the formation, construction or production of the image of disaster, Galison and Jones pointed toward the inevitable lacunae or blind spots, and suggested that a more complete picture would or could have very different pragmatic effects—that is to say, a more complete, more accurate picture could elicit very different responses from the public. This can hardly be gainsaid, and yet our close reading of their article has emphasized the necessity of a second step—beyond the surface images, and then beyond the specific invisibilities left out of the picture—in order to open up a “deeper” pragmatic ground outside of or anterior to the technocratic framework. Indeed, the “chiaroscuro” logic of their analysis, recognizing that the very visibility of the surface images effectively occludes all other aspects of disaster, can be applied as a second level. The “positivity” of the technocratic framework—whose objects are measurable, calculable, open to scientific scrutiny and technological intervention—functions to occlude the type of analysis sketched out in this study. The effective working space constituted within the operative framework of environmentalism blocks from view the “deeper” pragmatic ground addressed by ontological inquiry. This deeper pragmatic ground is accessible only by means of an ontological inquiry. That is to say, by means of a more radical questioning of the structure of our reality, the fundamental configuration of the world we inhabit, a new conceptual approach to the environmentalist problematic becomes possible. Rather than hoping for a more or less complete image of disaster to emerge, as a technological construct functioning in a technological totality—functioning, indeed, as a means of “critique” or self-correction of the system of relations that gives rise to environmental disaster as such—this ontological inquiry would direct attention, and response, toward this underlying “reality,” this system of relations, this fundamental configuration of the world we inhabit. Now, needless to say, no miracle cure emerges when we begin to rethink the environmentalist problematic in these terms. To be sure, the Seinsgeschichte [history-of-being] perspective outlined at the beginning of this study does situate our present Information Age as the culmination and critical turning point of the history of ontological epochs (ancient Greek, medieval Christian, modern scientific, etc.) that have constituted “reality” in different ways across the grand historical sweep of the West. In doing so, this perspective situates our present epoch as a transitional period of unprecedented ontological-historical importance. Now, to recognize the transitional character of our present ontological order is to recognize the essential fragility of our present world setup. A major environmental disaster, whether an oil spill or nuclear meltdown, can serve as an “ontic clue” (to borrow a term from Heidegger once again) that points to the essential fragility, the ontological instability, of the reality we inhabit. It is here, I think, that the most important pragmatic implications of this kind of thinking emerge. In the technocratic framework which is the natural home of the environmentalist problematic (that framework constituting a sort of generalized elaboration of the modern scientific worldview so as to include all social relations and in particular the “soft technologies” involved in governmental and legislative regulation of economic activities), the image of environmental disaster is meant to function as a mechanism of self-correction, by which “the system” responds to and adjusts to its own systemic threats and malfunctions. Even at this level, it is hard to claim, today, that the image is functioning properly—that it is “doing its job” in eliciting appropriate responses from the public or from governmental, legislative or corporate decision makers. Thus the critique of the “surface imagery” of disaster offered by Galison and Jones is entirely appropriate. But we can also follow the trajectory of their thinking a bit further, perhaps in a more radical direction: to keep in mind not only what is left out of the picture, but what is necessarily occluded by the very nature of the environmental disaster image qua technological construct. Namely, that is, the fundamental ontological configuration of “our reality.” In doing so, the pragmatic implications—the very meaning of response and the strategies of environmental activism—shift radically. Instead of hoping for a systemic self-correction, a reprogramming of governmental regulation of certain corporate practices, offshore drilling for example, or the oil-extraction industry‘s own internal adjustment spurred by costly mishaps, ontological inquiry points toward a different realm altogether—essentially “invisible” since it lies beyond the technocratic framework. If the etiology and the tracing of root causes of environmental disaster go back to the ontological dimension in which our basic conception of reality is forged, then our response, too, must be worked out in this realm. Not by imposing some new ontological arrangement, under the rubric of sustainability, for example, upon being itself. This is precisely what Western thought, and especially its modern scientific and technocratic culmination, has always attempted to do! In rethinking the environmentalist problematic from an ontological perspective we can recognize the possibility of a fundamental adjustment of the basic relation between consciousness and reality (or between thought and being, to put it in traditional philosophical terms.) To recognize that such an adjustment, perhaps as subtle as it is radical, is not only necessary but also possible (!)— is to catch sight of a new realm of action. What we must hope for and work toward is not a system-wide self-correction of the functioning technocracy, but a new relation to reality as such, a new way of being. If we cannot “ontologically fix” our world-system which is increasingly prone to breakdown, we can, in principle, respond to the new order of being as it emerges: not by imposing our technological will upon it, but by accepting the responsibility it will assign to us. Whatever “technical arrangements” will be necessary, (and they are of course many) regarding our actual existence in the world as human beings, will have to be informed by this underlying ontological responsibility. A new configuration that defines our place in the world as responsible beings—as beings that respond to the manifestations of being—will surely have to engage all those practical realms that shape our experience of what we call reality. Our political and economic arrangements, our basic social relations, our ways of growing food and building buildings—and our reliance on external energy sources—will all have to be re-thought and pragmatically re-worked in ways determined not by the reigning ontological technocracy, but by response to the new and multiple configurations of being as they emerge. Hardly utopian, this thinking points to the sobering tasks that will be assigned, or are already assigned to us insofar as we perceive the environmental disaster as clue—or perhaps as command—that opens up a new relation to being, a new realm of responsibility, and new forms of action.

### AT: Ontology Focus Bad

#### **Ontology predetermines policy – how we think of being influences every choice and experience that we have – ontological questioning undermines their very mode of thought.**

Dillon 99 (Michael Dillon, Professor of Politics at University of Lancaster, “Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics”, ed. David Campbell & Michael J. Shapiro, 1999, <http://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/4146017>)

As Heidegger—himself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the philosophical and the political—never tired of pointing out, the relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. For one cannot say anything about any-thing that is, without always already having made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought, in short, always already carries ontology sequestered within it. What this ontological turn does to other-regional-modes of thought is to challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that review reverberate through-out the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy. With ontology at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline of thought as it does to the question of modernity as such, with the exception, it seems, of science, which, having long ago given up the ontological questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears now, in its industrialized and corporatized form, to be invulnerable to ontological perturbation. With its foundations at issue, the very authority of a mode of thought and the ways in which it characterizes the critical issues of freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how they inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in question. The very ways in which Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficulty, or aparia, for human being of decision and judgment. In other words, whatever ontology you subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe to will construe the problem of action for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mock- innocent political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making. While certain continental thinkers like Blumenberg and Lowith, for example, were prompted to interrogate or challenge the modem's claim to being distinctively "modern,” and others such as Adorno questioned its enlightened credentials, philosophers like Derrida and Levinas pursued the metaphysical implications (or rather the implications for meta- physics) of the thinking initiated by Kierkegaard, as well as by Nietzsche and Heidegger. The violence of metaphysics, together with another way of thinking about the question of the ethical, emerged as the defining theme of their work! Others, notably Foucault, Deleuze, Lyotard, Baudrillard, and Bataille turned the thinking of Nietzsche and Heidegger into a novel kind of social and political critique of both the regimes and the effects of power that have come to distinguish late modem times; they concentrated, in detail, upon how the violence identified by these other thinkers manifested itself not only in the mundane practices of modem life, but also in those areas that claimed to be most free of it, especially the freedom and security of the subject as well as its allied will to truth and knowledge. Questioning the appeal to the secure self- grounding common to both its epistemic structures and its political imagination, and in the course of reinterrogating both the political character of the modern and the modern character of the political, this problematization of modernity has begun to prompt an ontopolitically driven reappraisal of modern political thought. This means that the ontological constitution of politics itself- its legislating categories of time, space, understanding, and action, and of what it is to be-prompted by the politics of the specific (ontological) constitutional order of political modernity, has begun to come under sustained scrutiny.

#### **Ontological inquiry is key to an authentic existence – ignoring ontology erases the possibility of individuals and political institutions making choices properly attuned to ourselves, each other, and our environment.**

Margini 10 (James Margini, College of DuPage, “Worlds Apart in the Curriculum: Heidegger, Technology, and the Poietic Attunement of Art”, Philosophy Scholarship, 1/1/10, http://dc.cod.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context=philosophypub)

Heidegger uses the term Dasein to describe the human. This term is not psychological, biological, or anthropological in nature. Instead, Dasein denotes specifically the way of life, or Being, of the human. Dasein is unlike any other entity in the world. For Dasein is neither an object nor subject we hypostatize. As Heidegger (1971) writes, “When we designate this entity with the term Dasein [‘there-being’], we are expressing not its ‘what’ (as if it were a table, house, or tree) but its Being” (p. 67/42). It is possible to envisage Dasein functioning uniquely as both noun and infinitive, as it indicates that we are always on-the-way, always moving toward our own potential for being what we will become through the enactment of our unique possibilities for an authentic, flourishing existence. Science does not engage in ontological inquiry, rather it is focused exclusively on learning facts about entities, without concern for their Being. Science conducts ontical investigations, and asks questions that can be answered with empirical certainty. To conduct an inquiry into Being, or the Being of entities, is to do ontology, and ontological questions are much more difficult, if not impossible, to answer with certainty. Ontology unfolds in the form of an inquiry as opposed to an investigation, e.g., ontology is concerned with more primordial questions than science, such as “What is it to be as a human being?” Ontology, as conceived by Heidegger, raises both the fundamental question concerning Being in general and the concomitant concern with the Being of beings, this latter concern presupposes that there are existential structures sustaining and enabling our Being-inthe-world. Heidegger’s philosophy places great importance on revealing the existential structures underlying our lives, and in particular, the various authentic ways we exist. He believed that our potential for a rich and fulfilling existence was bound up with the understanding of these structures. Living authentically relates directly to the ontological ways in which we are free, beholden and responsible to our ownmost potential for living, which includes the understanding of mortality and our solicitous Being-with-others. When caring for our Being and the Being of others, which represents an authentic existence, we are living in such a way as to exercise critical thought and engage in creative intellectual and artistic problem-solving. Heidegger lived out this type of life as a philosopher, educator, and “learner,” for Heidegger placed the highest value on education, stating that the teacher’s vocation is perhaps the most important and difficult role for one to assume. Heidegger’s entire philosophy, which includes his thinking on education, was directed toward awakening humans to their authentic ontological potential for living as true guardians of Being, for dwelling poetically on the earth. Heidegger viewed the history of the Western world in terms of the concern only for “beings” and “present-at-hand” entities, a concern for “what” comes to presence as opposed to a concern for “how” this is made possible in the first instance. We tend to value ontical investigation over ontological inquiry into the nature of Being, into the essence of our unique “potentiality-for-Being,” i.e., what we can be as ontological sites of potential and transcendence. This phenomenon, the “loss of Being,” the forgetting of the original question of ontology, dramatically effects our lives and world, and this includes the dehumanization of our social-political-educational institutions. This relates directly for Heidegger to the way in which our contemporary world is in the grip of an adverse form of attunement, which is the spawn of modern technology, causing us to understand and discourse about our lives in impoverished ways. Attunement (Befindlichkeit), represents the ways in which we find ourselves in the world. Our existence is revealed through the following “modes of disclosure”: moods (Stimmung), understanding, and interpretive discourse. It is important to know that our understanding and discourse are never revealed outside of our moods, as they are co-original with moods, therefore being in a mood is the most primordial way in which we inhabit our world. Moods are always at work coloring our thoughts influencing our behaviors and shaping our understanding of the world. “In having a mood,” writes Heidegger (1967), “Dasein is always disclosed moodwise as that entity to which it has been delivered over in its Being; and in this way it has been delivered over to the being which, in existing, it has to be” (p. 173/135). Moods should not be mistakenly identified as “emotions,” which are derivative of moods and extremely limited in their power to disclose our world, whereas moods are far more all-inclusive in what they reveal. However, not all moods disclose our world equally. For example, everyday moods do not provide us with authentic insight into our life, do not provide fundamental insight into our Being as a whole, and are associated for this reason by Heidegger, with inauthentic moods, ways of existing in which we are adversely attuned. When we are adversely attuned our full ontological potential is obscured; we live for others as opposed to living authentically for ourselves, we flee-in-the-face of our responsibilities, and this is a flight from original philosophical thinking. As Heidegger (1967) argues, when we are lost in the world, in the “They-self,” we are not beholden to our ownmost potential and possibilities, and that “factical potentiality for Being which is closest (the tasks and standards, rules, the urgency and extent of concernful solicitous Being-in-the-world) has already been decided upon” (p. 312/268). In such a state, we inhabit the world in an inauthentic manner, our lives are not our own, and we surrender our ontological potential for authentically existing, for authentically enacting our own unique possibilities. Authenticity is contrary to what I have described above, as Dwyer, et al (2000) state, “Authenticity has to do with the possibility of Dasein becoming awake of itself as existing inauthentically and consequently changing. In order to be authentic, Dasein must assume responsibility for its choices, and, more important, it must make these choices its own” (p. 144). The first step in recovering our ontological grounds for existing, consists in the recognition that our potential has been covered over due to being adversely attuned to our life and world.

### AT: Anthropocentrism

#### Readings of Heidegger as anthropocentric are incomplete – his later works break down the rigid barriers between human and animal being that he is accused of building.

Mitchell 11 (Andrew J. Mitchell, Professor of Philosophy @ Emory University, PhD from Stony Brook University, “Heidegger’s Later Thinking of Animality: The End of World Poverty”, Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual, 2011, http://www.heideggercircle.org/Gatherings2011-04Mitchell.pdf)

Discussions of the Heideggerian thinking of animality are overwhelmingly considerations of his – lecture course Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, where the animal is famously presented as “world poor” and trapped within a “disinhibiting ring.” The focus on this course is surely understandable as it is his most extensive treatment of the matter anywhere in his corpus, but it is not the only one. In the text “Language in the Poem,” Heidegger rethinks animality no longer in terms of containment, but instead in terms of exposure to world. A more radical break with the earlier course is hard to imagine. Here what comes to the fore is a new relation between mortality and animality, problematizing the distinction between the two. After presenting Heidegger’s later view of the animal, I will briefly address what it has to offer for questions of Heidegger’s purported “ontotheological anthropocentrism.” 2 1 The consideration of the animal in the Trakl essay “Language in the Poem” arises out of a thinking of departure and wandering. Beginning from Trakl’s line: “The soul is a stranger on earth,” Heidegger explains that “strange” ( fremd) derives from the Old High German fram, which means “on the way to … .” The soul that is a stranger on earth is one that has set out on the way to somewhere else. It has left any domicile behind for paths on the way somewhere, without yet having 4 reached any destination. The soul that is underway is thus “between” places. The soul is defied by this being underway, so much so that it is not even the source or “origin” of its own movement, but is “called” out along the paths it traverses. Heidegger asks, “to where is the stranger called?” and answers, in accordance with Trakl’s poem, that the stranger is called “into the downfall [Untergang].” 5 This Untergang, however, is not so much a downfall or even a “going under,” rather it is, translated just as literally, a “going among” or “going amidst” (unter zu gehen). The soul is called to go among the things of the world, which is to say, it is called into this between. If there is any downfall or demise to be had here, it is solely that of the self-centered and encapsulated subject that would imagine itself at home, master of the world, regarding it from on high. Indeed, Heidegger describes this Untergang in just such terms of dissolution: “It is losing oneself in the spiritual twilight of blueness.” 6 To set out underway, to enter the between, is to enter this spiritual twilight of blueness. It is “spiritual” insofar as Heidegger follows Trakl in understanding spirit as a flame capable of offering inviting warmth at a hearth as well as burning everything to ashes in conflagration. Spirit as flame is never wholly one or the other of these, always in between. The loss of oneself by entry into the between occurs at “twilight” (Dämmerung), the crepuscular transition of the day. It is not simply the end of the day, but likewise the dawn of morning. “Morning, too, has its twilight [dämmert].” Twilight is always between the end and the beginning. Lastly, the between is a spiritual twilight of “blueness” insofar as blue is the color of twilight, of the time that is neither day nor night. Blue is the color of the trace, of what remains light in the dark and dark within light. As Heidegger puts it, “The brightness sheltered in the dark is blueness.” 9 8 In all of these aspects, the loss of self is revealed to be an entry into the between of relationality. No longer at home and not yet at its destination, the wandering soul finds itself on the way somewhere. On these paths between enclosures, it wanders exposed. The essence of this soul as a stranger means that it is never at home, not even with itself. It is not defined by being in place, but by being underway, neither here nor there. Having left the closure of the home behind, it is exposed to what comes. This being underway is thus a condition for encounter, for seeing and being seen. Out among the blueness of twilight, the wanderer is caught sight of by a blue deer (das blaue Wild). Heidegger’s rethinking of animality unfolds in his reading of this recurrent figure in Trakl’s poetry. Let us note at the outset that the animal in question is a deer, a game animal or wild beast, a Wild. The etymologically attested connection with the wilderness, Wildnis, should not be missed. But just as the wilderness is understood by Heidegger as a “garden of the wilderness,” indicating the ineluctable relationality of the human such that the wild is never untouched, a similar understanding informs the thinking of the deer (das Wild). The deer will not be so wild as to remain completely foreign to us. There is a relation between wanderer and blue deer operative here. Trakl’s deer is the “blue deer” (das blaue Wild), where blue once again names the slippage of the between, the blurring of just such oppositions as the wild and the civilized, for example, and the appeasement of the antagonisms that they establish. In fact, Heidegger follows Trakl in thinking of the Wild as the “shy deer,” the “gentle animal.” 10 But the blue deer must enter the twilight, just as the wanderer must leave home. Heidegger follows Trakl in tracking this transformation of animal (Tier) into the deer (Wild). The transformation begins with Trakl’s depiction of “ … An animal’s face / transfixed before blueness, blue’s holiness.” 12 11 Heidegger elaborates the consequences of this exposure to blueness: In sight of the blue and at the same time brought to selfrestraint [Ansichhalten], the animal’s face is transfixed and transforms into the countenance of the deer [Antlitz des Wilds] … . In being transfixed, the face of the animal comes together. Its appearance gathers itself, composing itself, in order to look towards the holy. The transformation of the animal into the deer is coincident with the look out towards the holy, which we can provisionally sketch as the space of grace, or arrival. The animal is not some self-contained creature harboring an essence or species-being. The animal is instead what it is on account of a relation that carries the animal out past itself to situate it in the between, to transform it into the blue deer. Exposed in the blueness, the deer is open for what comes and stands as a witness to it. The deer observes what takes place along the twilit paths of the between: For a blue deer always follows these darker paths, an observer among the twilight trees 14 Trakl calls on the deer to assume this role of witness in regard to the wandering of the stranger. the steps of the stranger rang through the silver night. Would that a blue deer were to remember his path Heidegger asks, “who is the blue deer that the poet calls out to? An animal? Certainly. Only an animal? By no means. For it is supposed to remember [gedenken].” The remembrance of the deer is a looking past the present in two ways, first by remembering what it has seen, and second by seeing what is not simply present, but what is instead drawn out into the between along these twilight paths as well. This memory, this capacity for witnessing, makes the blue deer something other than an irrational animal. The deer is past the present in its recollection and this redefines its animality: “The blue deer is an animal, whose animality presumably does not rest in the animalistic, but in that observing recollection.” 17 16 The animal becomes the deer in looking beyond itself, certainly past any “disinhibiting ring” that would confine it. To be sure, the transformation in question is a break with all manner of confinement for the animal. Heidegger’s new understanding of the animal is on the basis of its exposure to blueness, i.e. in terms of the between. This means breaking with the traditional abstractions and oppositions of metaphysical animality whereby it is set against the rational and intelligible. In the Trakl interpretation, this animal-rational diremption is thought of as a “curse” that has befallen us, though Heidegger is quick to explain that “not duality [das Zwiefache] as such, but rather discord [die Zwietracht] is the curse.” Duality and dierence are the gift of existence for us, modes of relating. Concomitant with that 19 gift, however, is the curse of discord. The differences all too easily reify into antagonistic oppositions, not simply dividing the separated parties but urging them on to their utmost extremes. Animality becomes sheer wildness, with Heidegger observing that “due to this [the discord] each of the clans [Geschlechter, sexes, races, generations, tribes] is drawn into the unbridled uproar of the always isolated and sheer wildness of the wild beast [bloßen Wildheit des Wildes].” Discord isolates each pole of the opposition it institutes – animality against rationality, for instance – such that the poles are deprived of all contact with each other. Animality is opposed to the rational and becomes sheer wildness and revolting brutality. “Out of the uproar of blind wildness it [discord] carries each clan into a diremption [Entzweiung], and thereby casts it into unbridled isolation.” 21 20 The segregation of the animal from the rational has led to the animal being understood as the brute wild beast. It is isolated and quarantined within itself. Like a dog on a leash inciting the very behavior it would remedy, the isolated animal is caught within a sameness to self that drives it mad. The transformation of animality likewise promises a transformation of humanity insofar as the antagonism between the animal and the rational has been written into the definition of the human as animal ra- tionale. This dirempted being has not yet made its way into the indeterminacy of the blue. Invoking Nietzsche, Heidegger accordingly observes: “This animal, namely the thinking one, the animal rationale, the human, according to a word of Nietzsche’s, is not yet established.” But for Heidegger this does not mean that the animal has not been sufficiently determined – indeed, he mentions that the contemporary human is all too decisively constituted and determined – rather that “the animality of this animal has not yet been made firm, i.e. ‘brought home,’ brought into what is native of its veiled essence.” 24 23 The home for this human animal is out among the twilight paths. Its only home is on the way to … . What is not yet established for it is no further determination, but the dissolution of these in the blue. The animality of this animal has not yet been allowed to remain veiled, indeterminate, so as to essence. The diremption and exacerbation of oppositions dissolves in the blue twilight. Heidegger writes that “the countenance of the deer in sight of the blue takes itself back into the gentle [das Sanfte]. For the gentle is, according to the word itself [Grimms’ dictionary derives it from sammeln, to gather ], the peaceful gathering. It transforms the discord in that it converts [verwindet] what is injurious and scorching of the wild [der Wildnis] into an appeased pain.” 25 In the blue, the animal is no longer forced by its connement to be ever only brute and wild animality. Rather than being endlessly goaded into ever purer forms of self-sameness, ever more extreme expressions of its irrationality, the animal in the blueness is able to be calmed and become gentle. The appeased and calmed pain remains a pain, but the discord of it is “converted” (verwindet). The discord is not forgotten as though it never happened, instead it is understood as dependent upon a prior field of relations from which it was an abstraction. The discord that arose from a drive to purity (of the animal, of the rational, of the space between them) is understood as dependent upon a preceding context of nonoppositional relations, a deformation of the between. With the appeasement of discordant opposition, a new sense of animality can emerge. Heidegger refrains from trying to dene it any further. Indeed, in some sense this would be impossible, insofar as the animal is now understood as essentially connected through its look with what it is not, and thus not simply present-at-hand for an assessment and evaluation. In Heidegger’s words, “this animality is still far o and scarcely to be sighted. The animality of the animal here intended thus vacillates in the undefined.” 27 26 Let us note, however, that this animality is not unseen; there are traces. And if this new animality is as we have said, then it could never be fully present for the viewing anyway. It could only be sighted by a vision that likewise occurred within the between, one not constrained to the simply present, an observing recollection once again. What then does this tell us about the relationship between humans and animals? The stakes of this question are high, since Heidegger is often taken to be a “metaphysical humanist” who inserts a strict divide between the human and the animal, keeping each side in its purity free from contamination by the other. 28 One of the grounds cited in support of such a claim is precisely the distinction between “dying” and “coming to an end” that plays a strong role in the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, but which is also to be found in Being and Time as well as in later texts like the Bremen lectures. The current analyses allow us to respond to such claims. The transformation of the human in blueness would parallel that of the animal that is transformed into the blue deer. The human would become the mortal – a stranger to itself, and one defined by what lies most outside it, something that it can never possess and which keeps it open and disposed towards the world, i.e. its death. This is surely a shift from a thinking of the living being (Lebewesen) to that of the beings that can die (die Sterblichen), but it is a shift that is not automatically the privilege of the human. In “The Danger,” the third of the Bremen lectures where Heidegger first develops the role of the mortals within the fourfold, he intones that “the human is not yet the mortal.” 29 Mortality is not something simply pre-given as a distinction to the human against the rest of life. It marks a kind of transition out of the living being, out of humanity itself: “From the rational living being, the mortals must first become.” Mortality is something that humanity does not possess. A consequence of this is that it is not only the animal that does not die. It is the human, too. Heidegger makes this brutally clear in notorious lines from the same lecture: 31 Hundreds of thousands die in mass. Do they die? They perish. They are put down. Do they die? They become pieces of inventory of a standing reserve for the fabrication of corpses. Do they die? They are unobtrusively liquidated in annihilation camps. And even apart from such as these – millions now in China abjectly end in starvation. 32 These are harrowing words, to be sure, and what they express is the fact that death is nothing pre-given. More, death is something that can be taken from another. No one may be able to die my death for me, but they are in the position to take that death from me, it would seem. Humans do not die, they come to an end. Perhaps it is not a coincidence that in the wake of the war this purportedly essential marker of a difference between the human and the animal would waver, if not give way altogether. The idea that only humans would die and that this would ground an essential, even ontological, distinction from the animal for Heidegger must be surrendered.

### AT: Nazism

#### **Heidegger’s actions can’t be separated from historical context and shouldn’t invalidate the rest of his philosophy.**

Zimmerman 81 (Michael E. Zimmerman, Professor of Philosophy @ Tulane University, “Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger’s Concept of Authenticity”, pp. xxvi—xxvii)

I contend that Heidegger's concept of authenticity changed as the result of insight he gained during his own life. Some of his followers would object that this contention runs the risk of psychologizing his works, undermining their validity by interpreting them as “emotive" or "personal" statements. One of Heidegger's major claims, however, is that a change in one's understanding of Being presupposes a change in one's existence. His concept of authentic human Being changed because he himself changed. The probable motive behind the desire to separate Heidegger's thinking from his life is to protect that thinking from defilement by his involvement with National Socialism. Just as many people have committed the genetic fallacy of saying that Nietzsche's works are irrational because he went insane, others have committed the same fallacy by calling Heidegger's work immoral because, for a time, he supported Hitler. This conclusion is understandable, since Heidegger did use his philosophical vocabulary to support Hitler and some of his political aims; but it is invalid. In arguing against this conclusion, however, I do insist that Heidegger's use of his own philosophical concepts (including that of authenticity) cannot be ignored in a study of the development of those concepts. Heidegger himself insisted that a thinker must be understood in light of his historical context. This context must include the thinker's own activities. A thinker hopes to express what he has learned in his own life. It is true that the change in Heidegger's conception of authenticity, from resoluteness to releasement, occurred because the concept itself demanded the change. It is also true that Heidegger himself had to change in order to understand this demand. Philosophical theory cannot be divorced from the practice of human life. My biographical treatment of Heidegger will be based on his own remarks about his development as well as deduced from changes in his concept of authenticity.

#### **He joined the party but wasn’t anti-Semitic – Heidegger opposed the genocide and saw it as a terrible consequence of technological thought.**

Thomson 5 (Iain Thomson, Professor of Philosophy at University of New Mexico, “Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education”, pp. 82, 7/11/5)

As Rorty poignantly suggests (the interjected quote is from Paul Celan's powerful "Death Fugue"), another question haunts the two we will focus on here, and it is perhaps the most vexed: What was Heidegger's relationship to Nazi anti-Semitism, and so to the Shoah? My first sentence in this section expresses the general view I take on this disturbing issue. Many edifying details from the exculpatory narrative long disseminated by Heidegger and his most loyal followers - for example, that Heidegger became Rector of Freiburg reluctantly, and did so only in order to use his fame to protect his Jewish colleagues, students, and the academic freedom of the university - have been seriously compromised by the facts. We now know, for instance, that Heidegger occasionally resorted to strategic uses of anti-Semitism in the service of his academic political goals, and that this led (after a letter from Heidegger containing a derogatory reference to "the Jew Fraenkel" was leaked to Karl Jaspers) to Heidegger's indefinite loss of his teaching license and his subsequent hospitalization for depression.'3 At the same time, however, even Heidegger's critics acknowledge that he publicly condemned the "biologistic" racial metaphysics behind the Nazi "final solution" to Marx's "Jewish question," and that he did help some Jewish colleagues and students.'4 Moreover, although Heidegger never made the kind of public apology for which Marcuse and others long called, he did not in fact remain "silent" on the Shoah. A 1949 lecture proclaimed "the manufacture of corpses in the gas chambers and the death camps" to be "in essence the same" as mechanized agribusiness (GA7g 27), that is, more and less obvious symptoms of our nihilistic, "technological" understanding of being. Such a proclamation may be "scandalously inadequate" (as Lacoue-Labarthe writes), but the point is that, for Heidegger, the inhumanly rational mentality capable of devising such a horribly efficient network of technological processes for the "mass production of corpses" (Arendt) - factories for stripping human beings of all their potentially reusable resources (from fillings to hair), murdering them en masse, then reducing them to ashes (Celan's "graves in the air"), a process by which thirty thousand innocents could be, and were, murdered in a single twenty-four-hour period in the Auschwitz death camps alone - appears to be a particularly vivid and horrifying fulfillment of the underlying metaphysical logic that "liquidates" human beings by reducing them to Bestand, "resources," mere "items of material available for the manufacture of corpses [Bestandstucke eines Bestandes der Fabrikation von Leichen] " (GA79 56) .'5 Of course, until the notoriously secretive Heidegger archives all come to light, it is only reasonable to expect this troubling issue to continue to animate and inform the Heidegger controversy. For the current range of views, one need only compare the undeniably important but diametrically opposed treatises on the subject by Wolin and Julian young.16 Neither critic nor defender, however, maintains that Heidegger's decision to join the Nazis can be explained by anti-Semitism.

#### **Heidegger believed in a different version of National Socialism and quickly became critical of the Nazis – his political motives are distinct from his philosophy.**

Rohkramer 5 (Thomas Rohkramer, Professor of History @ Lancaster University, “Martin Heidegger, National Socialism, and Environmentalism,” in How Green Were the Nazis? Nature, Environment, and Nation in the Third Reich, ed. Franz-Josef Bruggmeier, Mark Cioc, and Thomas Zeller, pp. 173, 2005)

Heidegger's initial enthusiasm soon waned. He decided to end his rectorship in spring 1934 and withdrew from all political involvement. Already in the lecture "An Introduction to Metaphysics," delivered in the summer term 1935, he voiced his critique of the bureaucratic management of the race of a Volk, and in his Nietzsche lectures (1936-40) he became increasingly critical of a modern will to power that, he believed, was behind the actions of all leading nations including Germany. Despite this, Heidegger's claim that he had opposed the regime since 1934 is not correct. He never left the Nazi Party, and his lectures were always accompanied by a Nazi salute. When he met his former student Karl Lowith, who (as a Jew) had fled Germany in 1936, he wore his party badge, reaffirmed his conviction that "National Socialism was the proper course for Germany," and agreed with Lowith's suggestion that his political conviction was based on his philosophy.' Passages from his war lectures show that, while seeing the whole war as a tragedy, he still sided with Germany! While it is true that party spies listened in on his lectures and that attempts were made to stop the publication of one of his articles, this does not mean that the regime regarded him as an opponent. Rather, the Nazi movement was characterized by endless infighting: the philosophers Ernst Krieck (Heidegger's former ally in university politics) and Arthur Rosenberg tried to gather material to weaken the influence of a philosopher who was still regarded as a major player? Heidegger was an enthusiastic Nazi, at first. While his version of Nazism was not the ideology that won out in the Third Reich, the regime was well served by the initial support of a leading philosopher. From 1934 on, however, Heidegger's distance from the regime began to grow. It is difficult to put dates to this gradual process: but Lowith's report strongly suggests that he still saw himself as a Nazi in 1936, despite disagreements on fundamental policy issues. By the time he delivered the Nietzsche lectures, the distance had grown to the extent that Heidegger should no longer be regarded as a Nazi, although to the end of his life he continued to hold two opinions which suggest that he never quite realized the unique dimension of the Nazi atrocities: he always failed to differentiate between Nazism and other forms of modern society in his sharp critique of the modern world; and he never questioned his chauvinistic belief that Germany was the most metaphysical nation, from which a positive historical turn was most likely to emerge. Lastly, Heidegger was typical of the widespread German reluctance to acknowledge personal responsibility for Nazism: in his statement immediately after the Third Reich about his rectorship, he still maintained that it had been better to try to exert a positive influence on National Socialism rather than stand aside? He continued to play down the historical significance of his actions, and he tried to excuse his political error by pointing at the misjudgments of others.

## Affirmative Answers

### Permutation – Technology

#### **Tech is inevitable and useful – only the perm allows us to say “yes” and “no” to technology and preserve its saving power while questioning it.**

Elden 1 (Stuart Elden, Professor of Political Theory and Geography @ University of Warwick, PhD from Brunel University, “Mapping the Present: Hedegger, Foucault, and the Project of a Spatial History”, 2001)

Heidegger expressly sees this in terms of technology, a point he makes several times in his works. ‘Thus the essential unfolding of technology harbours in itself what we least suspect, the possible rise of the saving power’ (VA 36; BW 337). Though he is deeply sceptical about the advances of technology, Heidegger, contrary to how his critics have often characterized him, suggests that outright rejection is absurd. Instead, Heidegger suggests that we must give it a trial: For all of us, the arrangements, devices and machinery of the technological world are to a greater or lesser extent indispensable. It would be foolish to attack the technological world blindly. It would be short-sighted to condemn it as the work of the devil. We depend on technical devices; they even challenge us to ever greater advances. (G22– 3; DT53) What is important is to work with technology, but not surrender ourselves to it, so that it affects our inner and real core. Heidegger suggests that this ‘yes’ and ‘no’ is best summarized as releasement toward things [Die Gelassenheit zu den Dingen] (G 22– 3; DT 54; see ID 40/105). Unlike the early Ju ¨ nger he neither sees technology as a solution, nor looks to a new mode of thought over the line. What we have to do is understand and think: where there is danger, there is the potential of salvation; where there is power there lies the means of its resistance. This leads Heidegger to one of his most famous formulations: ‘The closer we come to the danger, the more brightly do the paths into the saving power begin to shine and the more questioning we become. For questioning is the piety of thought’ (VA 40; BW 341).

#### There is no single explanation for the problems of modernity – Heidegger’s universal opposition to technological rationality will always fail. The permutation opens up the narrative for diverse strategies and preserves the beneficial parts of technological reasoning while resisting Heidegger’s totalizing fascistic claims.

Zimmerman 90 (Michael E. Zimmerman, Professor of Philosophy @ Tulane University, “Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, and Art”, 1990, pp. 271-273, https://muse.jhu.edu/books/9780253114686)

This ever-receding, dissumulating, self-withdrawing, and self-veiling event of truth, that which "gives" the various modes of presencing which have stamped the history of the West, may be understood in part as Ent-eignis, as the event of dis-appropriation, as the "feminine" which refuses to be disclosed or unveiled by an obtrusive metaphysical-masculinist thrust. The thinker, then, is not to appropriate being but instead to pay homage to the self-concealing abyss which "gives" being in the first place, to submit to or to be appropriated by the play which can never be controlled or understood. Perhaps the major difference between Heidegger and Derrida is that while the former insisted that in this abyss there remains a mystery worthy of contemplation, a mystery whlch "gives" the ontological and temporal perimeters of the West, the latter contends that there is no such mystery, but rather only the unending, unpredictable, and ungroundable play of signifiers. That even the allegedly patriarchal Heidegger can be read as having called into question certain of the masculinist dimensions of his own ontological project reminds us of the dangers involved in applying any interpretive framework which tries to explain too much. Essentialist feminism, represented by authors such as Susan Griffin, Mary Daly, and Adrienne Rich, risks elevating in an ahistorical and uncritical way the "feminine" to a privileged position in respect to the now de-centered and dis-counted "masculine." Derrrida, however, despite his playful depiction of the struggle between the masculinist unveilers and the dissimulating feminine, warns that "there is no such thing as a Being or an essence of the woman or the sexual difference. . . . "44 Likewise, Julia Kristeva has urged us not to make the difference between male and female, masculinist and feminist, into a binary opposition in which the female pole becomes depicted as essentially superior, for "the very dichotomy man/ woman as an opposition between two rival entities may be understood as belonging to rnetaphysics." While the feminist interpretation of the patriarchal origins of modem technology may de-center important aspects of Heidegger's account of technology and may thereby reveal the sexual "difference" that he largely ignored, at least some of those interpretations seem to privilege the "essential" female in a way analogous to how Heidegger privileged the history of being in his own account of modem technology. Westem history is overdetermined by numerous factors; no single explanation can hope to account for the extraordinary complexity involved in the origins, development, and future of modem technology. Heidegger contributed to the contemporary discourse which depicts modem technology as a manifestation of hidden power interests. These interests, including those of state socialism and monopoly capitalism, have justified themselves on the basis of a foundationalist narrative, one of the key doctrines of which has been "universal human progress." Those who engage in the deconstruction of this narrative do not necessarily share Heidegger's concern about the dangers of a nihilistic world. Nor do they always discern the political perils involved in the radical critiques of the Enlightenment's "progressive" ideals regarding human liberty. While we may justifiably call for the dismantling of all authoritarian and hierarchical structures, and while we may laud attempts to de-center the primacy of the Enlightenment's atomistic, masculinist subject, we may also question the tendency to be relentlessly suspicious regarding the motives behind the aim of protecting the "rights" of individual subjects. Events of the twentieth century show that those movements which denigrate individual freedoms either as bourgeois ideals based on outmoded metaphysical foundations (Marxism), or as egocentric practices associated with the degeneration of those foundations (fascism), usually lead to repressive, collectivist, totalitarian political regimes. If the Enlightenment conception of the "subject" deserves redefinition, the Enlightenment's goal of protecting individuals from oppression and abuse also deserves being expanded and preserved. Despite its emancipatory aims, however, the Enlightenment also promoted attitudes which, especially in conjunction with subsequent developments in the economic and industrial realms, have in some ways clearly blunted or compromised those aims. The dark side of the Enlightenment includes anthropocentrism, subject-object dualism, and a totalizing tendency reflected in the overestimation of the importance of scientific and instrumental rationality (metaphysical foundationalism) at the expense of other modes of reasoning. Instrumental rationality, when placed in the service of the power drive present in monopoly capitalism and state socialism, tends to produce social formations that not only repress (whether overtly or indirectly) political freedoms but also distort the development of the kind of subjects necessary to engage in the communicative praxis required to reveal and to criticize such repression. The liberal commitment to protecting individuals from oppression, then, requires a critique of how market values, technological innovations, and concentrations of wealth in monopoly capitalism tend not only to undermine the structure of the subject who is supposedly "free," but also to displace or to marginalize those traditions and attitudes which promote community and solidarity, and which resist being absorbed into the domain of liberal political economy. While we must keep in mind the dangers of Heidegger's illiberal worldview, then, we must also take seriously his critique of the limitations of the technocratic character and the atomistic individualism of most modem liberal democracies. As one critic recently noted, Heidegger "dared to state that human fulfillment is not likely to be attained through an ever-expanding technology or in a managerial society, and that democratic individualism has resulted in the loss of cultural specificity and in delegitimating long-established community." In my view, if humankind is both to achieve liberation from various kinds of political, social, cultural, and economic oppression, and to avoid destroying the ecosphere by nuclear war or by industrial pollution, new narratives are needed which delineate and celebrate the differences inherent in a multi- voiced humanity, which attempt both to define and to protect the "rights" and "interests" that are arguably common to the great majority of humans at this point in history, which encourage the development of communities that do not involve regression to collectivist practices or attitudes, which develop an alternative to the dissociative and anthropocentric attitude toward nature and the human body, and which emphasize the importance of modes of reasoning other than instrumental-scientific without at the same time denigrating the latter. While these new narratives would celebrate diversity, they would possibly discover elements of a common narrative in the one now being developed by post-modem scientists, who have replaced the mechanist model of nature with one that emphasizes nature's capacity to develop novelty, complexity, uniqueness, and freedom.47 To some extent, the optimism of the totalizing narratives of modernity was grounded in the belief that nature is a machine which can be completely understood and controlled. The non-mechanist narratives of post-modem science suggest that the natural world is far too complex and diverse to be understood in terms of a single principle, despite the ongoing search for a "grand unified theory" in physics. Post-modem science, then, not only helps to undercut the basis for totalizing narratives which promote domination, but also sets the stage for overcoming the humanity-nature dualism which has helped to justlfy the "exploitation" of nature without and nature within. Such overcoming will take a long time and will require the development of different narratives in different cultural contexts. While affirming that human awareness arises from the play of natural forces, and while emphasizing the need to show respect for all forms of life, the requisite new narratives would not call for a primitive "return" to nature in the form of the recollectivization that characterized fascist movements. Rather, as I shall argue in a subsequent book, these new narratives would ideally encourage the development of authentic individuation that is consistent not only with a richly variegated human culture but also with a diverse and stable biosphere. In many different domains, including natural science and philosophy, there is a growing consensus that the ancient search for final truths is flawed not only because humanity itself is finite,- and because the very activity of interpretation changes what is being interpreted, but also because the universe itself is changing in ways that transcend the activity of interpretation. Although Heidegger may not have agreed with this particular way of describing the finite character of human understanding, he would have agreed with the conclusion that human existence is historical and thus lacks absolute foundations for its projects and attitudes. Sensitive to the dangers of nihilism posed by the dissolution of previous foundations, Heidegger attempted to find a nonabsolute, historical "ground" to guide his own people. Unfortunately, this attempt ended in disaster.

### Permutation – Essentialism

#### **Permutation avoids essentialism – allows us to analyze the effects of individual technologies in context and preserves the value of critique and reflection along with reforming actions that the alt alone can never take.**

Feenberg 99 (Andrew Feenberg, Canada Research Chair in Philosophy of Technology in the School of Communication @ Simon Fraser University, “Questioning Technology”, Preface, 1999, http://www.sfu.ca/~andrewf/books/Questioning\_Technology.pdf)

This non-essentialist approach has political implications. Awareness of the meanings embedded in technology is more immediately available to ordinary users than to managers and technical personnel. The manager may see the new machine as more efficient, but the worker condemned to using it notices that it also removes skill and initiative from the shop floor. The polluter is less likely to see the relevance of environmental ethics to technology than the victim of pollution. And so on. Thus what essentialism conceives as an ontological split between technology and meaning, I conceive as a terrain of struggle between different types of actors differently engaged with technology and meaning.(1) Concern for workers' skills and the environment could of course be dismissed as merely contextual, as not belonging to technology per se. But to understand its full complexity, we need to take seriously Don Ihde's remark that "technology is only what it is in some use-context" (Ihde, 1990: 128). The contexts of technology include such things as its relation to vocations, to responsibility, initiative, and authority, to ethics and aesthetics, in sum, to the realm of meaning. In the concluding chapter of this book I develop a socio-historical theory of technology to account for the role of context. I argue that the invariant elements of the constitution of the technical subject and object are modified by socially specific contextualizing variables in the course of the realization of concrete technical actors, devices, and systems. Thus technologies are not merely efficient devices or efficiency oriented practices, but include their contexts as these are embodied in design and social insertion. I believe my approach can incorporate much of essentialism's critical contribution while also opening up reflection on the reform of technology. I do not see how one can come up with a similarly positive program from the essentialist standpoint. Rather, the best one can do is to suggest that boundaries be drawn more tightly around the sphere given over to technological power. But that approach offers no criteria for improving life within that sphere.

### Permutation – Renewables

#### **Technology isn’t inherently problematic – renewable energies reveal new modes of harmonious living with nature – abandoning technology wholesale only makes the environmental crisis inevitable.**

Scatena 11 (Debora Scatena, Memorial University of Newfoundland, “Environment and Technology: Finding a Solution within the Modern Framework and Human Responsibilities”, International Journal of Business, Humanities and Technology, Vol. 1 No. 2, September 2011, http://ijbhtnet.com/journals/Vol\_1\_No\_2\_September\_2011/12.pdf)

“Technology is therefore no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing. If we give heed to this, then another whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself up to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e of truth” (Heidegger,12). Heidegger presents technology as a way to lead people towards the revealing of reality to which they are exposed, this revelation will eventually lead to truth, he states. His statement implies a beginning of a new perception and relation with nature along with understanding of knowledge and experience. Northern European countries, such as Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Scotland and Denmark, have based a possible solution to the environmental crisis on that principle; it is possible to see them advancing towards what might be a series of technological results to lead to a new balance of people and nature. Are technological solution a way to close the gap between men and nature? Will they lead to a true revealing or a new balance? It is possible to see that through the way Heidegger depicts technology more understanding can be gathered by people on nature and the nature of being. The advancements of the Northern European countries above listed have addressed the popular energy demands by people in different ways: wind farms, sea turbines, biogas and hydroelectric power. It is interesting to analyse how those countries have aimed to rural centres in their pursuit of these technologies, and in those small communities nature has become of value, as to be preserved, as it actually benefit people not solely on economic grounds. As an example the community of Dardesheim in Germany is aiming to cut his carbon footprint by investing in renewable energy. Namely the choices being enacted in Dardesheim do not effect merely the economy, as a result people's relationship with nature changes towards a more revealing true state of being. It is possible to take Dardesheim's example as a chance for people to re-discover a balance. Similarly to Dardesheim, there are many small communities in Germany and the countries above listed, that are finding new solutions and balance with the environment. Is that a plausible realization to Heidegger's ideas on technology? It is possible to see the example of such small communities as a turn of the tide, a tide in which people and nature are put on the same level, as both benefit from ethical choices of technological use. In other words nature becomes a treasure in which it is allowed to blossom, people do take pride and protect it, since it ultimately protect themselves. Through examples like that it is possible to view the idea of ecological cosmology as well as technology as a benefit to humanity, that should by all means expand. “Similarly, imagining a “State of law of nature”, a due process for the discovery of the common world, is not going to make life easier for those who claim to be sending back to the nonexistence of the irrational all the propositions whose looks they do not like” (Latour, 224). Latour, in his book, suggests a discourse to begin to enable people and nature, as well as technology and democracy, to co-exist. For instance it is very interesting to note that a balance can be found in the discourse that Latour suggests, but a change in perspective is needed. Nature and its beings have to be put on the same level as people. It is pretty difficult to picture a reality such as that, but it is a needed step that technology can assist people with. Technology – as well as – democracy have a common system , or a system of law, through which humanity can extend its understanding and rights to the nonhumans. The law of nature, the natural law, forces people to look for a moral law rather than an artificial law and legal system. Furthermore it would allow people to connect with the other beings, and instead of abusing them redefine an existence that is meaningful to both elements of life. The change of perspective is possible because of science and the knowledge that humanity, through technology has gained about the other beings that populate the planet. Technology is key to a level of understanding that can push humanity forward in overcoming a global environmental crisis and a climate crisis which challenges every living element of planet earth. Besides those factors it is very interesting to see how through logos or discourses those objectives can be achieved. Both Heidegger and Latour present positions in which a change of perspective is needed. They also seem to be optimistic on the fact that the future they present is possible. It is important to see a change in perspective and perception through technology as a series of possibilities. Those elements in fact enable and would enable people to expand knowledge and through knowledge understanding. In other words knowledge is a first step to get to find a solution to the current environmental crisis, since if that proceeds most likely humanity will disappear from planet earth sooner or later, given the environmental conditions that entails. Despite the situation people still have a few chances, and these are clearly related to technology and democracy. “Because the essence of technology is nothing technological, essential upon technology and decisive confrontation which it must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different from it” (Heidegger, 35) . As Heidegger points out the solutions can be found and they can be dealt with on two different levels: the technological one, and the other one that can be seen as the artistic or spiritual. To succeed in overcoming the climate crisis it is possible to find solution by following both routes, the first has been already undertaken with good results, the second is still rather distant given the situation that most countries encounter and approach in dealing with the current climate challenge. Moreover in achieving the artistic solution people first should conquer the technological solution. Through technology in fact people can learn and deal with an enhanced perception and understanding of nature. Nature is not an element of easy or full comprehension by humanity yet. It is a step by step process, which like most important changes, might take a generation or more to be accomplished. For instance given a series of elements, such as dependency on oil, or lack of planning – there are several countries that have not yet considered or looked into clean energy even given the important need to switch from fossil fuels – especially in the light of the recent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Yet situations as dramatic as the oil spill are causing uproar in economic terms, while not enough attention goes into moving forward technologies, which can actually improve both economic and environmental standings of people on the planet. Considering all factors it is unlikely for humanity to reach the prospect presented by Heidegger within a generation. It is also possible to see the technological step as a turning point for mankind as it is meant to lead to the artistic and spiritual level of co-existence of people and nature. Given the impact that oil related technology has had and is having on both people and nature it should be possible to learn from mistakes and improve the human relationship with nature through renewable sources. For instance renewable sources as well as technologies require a certain level of upkeep which will enable and force people to take responsibilities towards nature. Nature is not only men caregiver, and producer of goods, it will also have a role of an exchange, thus it will be important to establish a level of democratization within the new relationship. Namely an exchange is not a one way deal, hence both parties do have to take on board benefits and responsibilities. That is possible when people get goods or energy from nature and make sure that nature is preserved and protected so the exchange can be kept ongoing. On the other hand nature that nourish and protect mankind, also has the duty not to become a negative to humanity. These elements can be maintained only if there is a chance to establish a democracy of the living and non-living like Latour suggests. In doing that all parties will be guaranteed a level of dignity, and this dignity will be then transferred to the chance of developing harmonically: humanity and nature.

### Permutation – Aquaculture

#### **Perm solves best – sustainable aquaculture checks environmental damage and creates a responsible relationship towards nature and acceptable usage of technology.**

Carroll 10 (Courtney Carroll, environmental analysis and policy @ Boston University, “Fish Farming and the Boundary of Sustainability: How Aquaculture Tests Nature’s Resources”, WR: Journal of the Arts & Sciences Writing Program, Issue 2, 2009-2010, http://www.bu.edu/writingprogram/journal/past-issues/issue-2/carroll/)

Practices such as aquaculture and agriculture create a perceived certainty of food security and control of resources, but unchecked growth in industrial food production can lead to unforeseen consequences in the future that could potentially undermine that certainty. This uncertainty in the stability of nature’s resources stresses the need for a line between control and total ambiguity. An approach that aims to preserve the integrity of the ecosystem through more responsible treatment of the environment would justify our use of resources because such a policy would ensure a respectful relationship with nature. In the case of aquaculture, this means adopting more sustainable methods. For example, closed containment aquaculture has a much smaller impact on the environment because waste and effluents do not go into the ocean, and no escape events can occur, eliminating many problems associated with large scale marine aquaculture (“Salmon”). Also, an organic label has recently risen as a niche market in aquaculture and offers another option for sustainability that would reduce or eliminate the use of vaccines (Taylor 4). Polyculture, otherwise known as Integrated Multi-Trophic Aquaculture (IMTA), offers yet another example of a more sustainable seafood industry. This method effectively promotes sustainability because “nutrient losses from one species are nutritional inputs for another” (Reid 2). IMTA more closely resembles how a natural ecosystem operates; it makes environmental and economical sense because resources do not get wasted but get recycled in an endless loop. America’s need to invest in an industry that promises to protect our food security sends a message about America’s attitude toward nature. It suggests a belief that we have a right to use technology to control nature and the power to control its resources at our discretion. Aquaculture shares many similarities as agriculture in this regard because both represent attempts to control nature’s resources for our needs. Agriculture attempts to control nature’s resources by taking charge of what type of crops grow in a certain place. The mass production of crops such as corn and wheat in the Midwest take advantage of nature’s resources for high profits, because of a high demand for items that include these products. These monocultures have a keen susceptibility to disease and pests because a lack of variety in genetics makes them ecologically vulnerable. Farmers fight for control with chemicals, pesticides, and genetically modified crops. Aquaculture will experience similar dilemmas as fish growers fight for control of the oceans with new vaccines and genetic engineering. Technology will play an important role in maintaining food security; however, if society emphasizes conservation over reliance on technology, this would eliminate a lot of the uncertainty that technology only seems to complicate. Practices such as IMTA stress conservation over technology because they rely on natural processes rather than new inventions or technological advances. The move to more sustainable practices in aquaculture means that our belief of control over nature will shift to a dynamic partnership with nature, a relationship that will ensure the survival and the success of both.

### Calculative Thought Good

#### **Calculations are key to solve structural violence and injustice – only ethical response.**

Campbell 99 (David Campbell, Professor of International Politics @ Newcastle, “Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics”, 1/1/1999)

That undecidability resides within the decision, Derrida argues, "that justice exceeds law and calculation, that the unpresentable exceeds the determinable cannot and should not serve as alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles, within an institution or a state, or between institutions or states and others."9' Indeed, "incalculable justice requires us to calculate." From where does this insistence come? What is behind, what is animating, these imperatives? It is both the character of infinite justice as a heteronomic relationship to the other, a relationship that because of its undecidability multiplies responsibility, and the fact that "left to itself, the incalculable and giving (donatrice) idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the worst, for it can always be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation."92 The necessity of calculating the incalculable thus responds to a duty, a duty that inhabits the instant of madness and compels the decision to avoid "the bad," the "perverse calculation," even "the worst." This is the duty that also dwells with deconstruction and makes it the starting point, the "at least necessary condition," for the organization of resistance to totalitarianism in all its forms. And it is a duty that responds to practical political concerns when we recognize that Derrida names the bad, the perverse, and the worst as those violences "we recognize all too well without yet having thought them through, the crimes of xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, religious or nationalist fanaticism." Furthermore, the duty within the decision, the obligation that recognizes the necessity of negotiating the possibilities provided by the impossibilities of justice, is not content with simply avoiding, containing, combating, or negating the worst violence-though it could certainly begin with those strategies. Instead, this responsibility, which is the responsibility of responsibility, commissions a "utopian" strategy. Not a strategy that is beyond all bounds of possibility so as to be considered "unrealistic," but one which in respecting the necessity of calculation, takes the possibility summoned by the calculation as far as possible, "must take it as far as possible, beyond the place we find ourselves and beyond the already identifiable zones of morality or politics or law, beyond the distinction between national and international, public and private, and so on."94 As Derrida declares, "The condition of possibility of this thing called responsibility is a certain experience and experiment of the possibility of the impossible: the testing of the aporia from which one may invent the only possible invention, the impossible invention."95 This leads Derrida to enunciate a proposition that many, not the least of whom are his Habermasian critics, could hardly have expected: "Nothing seems to me less outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal. We cannot attempt to disqualify it today, whether crudely or with sophistication, at least not without treating it too lightly and forming the worst complicities." 6

### Science Good

#### **Critiquing science causes right-wing and pseudoscience takeover – that destroys all efforts to fight global warming – only evidence-based theories matter.**

Berube 11(Michael Berube, Professor in Literature and Director of the Institute for the Arts and Humanities at Pennsylvania State University, “The Science Wars Redux”, 2011, http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/19/BERUBE.pdf)

But what of Sokal’s chief post-hoax claim that the academic left’s critiques of science were potentially damaging to the left? That one, alas, has held up very well, for it turns out that the critique of scientific “objectivity” and the insistence on the inevitable “partiality” of knowledge can serve the purposes of climatechange deniers and young-Earth creationists quite nicely. That’s not because there was something fundamentally rotten at the core of philosophical antifoundationalism (whose leading American exponent, Richard Rorty, remained a progressive Democrat all his life), but it might very well have had something to do with the cloistered nature of the academic left. It was as if we had tacitly assumed, all along, that we were speaking only to one another, so that whenever we championed Jean-François Lyotard’s defense of the “hetereogeneity of language games” and spat on Jürgen Habermas’s ideal of a conversation oriented toward “consensus,” we assumed a strong consensus among us that anyone on the side of heterogeneity was on the side of the angels. But now **the climate-change deniers and the young-Earth creationists are coming after the natural scientists**, just as I predicted—**and they’re using some of the very arguments developed by an academic left that thought it was speaking only to people of like mind**. Some standard left arguments, combined with the leftpopulist distrust of “experts” and “professionals” and assorted high-and-mighty muckety-mucks who think they’re the boss of us, were fashioned by the right into a powerful device for delegitimating scientific research. For example, when Andrew Ross asked in Strange Weather, “How can metaphysical life theories and explanations taken seriously by millions be ignored or excluded by a small group of powerful people called ‘scientists’?,” everyone was supposed to understand that he was referring to alternative medicine, and that his critique of “scientists” was meant to bring power to the people. The countercultural account of “metaphysical life theories” that gives people a sense of dignity in the face of scientific authority sounds good—until one substitutes “astrology” or “homeopathy” or “creationism” (all of which are certainly taken seriously by millions) in its place. The right’s attacks on climate science, mobilizing a public distrust of scientific expertise, eventually led science-studies theorist Bruno Latour to write in Critical Inquiry: [E]ntire Ph.D. programs are still running to make sure that good American kids are learning the hard way that facts are made up, that **there is no such thing as natural, unmediated, unbiased access to truth..**.while **dangerous extremists are using the very same argument of social construction to destroy hard-won evidence that could save our lives**. Was I wrong to participate in the invention of this field known as science studies? Is it enough to say that we did not really mean what we meant? Why does it burn my tongue to say that global warming is a fact whether you like it or not? Why can’t I simply say that the argument is closed for good? Why, indeed? Why not say, definitively, that anthropogenic climate change is real, that vaccines do not cause autism, that the Earth revolves around the Sun, and that Adam and Eve did not ride dinosaurs to church? At the close of his “Afterword” to “Transgressing the Boundaries,” Sokal wrote: No wonder most Americans can’t distinguish between science and pseudoscience: their science teachers have never given them any rational grounds for doing so. (Ask an average undergraduate: Is matter composed of atoms? Yes. Why do you think so? The reader can fill in the response.) Is it then any surprise that 36 percent of Americans believe in telepathy, and that 47 percent believe in the creation account of Genesis? It can’t be denied that some science-studies scholars have deliberately tried to blur the distinction between science and pseudoscience. As I noted in Rhetorical Occasions and on my personal blog, British philosopher of science Steve Fuller traveled to Dover, Pennsylvania, in 2005 to testify on behalf of the local school board’s fundamentalist conviction that Intelligent Design is a legitimate science. “The main problem intelligent design theory suffers from at the moment,” Fuller argued, “is a paucity of developers.” Somehow, Fuller managed to miss the point—that there is no way to develop a research program in ID. What is one to do, examine fossils for evidence of God’s fingerprints? So these days, when I talk to my scientist friends, I offer them a deal. I say: I’ll admit that you were right about the potential for science studies to go horribly wrong and give fuel to deeply ignorant and/or reactionary people. And in return, you’ll admit that I was right about the culture wars, and right that the natural sciences would not be held harmless from the right-wing noise machine. And if you’ll go further, and acknowledge that some circumspect, well-informed critiques of actually existing science have merit (such as the criticism that the postwar medicalization of pregnancy and childbirth had some ill effects), I’ll go further too, and acknowledge that many humanists’ critiques of science and reason are neither circumspect nor well-informed. Then perhaps we can get down to the business of how to develop safe, sustainable energy and other social practices that will keep the planet habitable. Fifteen years ago, it seemed to me that the Sokal Hoax was making that kind of deal impossible, deepening the “two cultures” divide and further estranging humanists from scientists. Now, I think it may have helped set the terms for an eventual rapprochement, leading both humanists and scientists to realize that the shared enemies of their enterprises are the religious fundamentalists who reject all knowledge that challenges their faith and the free-market fundamentalists whose policies will surely scorch the earth. On my side, perhaps humanists are beginning to realize that there is a project even more vital than that of the relentless critique of everything existing, a project to which they can contribute as much as any scientist—the project o**f making the world a more humane and livable place**. Is it still possible? I don’t know, and I’m not sanguine. Some scientific questions now seem to be a matter of tribal identity: A vast majority of elected Republicans have expressed doubts about the science behind anthropogenic climate change, and as someone once remarked, it is very difficult to get a man to understand something when his tribal identity depends on his not understanding it. But there are few tasks so urgent. About that, even Heisenberg himself would be certain.

### Tech Good – Inevitable

#### Environmental tech is inevitable and not using it is worse – letting be only continues ecological damage and inequality – concrete policy actions solve.

Levy 99 (Neil Levy, Deputy Director (Research) of the Oxford Centre for Neuroethics, PhD @ Centre for Critical Theory at Monash, “Foucault’s Unnatural Ecology”, in “Discourses of the Environment,” ed. Eric Darier, 1999)

If the ‘technological fix’ is unlikely to be more successful than strategies of limitation of our use of resources, we are, nevertheless unable simply to leave the environment as it is. There is a real and pressing need for space, and more accurate, technical and scientific information about the non-human world. For we are faced with a situation in which the processes we have already set in train will continue to impact upon that world, and therefore us for centuries. It is therefore necessary, not only to stop cutting down the rain forests, but to develop real, concrete proposals for action, to reverse or at least limit the effects of our previous interventions. Moreover, there is another reason why our behavior towards the non-human cannot simply be a matter of leaving it as it is, at least in so far as our goals are not only environmental but also involve social justice. For if we simply preserve what remains to us of wilderness, of the countryside and of park land, we also preserve patterns of very unequal access to their resources and their consolations (Soper 1995: 207).in fact, we risk exacerbating these inequalities. It is not us, but the poor of Brazil, who will bear the brunt of the misery which would result from a strictly enforced policy of leaving the Amazonian rain forest untouched, in the absence of alternative means of providing for their livelihood. It is the development of policies to provide such ecologically sustainable alternatives which we require, as well as the development of technical means for replacing our current greenhouse gas-emitting sources of energy. Such policies and proposals for concrete action must be formulated by ecologists, environmentalists, people with expertise concerning the functioning of ecosystems and the impact which our actions have upon them. Such proposals are, therefore, very much the province of Foucault’s specific intellectual, the one who works ‘within specific sectors, at the precise points where their own conditions of life or work situate them’ (Foucault 1980g: 126). For who could be more fittingly described as ‘the strategists of life and death’ than these environmentalists? After the end of the Cold War, it is in this sphere, more than any other, that man’s ‘politics places his existence as a living being in question’ (Foucault 1976: 143). For it is in facing the consequences of our intervention in the non-human world that the hate of our species, and of those with whom we share this planet, will be decided?

### Tech Good – Environment

#### Critiquing technology kills billions of people – the environmental crisis is real, but we need more technology, not less – only way to solve existing damage.

Bostrom 3 PhD from the London School of Economics (Nick, 2003, “Transhumanism FAQ”, http://www.paulbroman.com/myspace/Transhumanism\_FAQ.txt)

**Population increase is an issue we** would **ultimately have to come to grips with** even if healthy life-extension were not to happen. **Leaving people to die is** an **unacceptable** solution. **A large population** should not be viewed simply as a problem. Another way of looking at the same fact is that it **means that many persons now enjoy lives that would not have been lived if the population had been smaller.** One could ask those who complain about overpopulation exactly which people’s lives they would have preferred should not have been led. Would it really have been better if billions of the world’s people had never existed and if there had been no other people in their place? Of course, this is not to deny that too-rapid population growth can cause crowding, poverty, and the depletion of natural resources. In this sense there can be real problems that need to be tackled. **How many people the Earth can sustain at a comfortable standard of living is a function of technological development** (as well as of how resources are distributed). **New technologies**, from simple improvements in irrigation and management, to better mining techniques and more efficient power generation machinery, to genetically engineered crops, **can continue to improve world resource and food output, while at the same time reducing environmental impact and animal suffering.** Environmentalists are right to insist that **the status quo is unsustainable.** As a matter of physical necessity, things cannot stay as they are today indefinitely, or even for very long. If we continue to use up resources at the current pace, without finding more resources or learning how to use novel kinds of resources, then **we will run into serious shortages sometime around the middle of this century. The deep greens have an answer to this: they suggest we turn back the** clock and return to an idyllic pre-industrial age to live in sustainable harmony with nature. The problem with this view is that the pre-industrial age was anything but idyllic. It was a life of poverty, misery, disease, heavy manual toil from dawn to dusk, superstitious fears, and cultural parochialism. Nor was it environmentally sound – as witness the deforestation of England and the Mediterranean region, desertification of large parts of the middle east, soil depletion by the Anasazi in the Glen Canyon area, destruction of farm land in ancient Mesopotamia through the accumulation of mineral salts from irrigation, deforestation and consequent soil erosion by the ancient Mexican Mayas, overhunting of big game almost everywhere, and the extinction of the dodo and other big featherless birds in the South Pacific. Furthermore, it is hard to see how more than a few hundred million people could be maintained at a reasonable standard of living with pre-industrial production methods, so some ninety percent of the world population would somehow have to vanish in order to facilitate this nostalgic return. Transhumanists propose a much more realistic alternative: not to retreat to an imagined past, but to press ahead as intelligently as we can. The environmental problems that technology creates are problems of intermediary, inefficient technology, of placing insufficient political priority on environmental protection as well as of a lack of ecological knowledge. Technologically less advanced industries in the former Soviet-bloc pollute much more than do their advanced Western counterparts. High-tech industry is typically relatively benign. Once we develop molecular nanotechnology, we will not only have clean and efficient manufacturing of almost any commodity, but we will also be able to clean up much of the mess created by today’s crude fabrication methods. This would set a standard for a clean environment that today’s traditional environmentalists could scarcely dream of.

### Tech Essentialism Turn

#### Heidegger’s universal opposition to technology is essentializing – the alt fails to recognize distinctions between technologies and makes action against its worst consequences impossible by viewing it as an isolated system distinct from ourselves.

Feenberg 99 (Andrew Feenberg, Canada Research Chair in Philosophy of Technology in the School of Communication @ Simon Fraser University, “Questioning Technology”, Preface, 1999, http://www.sfu.ca/~andrewf/books/Questioning\_Technology.pdf)

For two centuries now, great democratic movements have swept the globe, equalizing classes, races, genders, peoples. As these movements expand the definition of humanity, they also extend the boundaries of the political to embrace more and more of social life. At first law was taken from God and king and brought under human control. Then Marx and the labor movement placed the economy on the political agenda. In this century, political management of the economy has become routine, and education and medicine have been added to the list of contestable issues. As a new century begins, democracy appears poised for a further advance. With the environmental movement in the lead, technology is now about to enter the expanding democratic circle. This marks a fateful change in our understanding of technology, in its position on the conceptual maps of theory and critique. Formerly, the democratic movement gave its fullest confidence to the natural processes of technological development, and it was only conservative cultural critics who lamented the price of progress. The Ruskins, the Heideggers deplored the dehumanizing advance of the machine while democrats and socialists cheered on the engineers, heroic conquerors of nature. However, all agreed that technology was an autonomous force separate from society, a kind of second nature impinging on social life from the alien realm of reason in which science too finds its source. For good or ill, technology's essence--rational control, efficiency--ruled modern life. But this conception of technology is incompatible with the extension of democracy to the technical sphere. Technology is the medium of daily life in modern societies. Every major technical change reverberates at many levels, economic, political, religious, cultural. Insofar as we continue to see the technical and the social as separate domains, important aspects of these dimension of our existence will remain beyond our reach as a democratic society. The fate of democracy is therefore bound up with our understanding of technology. The purpose of this book is to think that vital connection. The same kind of ignorance that bound ~~men~~ [humans] to the gold standard for centuries maintains the illusion that technology is an alien force intruding on our social life from a coldly rational beyond. The forces of the market were believed to transcend the will of peoples and nations. The economy was treated as a quasi-natural system with laws as rigid as the movements of the planets. The social nature of exchange had to be discovered against tremendous ideological resistance. Today it seems absurd that modern societies renounced control of their own economic life to a second nature they had themselves created. Yet where technology is concerned we remain in willful submission to a second nature just as contingent on human action as the economy. Liberation from technological fetishism will follow the course of liberation from economic fetishism. The same story will someday be told about machines that we tell today about markets. Just insofar as democracy challenges the autonomy of technology, the essentialist philosophy of technology around which there used to be such general consensus, is challenged as well. The time has therefore come for an anti-essentialist philosophy of technology. We have had enough of generalizations about technological imperatives, instrumental rationality, efficiency, enframing, and similar abstract categories. I offer here a concrete alternative to the approach of such influential representatives of essentialism as Ellul, Borgmann, Heidegger, and, for reasons I will explain in chapter one, Habermas as well. Essentialism holds that technology reduces everything to functions and raw materials. Goal oriented technological practices replace practices which embody a human meaning. Efficiency sweeps away all other norms and determines an autonomous process of technological development. From this standpoint any attempt to infuse the technical with meaning appears as external interference in a rational field with its own logic and laws. Yet rational though it may be, technology engulfs its creators, threatening both spiritual and material survival. The methodological dualism of technique and meaning has political implications. On the one side, technology undermines traditional meanings or communicative action, while on the other side we are called to protect the integrity of a meaningful world. Because the essence of technology is unaffected by changes in particular technologies, technological reform is irrelevant to the philosophical issues, desirable though it may be on practical grounds. Universal technologization must be resisted by drawing boundaries around the technical sphere. But do these oppositions make sense at the end of the 20th century? This approach leaves me skeptical, not because it affirms the existence of social pathologies linked to technology, but because it forecloses in principle any serious action to address them. But huge changes are occurring in fields such as medicine and computers under the influence of political protest and public involvement in design. The environmental movement has been deeply and quite concretely involved in the question of technology for the last twenty years. The technological world we will inhabit in the years to come will be a product of public activity to a great extent. How can one know in advance that all this debate and contestation will have no effect, positive or negative, on the fundamental problems identified by the critics of technology today? I would argue that their approach is a function of our professional culture as humanist scholars and our relationship to the cultures of the technical disciplines, and has nothing to do with the realities of our time. This cultural relationship is peculiarly ambiguous. Technical disciplines are constituted around devices conceived as essentially functional, and therefore as essentially oriented toward efficiency. In the pursuit of efficiency, technical disciplines systematically abstract from social aspects of their own activities. Presumably, those aspects are the concern of humanistic disciplines. Essentialism accepts this division of labor. Like the technical disciplines, it views technologies as devices oriented toward efficiency. The only difference is that essentialism deplores the social consequences of technology the technical disciplines ignore. This, I think, points to the basic weakness of essentialism. It has produced a powerful critique of the obsession with efficiency that is indeed prevalent in our society and reflected in the design of many devices and systems, but it has not shown that that attitude reveals the essence of real technology as it has existed historically, as it exists today, and as it may exist in the future. If essentialism is unaware of its own limitations, this is because it confounds attitude with object, the modern obsession with efficiency with technology as such. No doubt real dangers do lurk in modern technology. And I can agree that it must have some general features that allow us to distinguish it and on the basis of which we can sometimes decide on its appropriate and inappropriate range of application. Although I see the logic of drawing boundaries narrowly in such cases, I cannot agree that this is the whole story. The "essence" of actual technology, as we encounter it in all its complexity, is not simply an orientation toward efficiency. Its many roles in our lives cannot be captured so simply. This is the burden of constructivist sociology of technology, which affirms the social and historical specificity of technological systems, the relativity of technical design and use to the culture and strategies of a variety of technical actors. Constructivism, in short, has introduced difference into the question of technology

### Cede the Political

#### **Rejection of technology abandons politics – theories of being can never create true political, material change.**

Weinberger 92 (Professor of Political Science @ Michigan State University, Senior Research Fellow of the National Endowment for the Humanities, “Politics and the Problem of Technology,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 1, March 1992, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1964019)

In other words, we would have to show that Heideggerian being, which grants a causeless and tactical play of its domains, cannot account for the genuine gravity of political life-for how the elements of experience contend against each other, as we see in the challenge of thought to faith, the tension between private and public life, the conflicts between morality and politics, the difference between the good and the just, and so on. We would have to show that such contention is possible only insofar as their elements are related causally and hierarchically, so that each by its very nature claims an authority, beyond the contingencies of any given world, to order the others. And we would have to see that however much the fact of such contention calls forth our efforts to overcome it by way of making and knowing, both making and knowing are even at their best the very source of this contention. Nature, as I propose to think about it, is beyond any project for conquest. Technology could, of course, simply destroy the natural soul by making it either subhuman or godlike; but it could never wholly stamp the human species because it cannot supply all of the needs that the soul has spontaneously (or by nature), such as the desire for noble preeminence. Consequently, the harder technology presses, the more intensely we sense a “problem” with it. I am suggesting that the problem of technology is most fully understood when we approach it through the old-fashioned equation of natural justice that transcends any given political conventions. I am suggesting that no era’s thinking and practice is so finite and self-contained that it can be wholly stamped by technology and that we do not have to recur to Heideggerian being to see the limits of the stamp. But I am also suggesting that such direction as nature gives to our groping for justice will never satisfy the demands of everyday politics and morality; for that direction consists in the limited extend to which the widest opening of our eyes can cure the blindnesses of political life.

### Ontology Focus Bad

#### **Focus on ontology fails – trying to determine subjective will for everyone only allows for objective atrocities and authoritarianism.**

Graham 99 (Phil Graham, Professor of Communication and Media Studies @ University of Queensland, “Heidegger’s Hippies: A dissenting voice on the “problem of the subject” in cyberspace”, Identities in Action!, 1999, <http://www.philgraham.net/HH_conf.pdf>)

**\*\*\*Note --- the text of this evidence was edited.**

Societies should get worried when Wagner’s music becomes popular because it usually means that distorted interpretations of Nietzsche’s philosophy are not far away. Existentialists create problems about what is, especially identity (Heidegger 1947). Existentialism inevitably leads to an authoritarian worldview: this, my Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, this mystery world of twofold voluptuous delight, my “beyond good and evil,” without a goal, unless the joy of the circle itself is a goal; without will, unless a ring feels good will towards itself – do you want a name for this world? A solution to all its riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most midnightly men? – This world is the will to power – and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power – and nothing besides! (Nietzsche 1967/1997). Armed with a volume of Nietzsche, some considerable oratory skills, several Wagner records, and an existentialist University Rector in the form of Martin Heidegger, Hitler managed some truly astounding feats of strategic identity engineering (cf. Bullock, 1991). Upon being appointed to the Freiberg University, Heidegger pronounced the end of thought, history, ideology, and civilisation: ‘No dogmas and ideas will any longer be the laws of your being. The Fuhrer himself, and he alone, is the present and future reality for Germany’ (in Bullock 1991: 345). Heidegger signed up to an ideology-free politics: Hitler’s ‘Third Way’ (Eatwell 1997). The idealised identity, the new symbol of mythological worship, Nietzsche’s European Superman, was to rule from that day hence. Hitler took control of the means of propaganda: the media; the means of mental production: the education system; the means of violence: the police, army, and prison system; and pandered to the means of material production: industry and agriculture; and proclaimed a New beginning and a New world order. He ordered Germany to look forward into the next thousand years and forget the past. Heidegger and existentialism remain influential to this day, and history remains bunk (e.g. Giddens4, 1991, Chapt. 2). Giddens’s claims that ‘humans live in circumstances of … existential contradiction’, and that ‘subjective death’ and ‘biological death’ are somehow unrelated, is a an ultimately repressive abstraction: from that perspective, life is merely a series of subjective deaths, as if death were the ultimate motor of life itself (cf. Adorno 1964/1973). History is, in fact, the simple and straightforward answer to the “problem of the subject”. “The problem” is also a handy device for confusing, entertaining, and selling trash to the masses. By emphasising the problem of the ‘ontological self’ (Giddens 1991: 49), informationalism and ‘consumerism’ confines the navel-gazing, ‘narcissistic’ masses to a permanent present which they self-consciously sacrifice for a Utopian future (cf. Adorno 1973: 303; Hitchens 1999; Lasch 1984: 25-59). Meanwhile transnational businesses go about their work, ~~raping~~ [harming] the environment; swindling each other and whole nations; and inflicting populations with declining wages, declining working conditions, and declining social security. Slavery is once again on the increase (Castells, 1998; Graham, 1999; ILO, 1998). There is no “problem of the subject”, just as there is no “global society”; there is only the mass amnesia of utopian propaganda, the strains of which have historically accompanied revolutions in communication technologies. Each person’s identity is, quite simply, their subjective account of a unique and objective history of interactions within the objective social and material environments they inhabit, create, and inherit. The identity of each person is their most intimate historical information, and they are its material expression: each person is a record of their own history at any given time. Thus, each person is a recognisably material, identifiable entity: an identity. This is their condition. People are not theoretical entities; they are people. As such, they have an intrinsic identity with an intrinsic value. No amount of theory or propaganda will make it go away. The widespread multilateral attempts to prop up consumer society and hypercapitalism as a valid and useful means of sustainable growth, indeed, as the path to an inevitable, international democratic Utopia, are already showing their disatrous cracks. The “problem” of subjective death threatens to give way, once again, to unprecedented mass slaughter. The numbed condition of a narcissistic society, rooted in a permanent “now”, a blissful state of Heideggerian Dasein, threatens to wake up to a world in which “subjective death” and ontology are the least of all worries.

### Alt Fails – Falsifiability

#### **Ontology is non-falsifiable – no evidence for Heidegger’s theory of technology.**

Rockmore 97 (Tom Rockmore, Professor of Philosophy @ Duquesne University, “On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy”*,* “Toward Criticism of Heidegger’s View of Technology”, p. 233-4, 1997)

Second, his nonanthropological interpretation of technology is problematic. Heidegger's claim does not follow from a critique of the rival view or views, which he simply rejects in virtue of his prior commitment to Being as the ultimate explanatory factor. A prior commitment helps to explain why Heidegger analyzes technology as he does, but it does not justify his analysis. In order to make out his nonanthropological technological view, Heidegger needs to supplement his analysis, for instance through a demonstration that the anthropological and nonanthropological approaches exhaust the possible ways to understand technology, an indication of the basic flaws leading to a rejection of the so-called anthropological approach, or an argument in favor of his own rival view. It is not sufficient to point out that Heidegger's theory successfully accounts for the transhuman agency exhibited by technology unless it can be shown that technology has a transhuman dimension, something Heidegger merely asserts but does not demonstrate.

### Alt Fails – Passivity

#### **Heidegger’s constant reflection and rejection causes political and social passivity – the alt merely stands by while genocidal atrocities and ecological destruction continue.**

Bookchin 95 (Murray Bookchin, Founder of the Institute for Social Ecology, Emeritus Professor @ Ramapo College, “Re-enchanting Humanity: A Defense of the Human Spirit Against Antihumanism, Misanthropy, Mysticism, and Primitivism”, 1995)

"Insofar as Heidegger can be said to have had a project to shape human lifeways, it was as an endeavor to resist, or should I say, demur from, what he conceived to he an all-encroaching technocratic mentality and civilization that rendered human beings 'inauthentic' in their relationship to a presumably self-generative reality, 'isness', or more esoterically, 'Being' *(Sein).* Not unlike many German reactionaries, **Heidegger viewed ‘modernity' with its democratic spirit, rationalism, respect for the individual, and technological advances as a 'falling' *(Gefallen)* from a primal and naive innocence in which humanity once 'dwelled,’** remnants of which he believed existed in the rustic world into which he was born a century ago. 'Authenticity', it can be said without any philosophical frills, lay in the pristine Teutonic world of the tribal Germans who retained their ties with ‘the Gods’, and with later peoples who still tried to nourish their past amidst the blighted traits of the modern world. Since some authors try to muddy Heidegger's prelapsarian message by focusing on his assumed belief in individual freedom and ignoring his hatred of the French Revolution and its egalitarian, 'herd'-like democracy of the 'They', it is worth emphasizing that such a view withers m the light of his denial of individuality. The individual by himself counts for noth­ing', he declared after becoming a member of the National Socialist party in 1933. 'The fate of our Volk m its state counts for everything.'22 **As a member of the Nazi party**, which he remained up to the defeat of Germany twelve years later, **his antihumanism reached** strident, often blatantly reactionary proportions. Newly appointed as the rector of the University of Freiburg upon Hitler's ascent to power, **he readily adopted the *Fuehrer*-principle of German fascism** and preferred the title *Rektor-Fuhrer***,hailing the spirit of National Socialism as an antidote to 'the darkening of the world, the flight of the gods, the destruction of the earth [by technology], the transformation of men into a mass, the hatred and suspicion of everything free and creative.’28** His most unsavory remarks were directed in the lectures, from which these lines are taken, 'from a metaphysical point of view', against 'the pincers' created by America and Russia that threaten to squeeze 'the farthermost corner of the globe ... by technology and ... economic exploitation.'29 Technology, as Heidegger construes it, is 'no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing. If we give heed to this, then another whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself up to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth.’30 After which Heidegger rolls out technology's transformations, indeed mutations, which give rise to a mood of anxiety and finally hubris, anthropocentricity, and the mechanical coercion of things into mere objects for human use and exploitation. Heidegger's views on technology are part of a larger weltanschauung which is too multicolored to discuss here, and demands a degree of inter­pretive effort we must forgo for the present in the context of a criticism of technophobia. **Suffice it to say that there is a good deal of primitivistic animism in Heidegger's treatment of the 'revealing' that occurs when techneis a 'clearing' for the 'expression' of a crafted material** - not unlike the Eskimo sculptor who believes (quite wrongly, I may add) that he is 'bringing out' a hidden form that lies in the walrus ivory he is carving. But this issue must be seen more as a matter of metaphysics than of a spir­itually charged technique. Thus, **when Heidegger praises a windmill**, in contrast to the 'challenge' to a tract of land from which the ‘hauling out of coal and ore' is subjected**, he is notbeing 'ecological'. Heidegger is concerned with a windmill, not as an ecological technology, but more metaphysically with the notion that 'its sails do indeed turn in the wind; they are left entirely to the wind's blowing'. The windmill 'does not unlock energy from the air currents, in order to store it'.31 Like man in relation to Being, it is a medium for the 'realization' of wind, not an artifact for acquiring power**. Basically, **this interpretation of a technological interrelationship reflects a regression** - socially and psychologically as well as metaphysically – **into quietism. Heidegger advances a message of passivity or passivity conceived as a human activity, an endeavor to let things beand 'disclose' themselves. 'Letting things be' would be little more than a trite Maoist and Buddhist precept were it not that Heidegger as a National Socialist became all too ideologically engaged, rather than 'letting things be', when he was busily undoing 'intellectualism,' democracy, and techno­logical intervention into the 'world'**. Considering the time, the place, and the abstract way in which Heidegger treated humanity's 'Fall' into technological ‘inauthenticity’ – a ‘Fall’ that he, like Ellul, regarded as inevitable, albeit a metaphysical, nightmare - **it is not hard to see why he could trivialize the Holocaust, when he deigned to notice it at all, as part of a techno-industrial ‘condition’. 'Agriculture is now a motorized *(motorsierte)* food industry, in essence the same as the manufacturing of corpses in the gas chambers and extermination camps,' he coldly observed, 'the same as the blockade and starvation of the countryside, the same as the production of the hydrogen bombs.’32 In placing the industrial *means* by which many Jews were killed before the ideological ends that guided their Nazi exterminators, Heidegger essentially displaces the barbarism of a specificstate apparatus, of which he was a part, by the technical proficiency he can attribute to the world at large!** These immensely revealing offhanded remarks, drawn from a speech he gave in Bremen m 1949, are beneath contempt. **But they point to a way of thinking that gave an autonomy to technique that has fearful moral consequences which we are living with these days in the name of the sacred, a phraseology that Heidegger would find very congenial were he alive today**. Indeed, **technophobia**, followed to its logical and crudely primitivistic conclusions, **finally devolves into a dark reactionism – and a paralyzing quietism. For if our confrontation with civilization turns on passivity before a ‘disclosing of Being’, a mere ‘dwelling’ on the earth, and a ‘letting things be’**, to use Heidegger’s verbiage – much of which has slipped into deep ecology’s vocabulary as well – **the choice between supporting barbarism and enlightened humanism has no ethical foundations to sustain it. Freed of values grounded in objectivity, we are lost in a quasi-religious antihumanism, a spirituality that can with the same equanimity hear the cry of a bird and ignore the anguish of six million once-living people who were put to death by the National Socialist state.**

### Alt Fails – Objectivity

#### Phenomenology’s focus on experience fails – objective facts exist independently.

Searle 5 (John Searle, Professor of Philosophy @ UC Berkeley, “The Phenomenological Illusion”, 2005, http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/PhenomenologicalIllusion.pdf)

The picture that Dreyfus seems to have is that institutional facts exist from one point of view and brute facts exist from another point of view. But that is wrong. Brute facts simply exist. No point of view is necessary. Institutional facts exist from a point of view of the participants in the institution and their participation in the institution creates the facts. But where Dreyfus cites a “tension” there is no tension. There is no tension at all in supposing that the piece of paper in my hand is both a piece of paper and a ten dollar bill. There is a philosophical problem, as to how human beings create an institutional reality by imposing status functions on brute facts. I ask the question, How do we get from the brute facts to the institutional facts? How does the mind impose status functions on the phenomena? The logical form of that question is: Given that there is a brute reality of observer independent phenomena, phenomena that have an absolute existence, independent of any human attitudes, stances, etc., how do such phenomena acquire status functions? The reference to brute phenomena is de re, it has wide scope occurrence. The problem is that the phenomenologist tends not to hear the de re occurrence. Thus Dreyfus hears the question as asking: From the detached logical point of view there exist brute facts, from the active participants point of view there exist institutional facts. What is the relation between them? Now there does seem to be a “tension” because there is now a problem about reconciling the detached logical point of view with the active participant’s point of view. Nothing has wide scope or de re occurrence. That is the perspectivalism that I have tried to identify.

### Alt Fails – Nuclear War

#### **Doing nothing and “rethinking” makes extinction inevitable – nuclear war is worse than ontological damnation.**

Santoni 85 (Ronald E. Santoni, Professor of Philosophy @ Denison, “Nuclear War: Philosophical Perspectives”, ed. Michael Allen Fox and Leo Groarke, August 1985)

To be sure, Fox sees the need for our undergoing “certain fundamental changes” in our “thinking, beliefs, attitudes, values” and Zimmerman calls for a “paradigm shift” in our thinking about ourselves, other, and the Earth. But it is not clear that what either offers as suggestions for what we can, must, or should do in the face of a runaway arms race are sufficient to “wind down” the arms race before it leads to omnicide. In spite of the importance of Fox’s analysis and reminders it is not clear that “admitting our (nuclear) fear and anxiety” to ourselves and “identifying the mechanisms that dull or mask our emotional and other responses” represent much more than examples of basic, often. stated principles of psychotherapy. Being aware of the psychological maneuvers that keep us numb to nuclear reality may well be the road to transcending them but it must only be a “first step” (as Fox acknowledges), during which we Simultaneously act to eliminate nuclear threats, break our complicity with the ams race, get rid of arsenals of genocidal weaponry, and create conditions for international goodwill, mutual trust, and creative interdependence. Similarly, in respect to Zimmerman: in spite of the challenging Heideggerian insights he brings out regarding what motivates the arms race, many questions may be raised about his prescribed “solutions.” Given our need for a paradigm shift in our (distorted) understanding of ourselves and the rest of being, are we merely left “to prepare for a possible shift in our self-understanding? (italics mine)? Is this all we can do? Is it necessarily the case that such a shift “cannot come as a result of our own will?” – and work – but only from “a destiny outside our control?” Does this mean we leave to God the matter of bringing about a paradigm shift? Granted our fears and the importance of not being controlled by fears, as well as our “anthropocentric leanings,” should we be as cautious as Zimmerman suggests about out disposition “to want to do something” or “to act decisively in the face of the current threat?” In spite of the importance of our taking on the anxiety of our finitude and our present limitation, does it follow that “we should be willing for the worst (i.e. an all-out nuclear war) to occur”? Zimmerman wrongly, I contend, equates “resistance” with “denial” when he says that “as long as we resist and deny the possibility of nuclear war, that possibility will persist and grow stronger.” He also wrongly perceives “resistance” as presupposing a clinging to the “order of things that now prevails.” Resistance connotes opposing, and striving to defeat a prevailing state of affairs that would allow or encourage the “worst to occur.” I submit, against Zimmerman, that we should not, in any sense, be willing for nuclear war or omnicide to occur. (This is *not* to suggest that we should be numb to the possibility of its occurrence.) Despite Zimmerman’s elaborations and refinements his Heideggerian notion of “letting beings be” continues to be too permissive in this regard. In my judgment, an individual’s decision not to act against and resist his or her government’s preparations for nuclear holocaust is, as I have argued elsewhere, to be an early accomplice to the most horrendous crim against life imaginable – its annihilation. The Nuremburg tradition calls not only for a new way of thinking, a “new internationalism” in which we all become co-nurturers of the whole planet, but for resolute actions that will sever our complicity with nuclear criminality and the genocidal arms race, and work to achieve a future which we can no longer assume. We must not only “come face to face with the unthinkable in image and thought” (Fox) but must act now - with a “new consciousness” and conscience - to prevent the unthinkable, by cleansing the earth of nuclear weaponry. Only when that is achieved will ultimate violence be removed as the final arbiter of our planet’s fate.

### Extinction Outweighs Value to Life

#### **Real death outweighs ontological death – life is a prerequisite for ontological disclosure.**

Storl 8 (Heidi Storl, Professor of Philosophy at Augustana College, “Heidegger in Woolf’s Clothing” Philosophy and Literature, Vol 32 No 2, p 303-314, October 2008, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/phl/summary/v032/32.2.storl.html)

While the strength and pervasiveness of "how one finds oneself" cannot be over-estimated, the being of the human being can be extinguished only by death. As long as human activity occurs (even when dull and dim), being is, and disclosing and projecting remain as possibilities. It is here that Heidegger offers a way out of our modern predicament and the ever-deepening normative void. The door slams. We "come to," gasp, encounter. Though nothingness is everywhere and nowhere, has swallowed up the anchors of our daily existence, and has left scarcely any trace of body and mind—our embodied and embedded being—we do grasp something and in so doing, we care. "If Da-sein explicitly discovers the world and brings it near, if it discloses its authentic being itself, this discovering of 'world' and disclosing of Da-sein always comes about by clearing away coverings and obscurities, by breaking up the disguises with which Da-sein cuts itself off from itself " (p. 121). According to Heidegger, Dasein ultimately is driven to discover and disclose its embodied and embedded being due to some form of uncanniness. It is this which "fetches Da-sein out of its entangled absorption in the 'world'" (p. 176). Everyday familiarity collapses. The door slams, and we arrive. And, even if for just a moment, we care.

### Anthropocentrism Turn

#### **Heidegger’s theory of being reproduces anthropocentrism – only humans have true authentic existence opposed to lesser animal existences – turns the alt’s environmentalism.**

Calarco 8 (Matthew Calarco, Professor of Philosophy @ Fullerton, “Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida”, June 2008, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/cala14022)

Let me, then, sum up the issue with Heidegger as clearly as possible. Where classical humanisms have been content to determine man's Being in light of a presupposed determination of nature and humanity, Heidegger has boldly raised the question of the ground of these determinations, thereby exposing humanism's complicity with dogmatic metaphysics and offering a new determination of man's essence as eksistence. With this critique of humanism and conception of ek-sistence we are given not only the possibility for a clearer understanding of the collapse of value theory and its attendant nihilism but also the possibility for an alternative "ethics," another thought of responsibility itself of responsibility qua responsivity or exposure.t6 This is Heidegger's great contribution to contemporary thought and one with which I am largely sympathetic. The problem arises, though, when Heidegger limits ek-sistence to man alone. And the issue here is not simply that Heidegger offers no analysis or argumentation in support of this claim (although this deficiency does pose certain difficulties); nor is the problem that this claim about ek-sistence is anything but certain. (Is anyone certain, including Heidegger himself, that ek-sistence cannot be found beyond the human? If he is certain and the case is so obvious, what is the status of his constant denegrations and disavowals of animal ek-sistence?) The problem lies instead with Heidegger's uncritical reliance on a logic of opposition in differentiating human beings from animals. Why does Heidegger repeatedly insist that man alone ek-sists? Could one not just as easily speak of ek-sistence without drawing single, insuperable lines between human and animal? Of course a less anthropocentric and more nuanced discussion of ek-sistence might still eventually give rise to certain distinctions and boundaries-but would these differences necessarily be essential, simple, oppositional, binary, and abyssal, and would they necessarily fall along a line dividing human from animal? Ultimately, despite his profound analysis of the limits of metaphysical humanism, Heidegger offers nothing in the way of critique concerning the metaphysical tradition's drawing of the oppositional line between human beings and animals; his final concern, rather, is with the way in which this oppositional line has been determined and understood. Heidegger thus says the "Same" as the humanist tradition-he too insists on an oppositional logic separating human from animal. The difference in Heidegger's repetition of the Same lies in his shifting of the opposition between human and animal onto another register. The essential difference between human and animal for Heidegger lies not merely in having language or reason but in the ground of these capacities: ek-sistence, which is reserved for the human alone. Thus, what we find in Heidegger's text when read from the perspective of the question of the animal is an effective challenge to metaphysical humanism (where man is determined according to a pre-established interpretation of the Being of beings) but, at the same time, a further sedimentation and reinforcement of the anthropocentrism of this same humanist tradition (in which the animal's Being is determined in strict binary opposition to and against the measure of the Being of the human). Anthropocentrism is not simply a matter of placing the human being in the center of beings (something Heidegger is keen to avoid); it is also the desire to determine human specificity over and against those beings who/that threaten to undermine that specificity. It is this problematic anthropocentric remnant that Heidegger has bequeathed to contemporary thought. In the following chapters, I will track this remnant of anthropocentrism as it gets taken up, refined, interrogated, and refigured in Levinas, Agamben, and Derrida.

### Nazism Turn

#### **Heidegger was a Nazi – anti-Semitic racism is inextricable from his most basic philosophy and politics – he associates Judaism with the evils of calculative thought and considers them less than animal.**

Brody 14 (Richard Brody, The New Yorker, “WHY DOES IT MATTER IF HEIDEGGER WAS ANTI-SEMITIC?”, 3/27/24, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/movies/2014/03/why-does-it-matter-if-heidegger-was-anti-semitic.html)

It’s not news that Heidegger (1889-1976) had more than a flirtation with Nazism. After becoming a Party member, in 1933, he was named rector of the University of Freiburg, and he praised the Party in his inaugural address. He resigned from the job the following year (though he remained in the Party). Even as a high-school philosophy buff, in the seventies, I knew of Heidegger’s enthusiasm from reading “An Introduction to Metaphysics,” from 1935, which contains a line of praise for National Socialism. When Victor Farias’s book “Heidegger and Nazism,” which amplified the historical record of Heidegger’s activities and public remarks during the time of the Third Reich, appeared, in 1987, it became, as Menand writes, a central topic of debate in the intellectual world for a time. It also gave rise to Jacques Derrida’s book “Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question,” which defends Heidegger by showing that the underpinnings of his philosophy—his vocabulary and his network of metaphors—were the same as those of the era’s ostensibly liberal thinkers. But early debate about “Black Notebooks” is focussed on Heidegger’s acknowledgment of the important role of anti-Semitism in his philosophy. Unlike de Man, whose anti-Semitic texts, written when de Man was in his early twenties, seemed mainly a matter of overweening careerism, Heidegger’s “Notebooks” are works of the full flowering of his philosophical maturity, written privately, as a means for him to work out his ideas. Heidegger has long been suspected of anti-Semitism in his private life, as well as of collaboration with an anti-Semitic regime, but, Trawny writes, “nobody would have suspected an anti-Semitism transmuted into philosophy.” (Trawny’s new book is titled “Heidegger and the Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy.”) According to Thomas Assheuer, writing in Die Zeit, “The Jew-hatred in ‘Black Notebooks’ is no afterthought; it forms the foundation of the philosophical diagnosis.” In other words, these newly published writings show that, for Heidegger, anti-Semitism was more than just a personal prejudice. In the Guardian, Philip Oltermann offers some choice passages: “World Judaism,” Heidegger writes in the notebooks, “is ungraspable everywhere and doesn’t need to get involved in military action while continuing to unfurl its influence, whereas we are left to sacrifice the best blood of the best of our people.” In another passage, the philosopher writes that the Jewish people, with their “talent for calculation,” were so vehemently opposed to the Nazi’s racial theories because “they themselves have lived according to the race principle for longest.” The French philosopher Emmanuel Faye picks up on one notably insidious term in the new publications: We know that [Heidegger] speaks in his “Black Notebooks” of the “worldlessness” of Judaism…. Jews aren’t just considered to lack a homeland, they are said definitively to be worldless. It’s worth recalling that worldlessness is an expression that Heidegger doesn’t even use for animals, which, in a 1929 lecture, he calls “world-poor.” In this complete dehumanization of Judaism, the Jews no longer have a place in the world, or, rather, they never had one. We also discover…that the Heideggerian idea of “being-in-the-world” which is central to “Being and Time” can take on the meaning of a discriminatory term with an anti-Semitic intent. Oltermann adds that Heidegger also “argues that like fascism and ‘world judaism,’ Soviet communism and British parliamentarianism should be seen as part of the imperious dehumanising drive of western modernity.” Yet, in the magazine Prospect, the philosopher Jonathan Rée attempts to defend Heidegger by minimizing the significance of this idea: “One of his arguments is that Judaism, like Bolshevism and Fascism, participates in the corrosive calculative culture of modernity, even though it goes back thousands of years.” This makes me wonder about Rée as well: Isn’t it a priori anti-Semitic to consider Judaism “corrosive”? And wouldn’t that idea, as Oltermann suggests, place anti-Semitism at the core of Heidegger’s philosophical conception of history? So the discussion has begun. But the underlying question is: Why the ongoing fascination with deconstructionism and with the work of the philosopher whose radical works inspired it? Why does this philosophical strain seem strangely central to the conception of modern criticism, even as it recedes in influence? And why do these thinkers’ personal lives and ideological compromises seem unusually relevant to their work, beyond the usual scandal-sheet Schadenfreude? It may have something to do with their distinctive views regarding the relevance (or, rather, irrelevance) of character and personality to the objects of their study. Menand offers a crucial insight in his Critic at Large piece on de Man, explaining that deconstructionism offered a sort of nuclear physics of literature: It generated intellectual power by bracketing off most of what might be called (with due acknowledgment of the constructed nature of the concept) the real-life aspects of literature—that literature is written by people, that it affects people, that it is a report on experience. But it was exciting to get inside the atom. The crucial difference is that, when a physicist splits atoms, they’re not the atoms of the chair that he’s sitting on or of the equipment that he’s splitting them with. Deconstruction pulls the chair out from under the reader, compels the reader to undermine his own habits of reading. By dissolving the overt categories of reading—plot, story, style, character, moral—deconstruction wrenched literature away from the amateurs and delivered it to the sole care of academics, who alone had the tools with which to approach it. Thus, it transformed the academic study of literature from a marginal scholarly apparatus of footnotes to the only game in town, thereby turning traditional readers into spectators. Deconstruction is a reflexive philosophy: it makes the very notion of literary analysis a self-revealing, self-questioning, quasi-poetic creation, undoing the traditional hierarchy by which the literary critic is the handmaiden of the creative writer. This philosophy doesn’t merely study the art of writing, it fuses with the art; instead of depersonalizing literary criticism into a quasi-scientific activity, it turns the literary critic into a self-defined peer of the novelist and the poet. (Similarly, Roland Barthes’s famous “death of the author” was actually the birth of a new author; namely, the critic who proclaimed that death.) Heidegger happens to have been—a blessing and a curse—a brilliant writer, whose serpentine, spellbinding prose was both an argument against the traditional authority of logical reasoning and a performative undermining of that authority. (De Man, by contrast, is a rather dully mechanical writer; when I read his books in college, I found it strange that his influence should have survived his prose.) But, even without particular regard to Jews and Nazis, Heidegger’s brilliance was intrinsically political. For Heidegger, the project of rescuing language from the ostensible truth of logic and restoring it to iridescent incantation implied kicking out the intellectual struts from under the claims to progress on the part of technological society. By undermining logic and science, Heidegger also undermined the Enlightenment—and the individualism, the freedoms, the claim to rights that are made in the name of reason and progress. Even apart from his specific ideological pronouncements, Heidegger was, philosophically, an anti-humanist rightist.

#### Heidegger’s Nazism turns the K – rejection of democratic values and anti-Semitism subordinates real human beings to an abstract concept of Being.

Rockmore 97 (Tom, Professor of Philosophy @ Duquesne University, “On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy”, Heidegger’s Nazism and the Limits of His Philosophy, p. 292, 1997)

The problem posed by Nazism is a human problem in the most basic meaning of the term "human." It is widely known that Nazism posed a decisive threat to values, to human beings, to the democratic form of life, to the idea of human and racial equality, to concepts of mutual tolerance—in short, was a menace to the small advances of human beings concerned to realize, as Hegel put it, the idea of freedom. Heidegger either could not understand or was unconcerned with the problem posed by Nazism to human beings since he consistently offered the main role to Being. Heidegger's philosophy is rooted in his antihumanistic subordination of human being to Being, to which he subordinated his own entire life, and to which his students on occasion seem willing to subordinate themselves and others in the increasingly unavailing effort to excuse Heidegger the philosopher and sometimes even Heidegger the man. Heidegger's understanding of the problem of Being required him to reject values and anything linked to value as incompatible with thought in the deepest sense, which is limited to contemplation of the idea of Being. According to Heidegger, any concept of value is inextricably linked to the philosophies of the worldview which are philosophy in name only, since they fall below the genuine thought necessary to think Being.